Relational Investors Boosts Stake in Unum Group (UNM) to 8.55%

In an amended 13D filing after the close on Unum Group (NYSE: UNM), Relational Investors disclosed they raised thier stake in the company to 8.55% (29.3M shares). This is up from the 7.49% stake (25.7 million shares) the firm disclosed in an May 13D/A filing.

In the original 13D filing, Relational Investors said they believe that several major factors have contributed to the Shares' undervaluation and underperformance including the Company's history of: (i) repeated, significant, one-time reserve and settlement charges against reported earnings, (ii) poor operating results and (iii) poor forecasting. Relational said it intend to closely monitor the management's progress toward achieving the Company’s 2007-2008 performance targets.

Pardus Enters Confidentiality Agreement With Bally Total Fitness (BFTH)

In an amended 13D filing on Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. (OTC: BFTH) 14.8% holder Pardus disclosed that on May 30, 2007, the Fund and the Company entered into a confidentiality agreement pursuant to which, among other things, the Company may make available to the Fund and its representatives certain non-public information about the Company for the purpose of evaluating and negotiating a possible restructuring of the Company.

Clinton Group Proposes $25/Share Recapitalization of Griffon (GFF)

In an amended 13D filing on Griffon Corp. (NYSE: GFF) this morning, 8.5% holder Clinton Group delivered a letter to the company proposing a $25.00 per share public recapitalization where up to 50% of the outstanding shares would be purchased through a tender offer.

Clinton Group said they have not received a meaningful response from the company with respect to the proposal.

The firm said, "Based on our analysis of comparable companies, it seems that the cost structure of Griffon can be reduced dramatically. If significant annual cost savings are outlined and a plan is undertaken by the restructuring firm to realize such savings in the near-term, then we believe the stock of Griffon should trade well north of the $25 tender price and offer significant long-term upside. For example, using a conservative 15x P/E multiple on a tax effected $20 million of savings divided by a share count reduced by 43% (through the recapitalization and Clinton Group's incremental equity investment) YIELDS IN EXCESS OF $9.00 PER SHARE OF INCREMENTAL VALUE."

A Copy of the Letter:

To Griffon Board Members:

We have recently attempted to discuss with management and its advisors anoutline of a PROPOSED $25.00 PER SHARE PUBLIC RECAPITALIZATION of GriffonCorporation ("Griffon" or the "Company"). Unfortunately, to date, we have notreceived a meaningful response with respect to the proposal. Therefore, we wouldlike to outline our transaction to the Board of Directors with the hope that wewill ultimately receive a favorable response to our proposal. We wouldappreciate a response within two weeks so that we can expeditiously finalize ourdue diligence with respect to arranging financing as well as appropriatelyaddressing structural issues with the Company.

We propose a $25.00 per share public recapitalization, led by Clinton GroupInc., where up to 50% of shares outstanding are purchased through a tenderoffer. Each existing shareholder would be entitled to have a minimum of 50% oftheir current holdings purchased if proration is required.

The sources of financing for the recapitalization are expected to be as follows:

- $395 million 1st lien bank financing
- $130 million 2nd lien bank financing
- Approximately $65 million incremental capital from Clinton Group, or its affiliates and co-investors.

At less than 5.0x total debt to EBITDA, we believe this is a reasonable andflexible debt financing proposal for the Company. We have been in discussionswith several major financial institutions regarding the debt financing, andbelieve this financing to be easily obtainable. Compared to relevant corporaterefinancing and leveraged buyout transactions in the current marketplace, thiscapital structure is actually conservative.

The proposal is contingent on:

- Clinton Group initially appointing a majority of the directors to the board, who will be subject to annual elections thereafter;

- Adoption of the governance modifications articulated in our previous letter, including board declassification, to be implemented for the benefit of all shareholders;

- Mr. Blau to be designated Non-Executive Chairman with any associated change of control payments deferred until he no longer remains a member of the Board of Directors;

- Engagement of a restructuring firm to manage the Company on an interim basis focusing on cost reductions related to corporate overhead, segment SG&A, manufacturing, distribution, product sourcing, product rationalization and other areas designed to greatly improve the profitability of Griffon's businesses. We have been in contact with a firm who is willing to commence this engagement on an expedited basis;

- Completion of due diligence, and funding, by major financial institutions with whom we have had discussions regarding financing terms and structure; and

- Equity incentive plans created for the management teams of the individual subsidiaries.

We believe that undergoing a levered recapitalization by utilizing the strengthof the Company's balance sheet, coupled with executing a turnaround in Griffon'sstruggling business segments and rationalization of corporate overhead, willultimately create tremendous value on a per share basis over the long-term.

Offering both attractive rates and favorable terms, the current debt financingmarkets further suggest that now is the opportune time to employ leverage toreduce the Company's cost of capital while executing on a strategy that willprovide existing shareholders with partial monetization of their shares at apremium to today's market price and the upside in Griffon's "turnaround."

Based on our analysis of comparable companies, it seems that the cost structureof Griffon can be reduced dramatically. If significant annual cost savings areoutlined and a plan is undertaken by the restructuring firm to realize suchsavings in the near-term, then we believe the stock of Griffon should trade wellnorth of the $25 tender price and offer significant long-term upside. Forexample, using a conservative 15x P/E multiple on a tax effected $20 million ofsavings divided by a share count reduced by 43% (through the recapitalizationand Clinton Group's incremental equity investment) YIELDS IN EXCESS OF $9.00 PERSHARE OF INCREMENTAL VALUE.

We look forward to hearing your response to our proposal and meeting withmembers of the board and its advisors to discuss our proposal in detail.

Clinton Group Inc.
Conrad Bringsjord

Riley Investment Wants ESS Technology (ESST) Liquidated

In a 13D filing after the close on ESS Technology Inc. (Nasdaq: ESST), Riley Investment Management (RIM) discloses a 1.3 million share stake in the company.

RIM believes that the shares are undervalued and that the current restructuring should be expedited with the ultimate resolution of a liquidation of the company. RIM believes that a liquidation of the company could result in a 100% appreciation of ESST shares, however that value deteriorates every day the company functions in its current structure.

RIM believes that the current operating model is flawed, will lead to continued shareholder deterioration and that the Board of Directors’ oversight has not been in shareholders’ interests. RIM is also concerned that the company may make an acquisition that will further deteriorate the remaining equity value. RIM said it has attempted to communicate these concerns with the company and will more fully describe their position in a letter to the Board in the next 48 hours. RIM will consider all options including nominating a new Board or tendering in the open market for more shares.

Breeden Capital Accumulates 9.71% Stake in ACCO Brands (ABD)

In a 13D filing on ACCO Brands Corporation (NYSE: ABD), Breeden Capital disclosed a 9.71% stake (5.24 million shares). This is up from the 392,500 share stake the firm disclosed at the quarter ended March 31, 2007.

The firm said it intends to continuously review the investment but said at this time they do not have any present plans or proposals that relate to or would result in any of the actions specified in clauses (a) through (j) of the instructions to Item 4 of Schedule 13D.

Breeden Capital, run by former SEC-chief Richard Breeden, recently targeted Applebee's (Nasdaq: APPB), winning a board seat and pushing for a strategic review, which the company said has yielded several non-binding, preliminary proposals to acquire the company.

ACCO Brands is a leader in select categories of branded office products. The company's brands include Day-Timer, Swingline, Kensington, Quartet, GBC, Rexel, and Wilson Jones, among others.

Chapman Capital Discloses 7.4% Stake in Building Materials (BLG), Urges Sale

In a 13D filing after the close Friday on Building Materials Holding (NYSE: BLG), Chapman Capital disclosed a 7.4% stake in the company and recommended the company engage financial advisors to explore the complete or divisional sale of the Company.

Chapman Capital's Robert L. Chapman, Jr. said, "Having recently made personal contact with BMHC’s peers and leveraged consolidators of the building supply industry, I can convey an extremely high level of interest from both private equity and strategic building supply players in the acquisition of the Company."

Chapman concluded, "it was with much appreciation that Chapman Capital has become familiar with you and other senior management of BMHC. Moreover, I was gratified to discover during our meeting earlier this week the tight compatibility between Chapman Capital’s strategic goals for the Company and those of you, Mr. Smartt and apparently BMHC’s Board. The stock market is ascribing virtually no value to SelectBuild, making it imperative that BMHC management and the Board rectify this deficiency both via operating margin improvement and subsequent change-of-control premium offered for BMHC or its divisions by financial or strategic acquirers. Given Lehman Brothers’ current engagement to maximize the value of HD Supply, we strongly recommend that the Board engage it or an equally qualified advisor to begin discussions with prospective acquirers in earnest."

A Copy of the Letter:

Dear Mr. Mellor (and the BMHC Board of Directors):

Chap-Cap Partners II and Chap-Cap Activist Partners (the “Chapman Funds”), advised by Chapman Capital L.L.C., own approximately 2.2 million common shares, or just over 7.4%, of Building Materials Holding Corporation (“BMHC”, the “Company”). To put this ownership stake (the “Chapman Ownership Stake”) into perspective, the Chapman Funds’ financial interest in BMHC now exceeds that of the entirety of BMHC’s management and Board of Directors (“the Board”; together, the “Insiders”) by a nearly four-to-one ratio.11 At the risk of implying that this statistic on its own is not reason for concern, even more disconcerting is our estimation that nearly 100% of the Insider Stake was granted free of cost to the Insiders, and is residual of the exercise-and-sale of free stock option grants that have flooded your personal coffers with millions of dollars in the last six months alone.12 This followed Mr. Mellor being San Francisco’s own “$6 Million Man” in 2006, with his total compensation coming in at a whopping $6,236,182.13 The balance of BMHC’s senior management team also seems to have a disconnect between stock ownership and compensation, with Chief Financial Officer William M. Smartt hitting $2,201,114 in 2006 total compensation despite his mere 20,000 BMHC share ownership, SelectBuild CEO Michael D. Mahre stacking up $2,696,251 despite his small 22,000 BMHC share stake, BMC West CEO Stanley M. Wilson adding $2,199,728 despite his 45,234 BMHC shareholding, and General Counsel Paul S. Street accumulating $1,676,489 despite 82,944 of BMHC share ownership.14

Despite this asymmetry, it is our sincere intention for this initial written communication with you and the balance of the Board to be considered amicable and productive, rather than invective or, as past activist targets have claimed, viscerally scurrilous. Uncharacteristically, Chapman Capital is not taking this approach because May flowers have intoxicated me with unalloyed happiness or inexplicable tolerance for excessive “agency issues” in BMHC’s corporate governance. Instead, our behavior is the direct response to your responsible, accountable, fiduciary-duty cognizant reception to Chapman Capital’s initial accosting of, and ensuing dialog with, you and Mr. Smartt. In fact, you could provide a public service by calling and educating the corporate cretins in respective management and director positions at Entertainment Distribution Company/EDCI (Clarke H. Bailey - (212) 333-8478; and James M. Caparro - (917) 974-4061), Vitesse Semiconductor (James A. (Hole)/Cole - (805) 497-3222) and FSI International (Donald S. Mitchell - (858) 759-7783; and Benno G. Sand - (612) 840-5702). Hopefully, this letter will be viewed as yet another in a steady stream of constructive communications, the aim of which is to remedy the undervaluation of BMHC due in large part to its bloated cost structure and depressed operating margins within its SelectBuild construction services division (“SelectBuild”).

Nobody can blame BMHC’s management team for the steep correction of the U.S. homebuilding market, though the Board’s granting you generous financial rewards during its 2004-2006 boom years should not be ignored. Boom or bust, shallow or deep, the ups and downs of the homebuilding industry unfortunately are out your control (as compared to the self-inflicted shareholder immolation of the EDC/Vitesse/FSI miscreants named above). Auspiciously, sales of new homes rose 16% last month as homebuilder price concessions enticed buyers with a shot at median home prices down nearly 11%.15 Thus, it appears that the clearance of excess regional home inventory (the creation of which benefited BMHC by essentially pulling revenues from 2007-2008 into prior years) can be catalyzed with “couponing” and other marketing techniques designed to capitalize on the elastic nature of your customers’ newly built homes.

Though stipulating that homebuilding cycles are beyond BMHC’s control, corporate and divisional overhead can be restrained by a realistic, practical management team. In a market where U.S. single family building permits (the industry’s standard 30-day leading indicator) are falling nearly 30% year/year,16 BMHC must take drastic action to rationalize its expense base to fit today’s reduced base level of homebuilding. This is especially true given that BMHC’s outsized exposure to boom/bust markets (such as San Diego and Phoenix) have experienced single family building permit declines approaching 40% in recent months.17 Simply stated, intense focus is required immediately on SG&A expense reduction in Mike Mahre’s SelectBuild division in order to navigate effectively this cyclical downturn. Moreover, in order to regain a more favorable public market valuation, BMHC must demonstrate that it can stabilize operating margins and cash flow despite prospectively sustained weak housing conditions. SelectBuild has invested an estimated $700 million into 17 acquisitions and five greenfield operations over the past five years;18 accordingly, there is no reason that its estimated real-time $1.3-1.4 billion in revenues should not receive a minimum valuation of 50% of such sales,19 which happens to coincide with its $700 million “cost basis.”

Chapman Capital, on behalf of what it believes is a significant percentage of BMHC’s owners, strongly recommends that the Company engage financial advisors to explore the complete or divisional sale of the Company. The building materials sector arguably is in the third or fourth inning of a consolidation wave, somewhat akin to where SelectBuild’s primary customers, the national homebuilders, found themselves a decade ago. To proclaim that the $400 billion building supply sector is undergoing consolidation would be a masterpiece of understatement. HD Supply, Home Depot, Inc.’s professional building supply subsidiary that a) in 2006 engaged in M&A estimated at $4.4 billion20 spread over one dozen targets,21 and b) is in the final stages of being consolidated itself for an estimated $9-11 billion.22 Even Masco Corporation, the $12 billion (in market capitalization and revenues) manufacturer and marketer of home improvement and building products, recently exhibited appreciation for the advantages of vertical integration within the building materials supply chain.23 Having recently made personal contact with BMHC’s peers and leveraged consolidators of the building supply industry, I can convey an extremely high level of interest from both private equity24 and strategic building supply players in the acquisition of the Company. Chapman Capital recognizes the unique value of BMHC’s assets, the years and efforts required to assemble and integrate them. As a result, we are not encouraging an inopportune, undervalued sale, but instead a methodical auction timed to consummate into the inevitable cyclical recovery.

In conclusion, it was with much appreciation that Chapman Capital has become familiar with you and other senior management of BMHC. Moreover, I was gratified to discover during our meeting earlier this week the tight compatibility between Chapman Capital’s strategic goals for the Company and those of you, Mr. Smartt and apparently BMHC’s Board. The stock market is ascribing virtually no value to SelectBuild, making it imperative that BMHC management and the Board rectify this deficiency both via operating margin improvement and subsequent change-of-control premium offered for BMHC or its divisions by financial or strategic acquirers. Given Lehman Brothers’ current engagement to maximize the value of HD Supply, we strongly recommend that the Board engage it or an equally qualified advisor to begin discussions with prospective acquirers in earnest.

Sincerely,

Robert L. Chapman, Jr.

Footnotes:

1 Robert E. Mellor ownership stake: precisely 254,370 (vs.154,354 year/year) shares per BMHC 2007 Proxy Statement. Total outstanding share count of 29,170,793 as of March 7, 2007.
2 Sara L. Beckman ownership stake: precisely 18,653 (vs. 16,890 year/year) shares per BMHC 2007 Proxy Statement.
3 Eric S. Belsky ownership stake: precisely 1,519 (vs. 0 year/year) shares per BMHC 2007 Proxy Statement.
4 James K. Jennings, Jr. ownership stake: precisely 17,100 (vs. 15,600 year/year) shares per BMHC 2007 Proxy Statement.
5 Norman J. Metcalfe ownership stake: precisely 7,519 (vs. 3,000 year/year) shares per BMHC 2007 Proxy Statement.
6 David M. Moffett ownership stake: precisely 1,500 (vs. 0 year/year) shares per BMHC 2007 Proxy Statement.
7 R. Scott Morrison, Jr. ownership stake: precisely 26,700 (vs. 24,200 year/year) shares per BMHC 2007 Proxy Statement.
8 Peter S. O’Neill ownership stake: precisely 41,996 (vs. 40,180 year/year) shares per BMHC 2007 Proxy Statement.
9 Richard G. Reiten ownership stake: precisely 32,809 (vs. 28,454 year/year) shares per BMHC 2007 Proxy Statement.
10 Norman R. Walker ownership stake: precisely 0 (vs. NA year/year) shares per BMHC 2007 Proxy Statement.

11 The Chapman Funds owned 2,189,239 as of May 24, 2007 vs. “the Insider Stake” of 572,344 shares (or 2% of the shares outstanding) owned by BMHC management and the Board as of March 7, 2007 (Source: BMHC 2007 Proxy Statement, dated April 2, 2007).
12 Mr. Mellor sold 71,491 and 28,509 BMHC shares at approximately $26/share November 17-21, 2007 for a total of $2,605,393.
13 Source: BMHC 2007 Proxy Statement.
14 Ibid.
15 The U.S. Census Bureau reported that sales of newly constructed homes rose 16.2% in April 2007 to a seasonally adjusted annual rate of 981,000 homes, the largest monthly gain in 14 years.

16 U.S. single family building permits declined 28% in March 2007 (over 2006 levels) to an annual pace of 1.1 million.
17 BMHC’s regional markets experienced a single family building permit decline of 37% (vs. a 31% national rate decline) in the three months ending February 2007.
18 SelectBuild transaction highlights include the following (Target Revenue/Acquisition Price/Acquisition Date): 27% interest in Riggs Plumbing (N/A, $10.5MM, 3/28/2007), Willis Roof Consulting ($90.0MM, N/A, 06/30/06), Davis Brothers ($110.0MM, $43.3MM, 8/1/2006), Azteca (N/A, $1.5MM, 4/1/2006), Boulder's West (N/A, $6.7MM, 4/1/2006), Benedeti Construction ($145.0MM, N/A, 1/11/2006), MWB Building Contractors ($80.0MM, $57.1MM, 1/11/2006), 20% stake in WBC Construction (N/A, $31.4MM, 1/1/2006), HnR Framing & Home Building Components ($140.0MM, $72.6MM, 10/18/2005), Campbell Companies ($200.0MM, $85.6MM, 8/31/2005), Gypsum Construction (N/A, $5.9MM, 9/1/2005), 20% stake in WBC Construction (N/A, $24.8MM, 8/1/2005), 51% interest in BBP Companies ($100.0MM, $10.4MM, 7/1/2005), 73% interest in Riggs Plumbing (N/A, $19.2MM, 4/19/2005), 51% interest in RCI Construction (N/A, $4.9MM, 1/27/2005), 51% Interest in A-1 Building Components (N/A, $2.3MM, 9/1/2004), 49% interest in KBI Norcal (N/A, $14.0MM, 8/9/2004), 67% Interest in WBC Mid-Atlantic (N/A, $5.1MM, 10/1/2003), BMC West (N/A, $5.1MM, 6/1/2006), 60% stake in WBC Construction (N/A, $24.0 MM, 1/1/2003), and 51% interest in KBI Norcal (N/A, $7.1MM, 6/24/2002).
19 Valuation Assumptions (Chapman Capital research): 14-20% (cycle trough-peak) gross margins reduced by 6-10% (cycle peak-trough) SG&A loads, capitalized at 16-17% ROI.

20 HD Supply doubled in size with its $3.5 billion acquisition of Hughes Supply Inc. in January 2006.
21 HD Supply reportedly has expended approximately $8 billion buying the estimated 39 companies in its composition, in an effort to leverage Home Depot’s $70 billion supply chain.
22 Home Depot reportedly has retained Lehman Brothers, Inc. to conduct a strategic review of HD Supply, including its sale in part or entirety.
23 Masco acquired on May 1, 2007, Erickson Construction Company (turnkey framer) and Guy Evans, Inc. (millwork, interior and exterior door, window and bath hardware installer) for an estimated .8-1.0 times a combined $200 million in anticipated 2007 revenues, roughly in line with the valuation placed on Masco 2001 acquisition BSI Holdings. In 2002, Masco acquired Service Partners LLC (insulation installer) and other smaller businesses for $1.2 billion.
24 Leonard Green & Partners, L.P. reportedly gained 2.5 times its $88 million investment for a 60% stake in White Cap Construction Supply Inc. upon its acquisition by Home Depot in 2004; Warburg Pincus, LLC and its affiliate JLL Partners are the private equity backers to Builders FirstSource, Inc. (Nasdaq: BLDR), having a 50% combined ownership stake as of March 27, 2007.

Bradley Pharmaceuticals (BDY) CEO Offers to Acquire Company for $21.50/Sh

In a 13D filing this morning on Bradley Pharmaceuticals Inc. (NYSE: BDY), President and CEO Daniel Glassman submitted a proposal to acquire all of the outstanding equity at a cash purchase price of $21.50 per share.

Shares of BDY closed at $18.44 on Friday.

Bradley Pharmaceuticals confirmed the receipt of the bid and said they have formed a special committee to review the offer as well as other strategic alternatives.

Ditech Networks (DITC) Holder Riley Investment Management Requests Dutch Tender Auction

In a 13D filing on Ditech Networks, Inc. (Nasdaq: DITC), 5.8% holder Riley Investment Management discloseed a letter to the company expressing its concerns about the company's performance. The firm said due to the excessive cash on the balance sheet and improved financial condition, they suggested that the company should return at least $100 million to its shareholders through a dutch tender auction at a price between $9 and $11.

The firm said if the company was unable to purchase the requisite number of shares, they suggested that the remaining cash should be returned to shareholders via a dividend. The firm also stated that it may seek representation to the Board of Directors.

A Copy of the Letter:

Dear Sirs:

Riley Investment Management has been a shareholder intermittently for the last six years and currently owns or has beneficial ownership of approximately 5.8% of Ditech’s common stock. We are writing you to express our view regarding the most efficient way to return value to your shareholders. We believe our view is prevalent in the financial community.

Since your public offering in June 1999, Ditech has accumulated losses of over $80 million. During this time the Company has spent over $110 million in stock and cash on acquisitions and invested $188 million in R & D. The current enterprise value of approximately $140 million ($114 million if you present value the Company’s N.O.L. carry forward) suggests a high degree of investor skepticism towards Ditech as a profitable investment. This skepticism has been well earned. Historically, the Company has chosen to hoard its cash, has diluted its shareholders and has consistently disappointed its investors. The fact that 3.7 million of the approximately 4.0 million shares of stock owned by Company insiders consists of options is particularly disconcerting. As investors have paid real dollars and lost real money, management and the Board have collected fees and salaries, issued options and sold stock. In particular, we believe that the $135 million in cash on the balance sheet the Company has maintained is inappropriate and detrimental to the creation of shareholder value.

However, over the last six months we have become more encouraged about Ditech’s business fundamentals and believe the Company is well positioned for consistent, strong cash flow and operating profit as its customer base increasingly diversifies. In fact, our analysis suggests that Ditech could be at an EBITDA run rate of $25 million in the next couple of quarters and possibly up to $35 million in the near future with continued customer wins (specifically a third domestic carrier that the Company has indicated it may close).

Given the Company’s excessive cash and improved financial condition, we believe that the Company would go a long way to reestablishing credibility with investors by immediately conducting a dutch tender auction and/or dividend that will result in a return of at least $100 million to shareholders. Specifically, the tender price per share should be between $9 and $11. If the Company is unable to purchase this amount of shares, then the remaining cash should be returned to shareholders via a dividend. After the tender or dividend, the Company would still be in an enviable position of having over $40 million in cash while potentially generating $20 to $35 million per year in free cash flow. We believe this is a reasonable course of action. The Company’s argument that it “needs” to have $100 million in cash on the balance sheet to market to its customer base in our opinion does not hold water. Ditech has been around now for enough years and generates enough cash that in our opinion carriers will be more than comfortable with our proposed balance sheet. In fact, one could clearly argue for a larger return of cash given our belief in the Company’s ability to generate cash going forward.

At the high end of the dutch tender auction range, the Company’s enterprise value would be $165 million. Before the April quarter, which is considered an aberration because of the Company’s international results, Ditech had been generating between $3.7 and $2.9 million in EBITDA per quarter for the last three quarters. Just annualizing those numbers results in approximately $12 million in free cash flow. Accordingly, at a tender price of $11 per share, the Company would be purchasing the shares at a free cash flow yield of 7.3%, higher than the interest rate the Company is earning on its cash. However, if our analysis proves to be correct and the Company’s free cash flow rises to $20 to 35 million, the Company would be buying the stock at a free cash flow yield of 12.1% to 21.2%, respectively—clearly a much better investment than cash. From an earnings perspective, with a self-tender, if EBITDA is $25 million, earnings per share would increase to approximately $0.63 from $0.56, and at $35 million EBITDA, earnings per share would increase to $1.02 from $0.95. From a non-GAAP perspective, which we believe is the preferable focus, this transaction would be accretive even at $16 million in EBITDA.

As stated above, we believe an EBITDA of $25 to $35 million is a reasonable projection. The Company has publicly stated that its operating model calls for operating profit of 20% to 30%. This is higher than the Company’s more recent non-GAAP profit margins of 12%. However, we believe that Ditech’s operating model is highly leveragable and that the majority of incremental gross profit will fall directly to the bottom line. Given 70% gross margins and roughly $45 million in annual cash operating expenses, it is easy to see that quarterly revenues need only approach $23 million for Ditech to garner 21% EBIT margins—not to mention $5 million in quarterly free cash flow. Accordingly, we concur that the Company’s target operating model is achievable as revenues increase, and believe further that the Company should be able to generate substantial free cash flow as Ditech’s revenue approaches $30 million per quarter.

In this regard, we believe that generating $30 million in quarterly revenues is achievable in the near future. The following sets forth our assumptions in our model for the Company’s revenue:

- $14 million quarterly revenue contribution from Verizon, the Company’s largest customer. This is reasonable considering that Verizon has been averaging $13.5 million per quarter in revenues over the last twelve months ($15 million in the most recent quarter), which is up almost 20% from the preceding 12-month average.

- $6 million quarterly revenue from the Company’s international business. Our assumption is even more conservative than the Company’s projections. Ditech’s international business has averaged $7.3 million per quarter year-to-date before its announcement that 4th quarter revenues would be approximately $2.5 million due to a delay in negotiation agreements in closing transactions. The Company has suggested that international business should bounce back in the June quarter, but our sense is that it should be closer to a $6 million revenue run rate per quarter.

- $2 million quarterly revenue from the Company’s PVP business. The Company’s PVP business has been slower than anticipated, but the Company has characterized this opportunity as having “tremendous upside” and that activity levels around this product set has been “tremendous.”

- $8 million quarterly revenue from new customers. Using existing numbers, the Company already has a $22 million run rate before any new carriers. The Company has indicated “some real optimism about being able to close the third” large, domestic wireless carrier in a recent conference call. When asked on the conference call if the new domestic customer could be as big as Verizon you said the following “…we could certainly see the opportunity ending up at that level. I’m not prognosticating that today, but we’re really excited.” Given our assumptions above, for Ditech to achieve quarterly revenues of $30 million, the new carrier would need only to generate $8 million per quarter--approximately 60% of Verizon. This seems achievable if not conservative.

Our analysis does not address operating expenses, to which we do not have detailed access. However, history has shown that when an existing long-term CEO leaves, expenses are typically reduced. We would suggest to the new CEO a full analysis of services and expenses. One example would be to replace PWC with a regional auditor. We have found this typically to reduce costs by at least 40%, which in the case of the Company would result in a savings of approximately $250,000.

It is possible that our analysis of the Company’s business is overly optimistic. Even if this were in fact the case, the Company’s decision would be simple – dividend out at least $100 million in cash in a special dividend to shareholders, representing $3 per share.

Ditech is at a critical juncture in its history. In 1999, shareholders entrusted the Company with over $75 million in cash through an IPO at $11 per share and a secondary at $51.50 per share. While insiders and VC investors took this opportunity to sell over $75 million of stock in the secondary and subsequently more through open market sales, investors have seen their shares decline 84% in eight years. Now, the Company’s fundamentals appear to be improving and the Company has the opportunity to bring on a new CEO that understands and is committed to shareholder value and is cognizant of the shareholder base. He or she must realize that the dollars on the balance sheet are those of shareholders and must not think that accepting a position at Ditech is akin to receiving carte blanche with these dollars. We believe it is time to enhance shareholder value by returning cash to your shareholders.

We look forward to discussing this possibility and our other thoughts to increase shareholder value with the Board in the near future. Moreover, we may seek representation on the Company’s Board. We have appointed directors to over 12 boards in the last three years and have had a high success rate in recognizing shareholder value through our contributions on various boards.

Sincerely,

Bryant Riley, Managing Member

Loeb's Third Point LLC Lowers Stake in Acorda (ACOR) to 4.1%

In an amended 13D filing on Acorda Therapeutics (Nasdaq: ACOR), Daniel Loeb's Third Point LLC disclosed they lowered their stake in the company to 4.1% (1 million shares), down from 9.9%.

In his original 13D filing, Loeb requested that Acorda's Board of Directors retain an investment bank and pursue a process to sell the Company.

Knightspoint Partners Raises Stake in Sharper Image (SHRP) to 21.1

In an amended 13D filing on Sharper Image Corp. (Nasdaq: SHRP), Knightspoint Partners disclosed a 21.1% stake in the company. This is up from the 13.7% stake the firm disclosed in a past filing.

From the 'Purpose of Transaction' section of the filing:

"The Reporting Persons may in the future take such actions with respect to their investment in the Issuer as they deem appropriate including, without limitation, seeking additional Board representation, making proposals to the Issuer concerning changes to the capitalization, ownership structure or operations of the Issuer, and, subject to compliance with applicable securities laws, purchasing additional Shares, selling some or all of their Shares, engaging in short selling of or any hedging or similar transaction with respect to the Shares or changing their intention with respect to any and all matters referred to in Item 4."

Earlier today, Sun Capital doubled their stake in Sharper Image to 19.8%

Elliott Associates Wants Packeteer (PKTR) To Entertain a Sale of the Company

In a 13D filing on Packeteer, Inc. (Nasdaq: PKTR), Elliott Associates and related funds disclosed a 6.3% stake in the company and said on May 18th they communicated to the company's Board of Directors their belief that the Board should be directing its attention to a prompt sale of the company.

From the Purpose of Transaction section of the filing:

The Reporting Persons expressed to the Board their views that: i) the Issuer has leading technology in one of the fastest growing segments of the networking market, but has proven unable to capitalize on such technology; ii) the business segment in which the Issuer operates is becoming increasingly competitive; and iii) the Issuer’s technology may prove extremely valuable to a larger acquirer looking to enter the wide area network optimization market or to supplement its current product offering. The Reporting Persons believe that prompt action by the Board to commence a sales process is necessary.

Sun Capital Doubles Stake in Sharper Image (SHRP)

In an amended 13D filing on Sharper Image (Nasdaq: SHRP), SCSF Equities (Sun Capital) disclosed they raised their stake in the company to 19.8% (2.96M shares). The firm held 1.47 million Sharper Image shares as of the quarter ended March 31, 2007.

The firm disclosed, "Pursuant to a purchase agreement dated May 16, 2007, between SCSF Equities and Richard Thalheimer Revocable Trust Established 3/6/89, SCSF Equities purchased 1,490,000 shares of Common Stock on May 23, 2007 directly from the Thalheimer Trust, at a purchase price of $9.25 per share, in a private transaction that was unanimously approved by the disinterested members of the Issuer’s Board of Directors."

Pirate Capital Lowers Their Stake in GenCorp (GY) to 6.8%

In an amended 13D filing after the close on GenCorp Inc. (NYSE: GY), Pirate Capital disclosed they lowered their stake in the company to 3,827,600 shares (6.8%). The firm held 5,061,000 GenCorp shares at the quarter ended March 31, 2007.

Loeb's Third Point Want PDL BioPharma (PDLI) Chairman Removed

In an amended 13D filing on PDL BioPharma Inc. (Nasdaq: PDLI), 9.8% Daniel Loeb's Third Point LLC disclosed a new letter to the company demanding that Dr. Gage be removed as Chairman of the Board and that Jeanmarie Guenot be dismissed as PDLI's head of business development.

In the past, Third Point demanded the company terminate CEO Mark McDade, add three shareholder representatives to the PDLI Board and retain an investment bank to explore strategic alternatives for the Company.

Chapman Capital Lowers Stake in eSpeed (ESPD) to 6%

In an amended 13D filing on eSpeed, Inc. (Nasdaq: ESPD), Chapman Capital disclosed a 6% stake in the company. This is down from the 8.1% stake the firm disclosed in a May 11th 13D/A filing.

Chapman has been pushing the company to sell. In April, the company's controlling stockholder, Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P., rejected a $12.00/share acquisition proposal from Tullett Prebon Plc.

Kerkorian's Tracinda in Talks with MGM MIRAGE (MGM) to purchase the Bellagio, City Center; Also To Pursue Strategic Aternative Related to MGM

In an amended 13D filing on MGM Mirage (NYSE: MGM), Kirk Kerkorian's Tracinda Corp, a 56% holder, announced that it intends to enter into negotiations with MGM MIRAGE to purchase the Bellagio Hotel and Casino and City Center properties.

Tracinda also wishes to pursue strategic alternatives with respect to its investment in MGM MIRAGE which may include financial restructuring transactions involving all or a substantial portion of the remainder of the Company. Tracinda has made no decision with respect to any such restructuring transactions and reserves the right not to engage in or approve any transaction.

Major Middle East Cement Player Sawiris Discloses 9.9% Stake in Texas Industries (TXI)

In an amended 13D filing on Texas Industries (NYSE: TXI), Nassef Sawiris/NNS Holding disclosed a 9.9% stake in the company.

In the filing the firm said, "The Reporting Persons intend to actively monitor efforts by management to increase stockholder value. The Reporting Persons may also decide in the future to propose a transaction whereby all or a portion of the Issuer be sold, and in connection therewith the Reporting Persons may seek to participate in such transaction or seek to acquire control of the Issuer in a negotiated transaction or otherwise. If the Reporting Persons should acquire control of the Issuer, they may transfer all or part of their holdings to affiliated or unaffiliated persons. The Reporting Persons also may seek in the future to have one or more representatives elected to the board of directors of the Issuer or to propose other matters for consideration and approval by the Issuer’s stockholders or board of directors."

Mr. Nassef Sawiris is Director and the Chief Executive Officer of Orascom Construction Industries (OCI) a leading cement producer and construction contractor active in emerging markets. OCI is based in Cairo, Egypt and employs more than 40,000 people in 20 countries. The OCI Cement Group is the largest cement producer in the Middle East and a leading regional cement exporter.

Texas Industries, Inc., together with its subsidiaries, engages in the production and supply of heavy building materials in the United States. It operates in three segments: Cement, Aggregates, and Consumer Products.

NOTE: Texas Industries has been up today prior to the filing on takeover speculation.

MMI Investments Plans to Vote Against the Acquisition of Acxiom (ACXM)

In an amended 13D filing on Acxiom Corp. (Nasdaq: ACXM), 8.2% holder MMI Investments, L.P. disclosed a letter to the Board of Directors expressing its intention to vote its shares in opposition to the Proposed Merger of the company with Silver Lake and ValueAct Capital, for cash consideration of $27.10 per share.

The firm said, "We do not believe this price represents fair value for our shares and note that it is: below what we believe to be a reasonable LBO valuation; significantly less than the price Acxiom would command were it valued at the mean multiple of LTM EBITDA in what we believe to be precedent transactions; and nearly 20% below the price Acxiom would command if it were valued at the LTM EBITDA multiple from ValueAct’s last offer for the company in 2005, prior to ValueAct’s joining the Acxiom Board."

A Copy of the Letter:

Dear Members of the Board:

MMI Investments L.P. is Acxiom’s second largest stockholder with approximately 8.2% of the outstanding stock. We have long been supportive of Acxiom’s operational and growth initiatives and believed our stock was significantly undervalued. We are therefore extremely disappointed by the Board’s decision to accept the $27.10 per share offer from ValueAct Capital and Silver Lake Partners. We are opposed to this deal as currently valued and intend to vote our shares in opposition for the following reasons:

We do not believe this price represents fair value for our shares and note that it is:

- below what we believe to be a reasonable LBO valuation;

- significantly less than the price Acxiom would command were it valued at the mean multiple of LTM EBITDA in what we believe to be precedent transactions;

- and nearly 20% below the price Acxiom would command if it were valued at the LTM EBITDA multiple from ValueAct’s last offer for the company in 2005, prior to ValueAct’s joining the Acxiom Board.

Our concerns about valuation are only amplified by our frustration with both the timing and structure of this transaction. Given the strategic initiatives currently underway (and recent earnings pain that your existing stockholders have had to bear) we struggle to understand why this is the right time to sell our company. Moreover it is our belief that the “go-shop” mechanism is a poor substitute for a full auction for a comprehensively marketed property. We can only hope that the “go-shop” for our company is a genuine one, with clear, concise, and thoughtful distribution of information, and thorough outreach to potential buyers from Acxiom’s industry, as well as those in comparable or tangential industries, and financial buyers (many of whom have significant experience and resources in the marketing data and informatics industry).

If any of the parties would like to discuss our views, we welcome the opportunity. Meanwhile unless or until a deal representing fair value for our shares emerges, we remain opposed to ValueAct Capital and Silver Lake Partners’ $27.10 per share offer and intend to vote our shares in opposition.

Sincerely,

Clay Lifflander

Brencourt Advisors Dissatisfied with Vertrue (VTRU) Takeover Offer; Says Stock Worth Much More

In a 13D filing after the close Frday on Vertrue Inc. (Nasdaq: VTRU), Brencourt Advisors disclosed a 9.5% stake and a letter to the company expressing their dissatisfaction with the current offer price by the One Equity Partners consortium and their intention to vote against the merger offer.
In the letter, Brencourt said the current $48.50 offer price is too low. The firm sees a fair value for the stock above $60.

The firm said the Board should reconsider its recommendation of the One Equity offer and also encourages the Board to re-visit a leveraged recapitalization of the Vertrue's balance sheet and to use those proceeds to fund a special dividend to shareholders.

A Copy of the Letter:

Dear Gary,

Brencourt Advisors, LLC ("Brencourt") is one of the largest shareholders of Vertrue Incorporated ("Vertrue" or the "Company"). We are writing to inform you of our dissatisfaction with the current offer price by the One Equity Partners consortium ("One Equity" or the "Sponsors") and our intention to vote against the merger offer. We believe that the current offer significantly undervalues the strong growth that Vertrue is experiencing and is a sub-optimal alternative to other strategies that deliver superior shareholder value.

THE CURRENT OFFER IS TOO LOW
Brencourt's position is that the current $48.50 offer price is too low. In examining the materials the Board reviewed in support of this bid, namely the Jefferies Broadview ("Jefferies") analysis set forth in the Company's preliminary proxy statement on file with the SEC, we believe that there were major flaws in Jefferies methodology which undervalued Vertrue's shares.

For example, Jefferies calculated a weighted average cost of capital ("WACC")that was too low. Jefferies estimated that Vertrue's WACC was 16.5%, comprised of a 17.8% cost of equity and a 9.25% cost of debt. We fail to see how Jefferies could have arrived at these numbers. Aside from the fact that Jefferies used a7.8% market risk premium (versus a market standard 5%), we believe the 2.3%"Size Premium" for the cost of equity is ridiculous. Using Jefferies' beta of1.4x, we believe the cost of equity should be 11.7%. Jefferies calculated the cost of debt based on the coupon of the Company's publicly issued debt. However,prior to the $48.50 offer, Vertrue's 9.25% senior notes were yielding 7%. Using this correct cost of debt (7%) would result in a WACC of 10.2%. Based on MANAGEMENT'S OWN PROJECTIONS, this more realistic WACC would imply an equity value over $60, A 25% PREMIUM TO THE CURRENT OFFER. If one were to apply 10.2%WACC to Jefferies' "NPV Sensitivity" chart, fair value for our shares would be above $70.

TABLE

We believe that the other valuation methods employed by Jefferies were flawed as well. While Jefferies correctly pointed out that there are no other truly comparable public companies to Vertrue, they drew incorrect inferences from theSOLE precedent transaction in the universe: Apollo's purchase of Cendant Corp'sMarketing Services Division ("Affinion"). First, that transaction occurred in July 2005, NEARLY 2 YEARS AGO. Since then, valuations have gone up for nearly every company, especially for less understood business models like Vertrue.Second, Jefferies did not adjust for certain one-time items that raised the Affinion acquisition multiple from 6.25x to 7.1x (please see the debt prospectus for the transaction).

In similar fashion, Jefferies does not properly calculate the acquisition multiple implicit in the Vertrue transaction. Jefferies reports that $48.50represents 8.9x TTM EBITDA, ostensibly a fair multiple, especially with respect to the Affinion transaction. However, this methodology ignores timing differences in marketing spend that have artificially depressed TTM EBITDA,thereby raising the transaction multiple. As you yourself stated on the 2Q07(December quarter) conference call, "I want to point out that it's important to note when comparing our performance to last fiscal year, our year-over-year results reflect both a strong first half in fiscal '06 and an increased marketing investment in the first half of fiscal '07". The results for the March2007 quarter demonstrate your point. In that quarter, adjusted EBITDA rose to$25.4 from $18.4 million in 3Q06.(1) Thus, based on management's projected June2007 EBITDA, the implied transaction multiple would only be 7.2x.

Furthermore, Jefferies does not accord Vertrue the premium multiple that it deserves vis-a-vis the Affinion acquisition. Vertrue, through its established online platform and Management Service segment, has better growth prospects than Affinion. A company with higher growth deserves a higher multiple. Therefore,the 7.2x multiple used to arrive at a $48.50 price is not quite the "gift" that the Jefferies analysis suggests. In fact, based on management's projected high teens EBITDA growth, Vertrue should trade in the 10-13x range. Even if we discounted that valuation to a 9x multiple, we still arrive at a fair value for the stock above $60.

We also find fault with the IRR returns of this transaction. If one were to take management's projections and use the same entry/exit multiples, One Equity will realize a mid 40% IRR over a 5-year horizon. This analysis includes all fees and expenses and does not consider One Equity re-levering at various stages of the investment to take dividends out of the Company. Although we understand that new buyers need an adequate return to compensate them for long-term risk, mid 40% is far higher than the 15-20% IRRs that private equity sponsors typically accept incurrent markets. At even a 30% IRR, the implied share price would be above $58,20% HIGHER than the current offer.

Finally, we take issue with Jefferies analysis that this offer is fair because it represents a 20% premium to the pre-NY Post article price of $40.12. While we do not believe that the premium offered to shareholders has any relevance to the ACTUAL value of our shares, we regard Jefferies analysis as incomplete. Nowhere does Jefferies account for the technical selling caused by Vertrue's converts that are struck at $40.37. Historically, the stock price has been capped by convert holders who hedge their stock exposure above that strike price.Likewise, Jefferies does not mention that the Company raised its guidance on January 24, 2007, THE SAME DAY that the NY Post reported the company was up for sale. We fail to see how Jefferies could not attribute any of the appreciation in the stock to that. Therefore, based on the $43.82 closing price on January24th, this transaction represents a mere 10.8% premium. How is that fair to shareholders based on Jefferies analysis?

ALTERNATIVES
We believe that there are other ways to increase shareholder value other than by accepting a low ball bid for the company. We believe that the Board should reconsider its recommendation of the One Equity offer in the light of the points we make above and the existence of alternative, value-enhancing transactions. In particular, we encourage the Board to re-visit a leveraged recapitalization of the Vertrue's balance sheet and to use those proceeds to fund a special dividend to shareholders.

We understand the Board's reluctance to approach the debt markets considering the Company's experience in 2004. However, much has changed in the market since then. Affinion's experience in the debt markets is a directly relevant example for Vertrue. At the end of 2005, Affinion launched a bond offering to partially fund the acquisition by Apollo. In similar fashion to Vertrue's 2004 offering,Affinion found that the capital markets were not receptive to its offering and consequently, the underwriting banks were forced to hold a large portion of the issue in a bridge facility. In order to move this bridge facility off their balance sheets, the underwriting banks educated the investment community on Affinion's business model to create demand for a new bond issue. In April 2006,the bond issue was placed as 11.5% subordinated debt.

Over the next several months, Affinion met expectations and that same debt appreciated substantially. Today, that 11.5% subordinated issue yields 8.8%despite Affinion being levered 5.2X. Furthermore, in January 2007, Affinionre-levered its balance sheet to 6.4X and used the $350 million of proceeds to buy back preferred debt and dividend to Apollo an amount in excess of Apollo's initial equity investment.

We believe Vertrue should draw upon Affinion's experience for the benefit of its own shareholders. Based on current market conditions and management's projections, Vertrue could issue debt to fund at least a $30 dividend while still maintaining a healthy balance sheet with significant free cash flow. We assess that based on a price to earnings ratio between 12.5 and 13.5x, the proforma stock price, including the special dividend, would be 25-35% higher than the $48.50 offer. We further suggest that if market conditions one year from now are similar and management meets expectations, Vertrue could issue more debt to fund ANOTHER special dividend to shareholders, while allowing current shareholders to maintain their ownership in the Company. We would note that given the size of One Equity's financing package, the Sponsor's bankers believe that this leveraged strategy for Vertrue is entirely feasible.

Looking at the proposed 1st lien / 2nd lien financing structure One Equity will use for its transaction, we hypothesize that one year from now One Equity will be in a position to take advantage of the cheap call protection of its debt and re-lever the Company, and dividend most, if not all, of its equity investment to itself. Clearly, we don't need a private equity company to do what we as shareholders can do for ourselves.

At this point, I would like to note that Brencourt remains a strong supporter of the Company, its management and its prospects. However we strongly urge the Board of Directors to re-consider its endorsement of the current $48.50 offer.We do not believe that the proposed transaction adequately compensates us for our shares. Otherwise we remain prepared to further defend alternative means that deliver greater shareholder value.

Sincerely,
William L. Collins
Chief Executive Officer
Brencourt Advisors LLC

Large Everlast (EVST) Holder Burlingame Expresses Concerns About Stock Offering

In a 13D filing after the close Friday on Everlast Worldwide (Nasdaq: EVST), 14.3% holder Burlingame Asset Management disclosed discussions with the company's management regarding the Issuer’s intention to issue additional shares of Common Stock. The firm changed their filing status from 13G (passive) to 13D (active).

Burlingame Asset Management said its objective is to be assured that the company has explored and evaluated all financing alternatives, and that significant value will not be unduly transferred from existing shareholders to the shareholders participating in the proposed offering.

Yorktown Avenue Capital Discloses 7.3% Stake in Goldfield (GV)

In a 13D filing after the close Friday on Goldfield Corp. (AMEX: GV), Yorktown Avenue Capital disclosed a 7.3% stake (1.9 million shares) in the company.
The firm said it does not have any plans or proposals which relate to, or could result in, any of the matters referred to in paragraphs (a) through (j), inclusive, of the instructions to Item 4 of Schedule 13D.

Value Act Capital Lowers Stake in Avaya (AV) to 3.9%

In an amended 13D filing after the close Friday on Avaya Inc. (NYSE: AV), Value Act Capital disclosed a 3.9% stake (17.7 million shares) in the company. This is down from the 27 million shares stake the firm held at the quarter ended March 31, 2007.

Loeb's Third Point Boosts Stake in CV Therapeutics (CVTX) to 9.9%

In a 13D filing on CV Therapeutics, Inc. (Nasdaq: CVTX), Daniel Loeb's Third Point LLC disclosed a 9.9% stake (5.9 million shares) in the company.

In a pretty standard disclosure, Loeb's firm noted that they presently do not have any plans or proposals that relate to or would result in any of the actions required to be described in Item 4 of Schedule 13D.

Yesterday, we noted that Loeb was building the new stake. Link

Shamrock Activist Value Fund Discloses 5.2% Stake in Reddy Ice Holdings (FRZ)

In a 13D filing on Reddy Ice Holdings, Inc. (NYSE: FRZ), Shamrock Activist Value Fund disclosed a 5.2% stake (1.12 million shares) in the company.

The firm said it has no current plans or proposals with respect to the Company or its securities of the types enumerated in paragraphs (a) through (j) of this Item 4 to the form Schedule 13D promulgated under the Act.

Loeb's Third Point Shows A Number of New Positions in Latest 13F

Third Point LLC, run by activist investors Daniel Loeb, released its 13F for the quarter ended March 31, 2007 yesterday afternoon.

Some interesting new positions from the filing:

Acadia Pharmaceuticals Inc. (Nasdaq: ACAD) 350,000 shares
Alexion Pharmaceuticals Inc. (Nasdaq: ALXN) 400,000 shares
Alkermes, Inc. (Nasdaq: ALKS) 750,000 shares
Ariad Pharmaceuticals Inc. (Nasdaq: ARIA) 1,600,000 shares
ATP Oil & Gas Corp. (Nasdaq: ATPG) 2,000,000 shares (already known from 13G)
BearingPoint (NYSE: BE) 3,000,000 shares
Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corp. (NYSE: BNI) 325,000 shares
Candela Corp. (Nasdaq: CLZR) 1,275,000 shares (already known from 13D)
Charming Shoppes Inc. (Nasdaq: CHRS) 2,200,000 shares
Coleman Cable, Inc. (Nasdaq: CCIX) 666,667 shares
CV Therapeutics, Inc. (Nasdaq: CVTX) 1,350,000 shares
DepoMed Inc. (Nasdaq: DEPO) 325,000 shares (already known from 13G)
FMC Corp. (NYSE: FMC) 700,000 shares
General Motors Corporation (NYSE: GM) 1,000,000 shares
Granite Construction Inc. (NYSE: GVA) 1,350,000 shares (already known from 13D)
Kansas City Southern (NYSE: KSU) 2,000,000 shares
MDS, Inc. (NYSE: MDZ) 1,350,000 shares
Norfolk Southern Corp. (NYSE: NSC) 1,250,000
Northern Orion Resources Inc. (AMEX: NTO) 7,600,000 shares
Onyx Pharmaceuticals Inc. (Nasdaq: ONXX) 1,080,000 shares
Talisman Energy Inc. (NYSE: TLM) 3,750,000 shares
Tronox Inc. (NYSE: TRX) 900,000 shares

DG FastChannel (DGIT) Discloses 13.2% Stake in Viewpoint (VWPT)

In a 13D filing after the close on Viewpoint Corp. (Nasdaq: VWPT), DG FastChannel (Nasdaq: DGIT) disclosed a 13.2% stake (10,750,000 shares) in the company.

In addition, DG FastChannel holds warrants to purchase 2,687,500 Shares at $0.45 per share beginning on November 11, 2007.

DG FastChannel announced the equity investment and partnership with Viewpoint earlier in the month.

Shamrock Activist Value Raises Modine Manufacturing (MOD) Stake to 6.37%

In an amended 13D filing after the close yesterday on Modine Manufacturing Co. (NYSE: MOD), Shamrock Activist Value Fund disclosed a 6.37% stake (2.1 million shares) in the company. This is up from 5.27% stake (1.7 million shares) the firm disclosed in the original November 2006 13D.

Buffett Discloses New Stakes in NSC, UNP and WLP

Warren Buffett's Berkshire Hathaway released their latest 13F for the quarter ended March 31, 2007.

New Stakes:
Burlington Northern Santa Fe (NYSE: BNI) 10,024,876 shares (already disclosed)
Norfolk Southern (NYSE: NSC) 6,362,800 shares
Union Pacific (NYSE: UNP) 10,513,100 shares
Wellpoint (NYSE: WLP) 979,700 shares

The full report is available at the main site: Link

Eddie Lampert Buys Up 15M Shares of Citigroup (C)

Eddie Lampert's RBS Partners disclosed a 15,244,168 share stake in Citigroup Inc. (NYSE: C) in its latest 13F.

The stake was disclosed after confidential treatment of the stake expired on May 15, 2007. From the filings its looks like March, 31 2006 was the first quarter the stake was required to be disclosed.

The full report is available at the main site: Link

JANA Nudges Alcoa (AA). Possibly Ingersoll-Rand (IR) Too

In its latest 13F filing, for the quarter ended 03/31/07, JANA Partners disclosed a 3.3 million share stake in Alcoa (NYSE: AA). The stake represents about 0.38% of Alcoa's shares outstanding.

Last week, the firm disclosed a letter to Alcoa calling upon Alcoa's Board of Directors to drop its efforts to acquire Alcan Inc. (NYSE: AL) and to instead focus on creating value for shareholders through an exploration of strategic alternatives, including potentially a sale of Alcoa to one or more buyers.

It is also being speculated that JANA had something to do with Ingersoll-Rand's (NYSE: IR) announcement today that it will explore strategic alternatives for its Bobcat and construction-related businesses and will expand its buyback plan to $4 billion, along with accelerating the plan. JANA showed a 6.3 million share, or 2.08% stake, in Ingersoll-Rand in the latest 13F. This is below the 5% threshold that would require a 13D.

Icahn's Latest Targets

It's 13F time again:

Carl Icahn's Icahn Management fund released its latest 13F today for the quarter ended March 31, 2007.

The filing showed news positions in:

Anadarko Petroleum Corp. (NYSE: APC): new 3,105,520 share stake
CSX Corp. (NYSE: CSX): new 2,675,680 share stake
Pride International Inc. (NYSE: PDE): new 4,588,000 share stake
Motorola Inc. (NYSE: MOT): new 9,360,000 share stake (already disclosed in proxy fight).

The full report is available at the main site: Link

Relational Investors Discloses "Confidential" 5.1M Share Stake in Analog Devices (ADI)

In an amended 12/31/06 13F filing, activist investors Relational Investors disclosed a 5.1 million shares stake in Analog Devices Inc. (NYSE: ADI). The firm requested confidential treatment of the position and it was not disclosed with the firm's original 12/31/06 13F which was released on 02/14/07.

Relational maintained its 5.1 million share stake in ADI from 12/31/06 to 03/31/07, according to its new 13F.

In the firm's new 13F for the quarter ended 03/31/07 , Relational Investors also disclosed a new 14.2 million share stake in Sprint-Nextel (NYSE: S) (WSJ report in April noted the position). The firm also closed out its stake in Ceridian (NYSE: CEN).

Relational Investors is best known for its push to remove Home Depot's (NYSE: HD) CEO Bob Nardelli.

Loeb's Third Point Discloses 8.7% Stake in Candela (CLZR)

In a 13G filing on Candela Corporation (Nasdaq: CLZR), Daniel Loeb's Third Point LLC disclosed an 8.7% stake (2 million shares) in the company. The firm did not show a stake in CLZR for the quarter ended 12/31/06.

A 13G filing indicates a "passive" stake, but Loeb is known as an activist investors. On Friday, Loeb also disclosed a new 5%+ stake in DepoMed Inc. (Nasdaq: DEPO).

Candela manufactures, and distributes innovative clinical solutions that enable physicians, surgeons, and personal care practitioners to treat selected cosmetic and medical conditions using lasers, aesthetic laser systems, and other advanced technologies.

ValueAct Capital Accumulates 7.3% Stake in Advanced Medical Optics (EYE)

In a 13D filing after the close Friday on Advanced Medical Optics Inc. (NYSE: EYE), ValueAct Capital disclosed a 7.3% (4.4 million shares) in the company. The firm did not show a stake in EYE for the quarter ended 12/31/06.

In a pretty standard disclosure, the firm said they reserve the right to formulate other plans and/or make other proposals, and take such actions with respect to their investment in the Issuer, including any or all of the actions set forth in paragraphs (a) through (j) of Item 4 of Schedule 13D, or acquire additional Common Stock or dispose of all the Common Stock beneficially owned by them, in the publicmarket or privately negotiated transactions.

Advanced Medical Optics develops advanced vision technologies. The company's product lines include cataract/implant, laser vision correction, and eye care.

ValueAct Capital looks for deep-value situations and was most-recently a big winner related to its position in Reuters (Nasdaq: RTRSY), which is in a possible merger deal with Thomson (NYSE: TOC).

Loeb's Third Point LLC Discloses 8.2% Stake in DepoMed (DEPO)

In a 13G filing after the close Friday, Daniel Loeb's Third Point LLC disclosed an 8.2% stake in DepoMed Inc. (Nasdaq: DEPO). The firm did not show a stake in DEPO for the quarter ended 12/31/06.

A 13G indicates a "passive" stake, but Loeb is known as a activist investor.

Depomed, Inc., is a specialty pharmaceutical company with two approved products on the market and multiple product candidates in its pipeline.

Monarch Activist Partners Discloses 6.1% Stake in Orbit International (ORBT)

In a 13D filing after the close on Orbit International (Nasdaq: ORBT), Monarch Activist Partners LP disclosed a 6.1% stake (280K shares) in the company.

The firm said it believes that ORBT's stock price is significantly undervalued and intend to communicate with management in order to explore measures to enhance shareholder value.

Loeb's Third Point Raises Stake in Nabi Biopharmaceuticals (NABI) to 11.4%

In an amended 13D filing this afternoon on Nabi Biopharmaceuticals (Nasdaq: NABI), Dan Loeb's Third Point LLC disclosed they raised their stake to 11.4% from 9.5%, buying 1.14 million shares from 05/08-05/10.

Third Point has representatives on the board of directors of Nabi as part of a 2006 settlement.

Lyondell (LYO) Soars After Billionaire Blavatnik Buys Rights on 8.3% and May Seek Acquisition

Shares of Lyondell Chemical Co. (NYSE: LYO) are higher today after billionaire Leonard Blavatnik bought the rights to acquire 8.3% of the company in a forward contract arranged by Merrill Lynch. The shares are being sold by Occidental Petroleum (NYSE: OXY).

In a 13D filing, Blavatnik said he may seek to engage in discussions with the company related to an offer to acquire all of the shares of Lyondell or to discuss a combination or similar transaction between Lyondell and his affiliates, including Access or Basell Holdings B.V.

Shares of Lyondell are 12% higher in early action Friday.