Monday, June 18, 2007

Chapman: "Nabi is not yet worthy of our disdain or disgust"

In a 13D filing Friday afternoon on Nabi Biopharmaceuticals (Nasdaq: NABI), Chapman Capital disclosed a 6.6% stake in the company and issued a press release announcing its support for the maximization of Nabi shareholder value via a three-step transaction: 1) FDA approval of Nabi’s BLA for Nabi-HB Intravenous; 2) the distribution of the proceeds from the sale of Nabi Biologics; and 3) partnering/licensing of Nabi’s vaccine pipeline led by smoking cessation drug, NicVAX (Nicotine Conjugate Vaccine).

Robert L. Chapman, Jr., Managing Member of Chapman Capital, commented, “Unlike many of our activist targets, Nabi is not yet worthy of our disdain or disgust. The Company has taken the necessary steps to prepare for its restructuring and recapitalization."
NOTE: Nabi has been a long time activist target of Dan Loeb's Third Point LLC
A Copy of Chapman's Letter to Nabi Interim CEO Dr. Leslie Hudson Ph.D.:
Dr. Hudson,
Chap-Cap Partners II and Chap-Cap Activist Partners (the “Chapman Funds”), advised by Chapman Capital L.L.C., own approximately four million common shares, or just over 6.6%, of Nabi Biopharmaceuticals (“NABI”, or the “Company”). Today’s Schedule 13D filing by Chapman Capital places Nabi in the historically distinct position of having a total of four, 5-12% activist ownership blocks1 each independently fomenting an identical strategic imperative for the Company. This mandate, conveyed to you by the owners to whom the Board of Directors (the “Board”) that hired you reports, has been defined as follows: 1) FDA approval of Nabi’s BLA for Nabi-HB® Intravenous; 2) the distribution of the proceeds from the sale of Nabi Biologics; and 3) partnering/licensing of Nabi’s vaccine pipeline led by smoking cessation drug, NicVAX® (Nicotine Conjugate Vaccine).2 Essentially, nearly 40% of Nabi’s ownership base has filed Schedule 13D’s with virtually identical activist platforms -- the conversion of the Company into a royalty trust following a special dividend financed by a divisional asset sale.
Unlike many of our activist targets,3 Nabi’s Board and executive hired help is not yet worthy of our disdain or disgust. The Company has taken the necessary steps to prepare for the restructuring and recapitalization described above. In March 2007, Nabi outlined its intent to bifurcate itself into two strategic business units4 to “provide business clarity to the investment community, improve operating and financial performance and facilitate successful completion of Nabi’s strategic alternatives process, including but not limited to [Nabi’s] work with Banc of America Securities.”5 Last month, Nabi announced successful results6 for its Phase IIb proof-of-concept study for NicVAX®.7 Under Nabi’s new corporate design, you repeatedly have committed to “further reduce its cost structure and cash burn in 2007”; accordingly, the Company’s implementation of that cost reduction just this week8 gives Chapman Capital confidence that you are a man of your word, with that word being “execution” (walk) and not the formerly insuperable one of “vision” (talk).
In conclusion, Chapman Capital anticipates Nabi’s long overdue announcement of FDA approval for Nabi-HB® Intravenous (before Cangene Corporation’s HepaGam B™ gains damaging traction in the liver transplantation market).9 This shall be preceded or followed by the sale of Nabi Biologics for a valuation that alone should approximate Chapman Capital’s $5/share cost basis in the Company’s shares. Lastly, like Cytos Biotechnology AG before it, Nabi shall license NicVAX® to a global pharmaceutical company such as GlaxoSmithKline plc or Pfizer Inc.,10 both of which may be interested in marketing NicVAX® in combination with their own "first-line" smoking cessation drug therapies.11 Should you fail to execute on these mandates, it is near certainty that Chapman Capital’s filings shall take on a distinctly less genial tone.

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Thursday, June 15, 2006

Third Point LLC Raises Stake in Nabi Biopharm (NABI), Sends Letter to Board to Maximize Value

In an amended 13D filing on Nabi Biopharmaceuticals (Nasdaq: NABI) Daniel Loeb's Third Point LLC disclosed a 9.5% stake in the company, up from the 8.7% disclosed on 04/27. The group sent a letter to the Board of Directors of NABI which, among other things, calls on the Board to commence a public process to maximize value.

A copy of the letter disclosed in the filing:

June 15, 2006

Mr. David L. Castaldi

Geoffrey F. Cox, Ph.D

Mr. Peter B. Davis

Mr. Richard A. Harvey, Jr.

Leslie Hudson, Ph.D.

Ms. Linda Jenckes

Mr. Thomas H. McLain

Mr. Stephen G. Sundova

rc/o Mr. Thomas E. Rathjen

Vice President, Investor Relations

Nabi Biopharmaceuticals

5800 Park of Commerce Boulevard, N.W.

Boca Raton, Florida 33487

To the Board of Directors of Nabi Biopharmaceuticals:

As one of the largest shareholders of Nabi Biopharmaceutials ("Nabi" or the "Company"), I am shocked that management has failed to contact us directly regarding our letter of April 27th and has refused to address any of the issues therein. We submitted our proposal in good faith and we had looked forward to a prompt and thoughtful reply. Instead we received a terse note dated May 1, 2006 which addressed our specific issues and concerns in a perfunctory and platitudinous manner. Frankly, we did not expect this inexplicable level of insouciance and disrespect for such significant shareholders.

Rest assured: our silence since receiving your flaccid response should not be interpreted as reduced focus on our position in Nabi, nor diminution in our resolve to see Nabi undertake an immediate formal and public process to maximize shareholder value. Perhaps management and its cronies on the Board have deluded themselves into thinking that Third Point would be placated by the unsupportable statement in the note that "[t]he Board of Directors and senior management team have developed and are effectively executing on a strategic business plan...." Maybe you thought we would "go away" or sell our position in frustration. To the contrary, each day that passes without action by management increases our resolve. In fact, for the reasons outlined below (specifically, our knowledge that there is significant current interest in purchasing Nabi, either in components or as a whole) we have increased our already-substantial stake in the Company during this time.

We are further alarmed by your apparent misrepresentation of the voting results at the Company's 2006 Annual Meeting of shareholders. Whereas you reported on May 12th that 74% of the Company's shares were counted towards a quorum at the annual meeting, and that 64% of the outstanding shares were voted in favor of your directors (an extremely weak "vote of confidence" by the way), Knott Partners Management, LLC, your largest shareholder, subsequently stated publicly that its shares were erroneously counted towards the quorum. Given this, the fact that roughly half of our shares were not acquired before the record date, and that this was apparently the case with several other large shareholders as well, you were quite lucky to have your uncontested directors elected by a majority of the shares outstanding.

Your luck may be running out, since much of your shareholder base appears to have turned over recently (judging by the volume in the shares and SEC filings over the past few months) and since investors have had more time to understand the byzantine process of successfully preventing their shares from being represented at a meeting. Based on our conversations with other shareholders, and the outcome of the May 12th vote, we strongly believe that if the vote were retaken today you would not achieve a quorum, and that substantially less than half of the shares would cast an affirmative vote for the current directors.

Despite this, you hide your heads in the nearest warm aperture in an apparent "ostrich defense" and ignore your shareholders (the top three now owning over 28% of your shares in aggregate) in the hope that the Company's owners will go away before your next annual meeting. We want to be clear that while the May 2006 Annual Meeting might have bought you time, unless a process is put into place to maximize shareholder value well prior to the next annual meeting we will work assiduously between now and then to ensure that you will have ample time to pursue your golf games and to enjoy the Florida sun thereafter. While you have ignored shareholders, we have not failed to notice that since your election the stock is down over 20% - with barely an uptick along the way. We believe that the marketplace is speaking loud and clear.

Mr. McLain has paid only lip service to the notion that management serves at the pleasure of the owners of the Company (i.e., the shareholders), but no substance supports his sanctimony. You, the Board of Directors, are no doubt well-aware that it is your legal duty to look out for the best interests of shareholders (although your previous actions, including the suspect retention program that you approved recently - a disproportionate share of which inexplicably went to Mr. McLain - throws this into question).

As such, we have to assume (1) that you are aware that there is currently significant interest in various pieces of Nabi (all of your marketed products, some of your developmental products, and the plasma business) and in the Company as a whole - which Mr. McLain undoubtedly well knows, and (2) that you are currently seriously considering this interest as a means to maximize the value of NABI stock in the near-term without incurring all of the risks and uncertainties that your many-year, high-risk strategic plan entails. Should Mr. McLain not have relayed the recent expressions of interest in all aspects of the Company to you, or should the apparently onerous and unusual confidentiality agreements that Nabi is asking potential acquirers to sign have kept some parties out of the process, feel free to give me a call to learn more about the outside interest in purchasing Nabi or its various assets.

To summarize: (1) We do not believe that you or your long-term strategic plan have the support of a majority of current shareholders, (2) ignoring your largest shareholders is not a workable strategy, and (3) we are aware of current significant and serious interest in purchasing all or parts of your Company as, we believe, is Mr. McLain. Accordingly, we call on you again to discharge your fiduciary duties to shareholders and immediately hire an investment bank with which you do not have a pre-existing relationship (which should hold true for the new relationship banker as well) to commence a public process to maximize shareholder value. We are not asking that you commit to any specific outcome, only that you explore all possible value-enhancing options fully and openly, so that all of the Company's owners can judge them on risk and time-adjusted metrics versus your current plans.

Neither you nor the Nabi management team has earned the right to unilaterally embark on another multi-year program that puts shareholders at significant risk and is unlikely to yield results, positive or negative, within an acceptable timeframe. Both current management and the majority of the Board have presided over a virtually unbroken string of missed earnings estimates, failed milestones, trial failures, etc. Mr. McLain has continually trumpeted a new era for Nabi since taking over as CEO three years ago. Sadly, all shareholders have gotten is "more of the same," while Mr. McLain has, during his tenure, managed to foster poor relations with several other management teams in the industry that we are aware of - to the detriment of Nabi and its shareholders (indeed, the CEO of a much-larger biotech company took the unheard of action of singling out Nabi at a recent industry conference for being "mismanaged" - apparently because of the low regard he has for Mr. McLain and his managerial abilities). Unfortunately, the Nabi Board is no better. Of the eight Nabi Board members, only one has seen NABI stock rise during his time on the Board, and then by a paltry cumulative 7% over 5 1/2 years. Put differently, the eight Nabi directors have served an average of 6 1/2 years on the Board, and the stock is, on average, down 35% during their tenures. Of the public companies that the current Nabi directors have been involved with, either as senior managers or directors, the overwhelming majority have been significant money losers for the shareholders of those companies during their tenures - some of them spectacularly so. Suffice it to say that Nabi has added two Board members overthe past year. One is CEO and President of a company whose stock is down over 85% in the less than one year that he has run that company, and now has a market capitalization of $60 million. The other was CFO of a company whose stock declined during the 11 years that he was at the financial helm, and which now is also in the micro-cap arena. It is especially alarming that this is the pedigree of the people that Nabi is bringing on board to safeguard our interests, and the type of people whose business judgment the Company is acting upon. They have not been successful in creating value for shareholders at their "day jobs," and there is no reason to believe that they will have any better success at Nabi. Although we do not believe in your latest strategic plan anyway, given the substantial risks and timeframe to which it exposes shareholders, we are even more negative about it in the hands of a management team and Board of Directors at Nabi that has a demonstrated record of virtually always destroying value for shareholders as either management or board members.

One last, but important, point: we understand that you are currently entertaining offers for at least one of Nabi's revenue-producing assets. As we've said previously, and as has been expressed to us by interested buyers of the Company, we believe that the greatest shareholder value will be derived from a public auction of the Company in its entirety (as opposed to the clandestine discussions that you have apparently undertaken). However, if there is to be an asset sale along the way, it must be demonstrably and irrefutably positive for shareholders.

MOST IMPORTANT, ANY PROCEEDS DERIVED FROM ASSET SALES SHOULD BE FULLY AND IMMEDIATELY RETURNED TO SHAREHOLDERS IN THE FORM OF A ONE-TIME DIVIDEND.

It is our fear that your plan is to "burn the furniture to heat the house" - i.e., sell off our revenue-producing assets to fund your ongoing cash burn and high-risk development projects. As we've stated many times, and as have other major Nabi shareholders, your strategic plan is laden with financial risk, scientific risk, execution risk, time risk, etc. Mr. McLain himself tried to explain away last year's StaphVAX trial failure by explaining that most new drug trials fail. Yet you are now asking that the owners of the Company assume all of these risks, without any commitment, or even comment, on when we can expect to see the Company in a positive operating cash flow and earnings position. Simply put, you have not demonstrated an ability to navigate any of these risks successfully over the course of many years, nor to allocate capital properly. Indeed, quite the contrary - based on past performance, this "strategic plan" is almost guaranteed to fail - and we, the owners of the Company, will bear the pain disproportionately as neither the Company's Board nor management has significant outright shareholdings, nor have any insiders demonstrated any willingness to "put their money where their mouth is" by buying significant amounts of stock in the marketplace as a show of confidence in the long-term strategic plan that you are attempting to foist upon us against our will.

We believe that the value to Nabi shareholders that could be derived from a value maximization process is comfortably in excess of $10 per share, a number that has been validated by additional work that we've done, and contacts that we've made, subsequent to our last letter to you (the recent IPO of Grifols also highlights the significant value of your plasma business in the right hands). We would be happy to review our valuation metrics with you in detail should you wish. When the stock was over $7 per share early last month (i.e., before you were re-elected), a Wall Street analyst wrote "... if a potential bidder were to offer a premium to today's current value, we believe it would be wise for the company to sell itself, as its pipeline and core technology still have clinical and regulatory hurdles to overcome, and are still several years from making it to market." Clearly we agree. As we've said previously, we believe that you have an extremely valuable and desirable set of assets, but only if managed properly - which history has shown will not be the case under the current Nabi management team.

We trust that you will do the right thing for all of the reasons noted above and immediately commence a well-organized public auction of the Company. We believe that you have met with several possible new investment banking firms to represent NABI recently, so we hope that this is a signal that you agree that this is the right approach. We are highly confident that this value maximization process will result in the best risk-adjusted and present-valued outcome for Nabi shareholders. We are also certain that this course of action has the support of the majority of current Nabi shareholders, for whom you work. If you disagree, why not canvas your current shareholder base to get their views rather than refusing to interact with them?

It is our preference, of course, to work out an amicable and cooperative solution to the issues we have raised. However, nothing short of a full and public value maximization process will satisfy us. We have written this letter directly to the Company's Board of Directors because we do not have faith in the CEO based on prior experience. Should you disregard the will of the majority of your shareholders, the consequences will be meted out through the democratic process afforded shareholders under Delaware law and your charter and bylaws. In that event, the clock is ticking towards the next annual meeting, and we will make sure to fully chronicle your many missteps, past, present and future, as you're shown your way out the door.

Sincerely,

/s/Daniel S. Loeb

Daniel S. Loeb

Chief Executive Officer

Third Point LLC

Monday, October 16, 2006

Nabi Biopharm (NABI) Holder Third Point Determined to Pursue a Consent Solicitation To Remove Chairman McLain and Others

In an amended 13D filing on Nabi Biopharmaceuticals (Nasdaq: NABI), 9.5% holder Third Point LLC disclosed a letter sent to the company. The firm said they are now determined to pursue a consent solicitation to remove not only McLain but, as well, a majority of the Company's directors from the Board. The firm said they will present a majority slate of proposed replacement directors. They said their nominees will have only one objective - "to capitalize on the enormous and escalating interest in, and investment dollars dedicated to, all of the areas in which Nabi currently participates - for the direct benefit of all Nabi shareholders."

The firm said the Company's management and Board are prepared to dissipate asset sale proceeds (PhosLo) on a risky business strategy rather than return them to shareholders. Third Point maintains its view that Nabi should not be a public company.

A Copy of the Letter:

October 16, 2006

Dear Nabi Directors:

As you are probably aware, on October 12th Nabi Biopharmaceuticals (the"Company") held a conference call following the announcement of the sale of PhosLo to Fresenius. In that call, Tom McLain articulated a plan which, when stripped down to its essence, would use the sale proceeds to fund $30 million per annum of cash burn in 2007 and 2008. Thus, the Company has proven our thesis that it contains valuable and coveted assets. The net present value of the PhosLo sale, which was exactly in line with our estimates, confirms our view that Nabi's assets are worth roughly twice as much as where the stock currently trades.

However, the conference call also confirmed our fears that this management and Board are prepared to dissipate asset sale proceeds on a risky business strategy rather than return them to shareholders. Further confirmation came in your letter to shareholders this morning, which stated that the proceeds from the sale of PhosLo, from partnering NicVAX and StaphVAX and Civacir, and the associated expected cost reductions will be used "to fund ... important development programs." Your strategy may now be clear, but we are baffled as to which "important development programs" you intend to fund going forward.

We have repeatedly warned this Board that we (and, we are confident, other shareholders) will not tolerate a "burning the furniture to heat the house"policy with respect to asset sales and spending, which is precisely the policy your October 12 conference call and this morning's letter appear to adopt. Indeed, there is no conceivable reason why Nabi should be in a cash burn position once the PhosLo disposition has been consummated and the major development projects sold or partnered. In fact, if the Company were to become an efficiently-run ongoing entity after such a restructuring, it should be earnings and cash-flow positive by mid-2007.

Mr. McLain unwittingly gave one of the most persuasive arguments on the conference call as to why Nabi should not continue as a public company. When asked about the cash flows from Nabi-HB, and why they would not be sufficient to fund ongoing business spending, he responded that this cash flow will be offset by the costs of being a public company. While we can't begin to fathom why it would cost nearly that much to run Nabi as a public company (given Nabi-HB's approximately $40 million in annual sales and the fact that the related cash flows should be a very high percentage of its sales), Mr. McLain's answer makes our point seem obvious - Nabi should NOT be a public company. We believe that Nabi-HB is worth upwards of $200 million, and the Company can get no credit for that substantial value in the marketplace if this value is in effect negated by unfathomable overhead and "development" expenses.

As you know, last month we proposed a settlement whereby we would place representatives on the Board to help ensure the success of the value-maximization process for all shareholders and ensure that shareholders directly receive the proceeds from any asset sales - as well as to aid in immediately beginning to mitigate Nabi's unnecessary cash burn. Unfortunately, your response made it clear that you have no interest in engaging in earnest discussions to involve the Company's highly-qualified owners in the oversight of these issues.

Accordingly, you have left us no choice: we have now determined to pursue a consent solicitation to remove not only McLain but, as well, a majority of the Company's directors from the Board. Concurrently, we will present to our fellow Nabi shareholders a majority slate of proposed replacement directors whom we believe are far superior to the directors we will seek to remove. Importantly, the nominees we will ask Nabi's shareholders to endorse will have only one objective - to capitalize on the enormous and escalating interest in, and investment dollars dedicated to, all of the areas in which Nabi currently participates - for the direct benefit of all Nabi shareholders.

Sincerely,

Daniel S. Loeb

Thursday, September 14, 2006

Third Point LLC Sends Letter to Nabi (NABI) Urging Expanded Mandate for BofA to Explore Sale of Company

In an amended 13D filing on Nabi Biopharmaceuticals (Nasdaq: NABI), 9.5% holder Daniel Loeb's Third Point LLC said it sent a letter to the Board of Directors urging the Board, at its next meeting, to expand the mandate of Bank of America, the Company's investment banking firm, to conduct a public process to maximize shareholder value by exploring all alternatives, including a sale of the Company in whole or in component pieces.

A Copy of the Letter:

Nabi Directors:

We submit this important letter for you to consider prior to the Nabi BioPharmaceuticals ("Nabi" or the "Company") Board of Directors meeting that we understand will take place this Friday, September 15, 2006. We understand that at this meeting you will decide whether to expand Bank of America's ("BofA")mandate to include exploration of asset sales and other means to maximize shareholder value. It is our hope that this letter will help clarify your thinking on this and other matters that may come before the Board.

We are extremely disappointed that on Tuesday Nabi refused to comply, except Ina limited manner, with our demand to inspect its books and records in order to confirm apparent gross mismanagement and breaches of fiduciary duty and to determine whether to initiate a proxy contest and/or litigation. This refusal is consistent with the Company's behavior under Tom McLain - being unresponsive to shareholders and avoiding transparency on important issues. As you undoubtedly understand by now, we will not be deterred by the Company's attempts to ignore its shareholders and hide behind legal facades. We will continue to press for full disclosure in order to shine a bright light on the many concerns we have expressed to the Board, to Mr. McLain and to your financial advisers at BofA pertaining to the mismanagement, poor oversight and suspected malfeasance that we believe has taken place during Mr.McLain's tenure as Chief Executive Officer.

Despite our already dim view of Mr. McLain's character and openness to the owners of his company, even we were shocked that, at the last minute, he backed out of his scheduled appearance at this week's Bear Stearns Healthcare Conference, and that he also apparently refused, while in New York on Monday, to meet with any shareholders who do not share his "vision." It is a primary job of a CEO to articulate the firm's strategy to investors and to face up to its shareholders, even when they include his harshest critics.

As noted in our letter to you dated August 16th, it is clear that Mr. McLain,despite claims that he values the input of Nabi's shareholders, has increasingly withdrawn from all interactions with shareholders whose views differ from his own. Given that the Company's three largest shareholders are all based in the New York area, that they have all clearly stated in public filings that they strongly oppose Mr. McLain's ill-conceived and highly-risky strategic plan, and that they are all convinced that shareholders will be far better served if a public process is immediately initiated to maximize value for shareholders,perhaps we should not have been surprised that Mr. McLain failed to follow through on his announced plan to present at the conference.

We identified shareholders representing over 35% of Nabi's shares outstanding(all of whom oppose your proposed strategic plan) in just the first 5 rows of the presentation to which Mr. McLain sent Henrik Rasmussen in his stead (we think that Henrik is terrific, by the way). Given this, and given that the Bear Stearns analyst has expressed serious concerns about Nabi's out-of-control expenditures, one would have thought that Mr. McLain would have welcomed the opportunity to interact with shareholders and analysts who have grave concerns about his leadership of Nabi. Instead, Mr. McLain deliberately ducked a dialogue with the multitude of Company owners who do not believe in his and the Board's plan, and who insist on knowing precisely when the Company's substantial and unnecessary cash burn will subside and when they can expect the Company to be cash flow and earnings positive.

Also, in the latest installment of Nabi's "Believe-it-or-Not," we note that at last week's Thomas Weisel Partners Healthcare Conference Mr. McLain snuck in a slide and commentary during his presentation showing that the Company now expects EU approval for PhosLo in the fourth quarter of this year or the first quarter of 2007 - a further delay, now approaching possibly eighteen months, for what should have been a "lay up" approval a long time ago. While we appreciate that the Company cannot force the European regulators to come to the United States to inspect its plant, the last step needed for approval, the Company's real failure has been its inexplicable inability for a sustained period of time to explain compellingly to the regulators why this approval should be a priority for them - or is even worthy of their attention. The Company's continued and constant inability to meet any time line that it sets, or any time line that is reasonable by industry standards, is simply astonishing and reinforces yet again that current management is not equipped to lead this Company on a going-forward basis, much less to maximize the value of Nabi's substantial assets.

In contrast to Mr. McLain's reign of shareholder value destruction, we urge each of you to consider Third Point's record with Ligand Pharmaceuticals Incorporated("Ligand") over the past year, which we have discussed with your investment bankers at BofA. Contrary to Mr. McLain's apparent portrayal of the Company's large shareholders as naive "financial players" who do not understand biotechnology companies (which is ironic coming from a former accountant with no scientific background who has presided over an unbroken string of financial AND scientific failures during his tenure), here is a real-life example of how we have added tremendous value to a biotech company as shareholders and board members. Our involvement with Ligand provides concrete evidence that while our goal is to maximize the long-term value of our portfolio companies for the benefit of all shareholders, we are receptive to any strategic process permutation that achieves this goal.

To recap briefly, when we first became Ligand shareholders last year our thesis was similar to that driving our Nabi investment: Ligand was an asset-rich company with value substantially above what Wall Street was giving it credit for, but the value of its assets was obscured by poor management and imprudent capital allocation decisions. When we concluded that it was highly unlikely that these values would ever be realized under existing management and Ligand's business plan, and that there was indeed a substantial risk that continued cash burn might eventually force management to sell off the company's valuable assets at fire sale prices, we demanded that Ligand immediately initiate a process to maximize shareholder value. The result is striking: the stock is up by 30% since we became involved; just last week Ligand announced the sales of its two commercial operations at extremely attractive prices; and the company has never been in a stronger financial position, nor had a more exciting future. Due to our direct and substantial involvement in the value maximization process,significant cash should be returned to Ligand's shareholders shortly, and the prospects for the "new" company's remaining R&D pipeline and partnered products is tremendously exciting. Mr. McLain should also note that while the scientific staff at Ligand is intact, former CEO David Robinson resigned in July.

I am confident that any Ligand board member will agree that while, like you,Ligand was initially resistant to our demands, the result is: 1) that undertaking a process to maximize shareholder values was unequivocally the right thing to do, 2) that Third Point was interested in maximizing value for all shareholders, but very open-minded about how to get there, 3) that we have added tremendous value to the maximization process, strategically, scientifically and financially, and 4) that Third Point's representatives constituted a minority of the board but were able to work constructively with the other board members to achieve an impressive result. We are confident that Ligand's other large shareholders would agree with all of these points as well. As we have discussed with your investment bankers, we believe that we would add significantly to Nabi's value maximization process as well, and we are willing to work constructively with you to create the greatest long-term value for all of Nabi shareholders. And to clear up any misconceptions, we are absolutely not demanding that Nabi be sold at any price. If an outright sale of the Company would yield the highest net present value to Nabi shareholders, then an outright sale would clearly be the proper course of action. However, if the market is willing to pay top dollar for Nabi's marketed products, but is not willing to pay full value for Nabi's tremendous pipeline potential, for instance, and we can instead create greater risk-adjusted value for shareholders by partnering out NicVax, StaphVAX, etc., then we would be supportive of that strategy. We believe that the Company should be creative and flexible in realizing the greatest risk-adjusted net present values for the Company's owners in whatever form that takes.

We continue to insist that the process to maximize shareholder value be publicly announced and that BofA's mandate be specifically expanded to explore all alternatives, including a sale of the Company in whole or in component pieces, that will lead to the greatest value creation for the Company's owners. We understand that this is a "sticking point" for you, and given the Company's culture of failure and negative thinking it is clear why this is so. However,for the reasons spelled out to you in our August 16th letter, we do not believe that your concerns regarding announcing this process publicly are valid, and feel that it is imperative that the process be run publicly so that the Company's shareholders can be certain that this process is not a stall tactic or sham process designed to thwart us, but is instead an earnest process run properly for the benefit of the Company's owners and in accordance with the will of the vast majority of your shareholders.

You probably also know that we received another two unsolicited calls last week from parties extremely interested in exploring the purchase of some or all of Nabi's assets. We referred these parties to your investment bankers. As we have communicated to you consistently over the past six months, based on an enormous amount of due diligence that we have done we are highly confident that there is significant interest from many parties in purchasing Nabi, or various assets owned by the Company, at extremely attractive prices - such that we continue to believe that a sincerely-run process will yield value for Nabi shareholders easily in excess of twice the current share price. Again, we (and undoubtedly other large shareholders) stand ready to invest further significant time and expertise, and in some cases to serve as non-Board consultants on a strategic action committee charged with running the process to maximize the value of Nabi's assets (the creation of which is standard corporate action in such processes), in order to assist you in ensuring that the value of Nabi's coveted assets is maximized in whatever form that ultimately takes.

Besides the Ligand example, I would like to draw your attention to two other recent corporate events that should be considered as you contemplate the future direction of Nabi. In the case of Bristol-Myers, you are undoubtedly aware that is CEO was forced out this week after a series of poor strategic decisions. We trust that you will take to heart the following quote from Bristol Chairman James Robinson: "The concern is the obvious one, that any CEO is held accountable for both the successes and the failures.... If there are failures in execution that have caused a loss of confidence in the mind of investors, that is a relevant consideration." There can be no doubt in your minds that Mr.McLain's "failures in execution" have caused a loss of confidence in the minds of most Nabi shareholders - several of the largest of whom you have recently interfaced with directly. We also trust that you are familiar with the events at AnorMED this year, wherein that company's Board of Directors and CEO were forced out by shareholders for reasons similar to the concerns we've expressed regarding Nabi, and the result has been a near doubling in the stock price as the result of a takeover offer. We are hopeful that the Nabi situation will not come to this, but are confident that if it does the outcome for Nabi shareholders will be similarly lucrative.

I also want to once again express our grave concern with Mr. McLain's insistence, contrary to the facts, that Nabi enjoys "both strong cash flow and a strong balance sheet." This belief was reiterated again at the Weisel conference last week. As we have documented in our previous letters, the cash burn at Nabi has been egregious and unexplainable for some time now, and has been particularly so in the first half of this year. Mr. McLain apparently recently stated in an investor meeting that in biotechnology a company needs to "spend money to make money." Carefully budgeted R&D spending with clear and specific objectives is one thing; dissipating the Company's cash reserves on ill-conceived, poorly-executed projects and bloated overhead with all the discipline of a drunken sailor on a night's leave in Bangkok is unacceptable and should not be tolerated by this Board. (Indeed, we are curious as to why this Board has apparently abandoned its oversight duties in approving past corporate budgets.) To reiterate, we will not tolerate a "burn the furniture" program wherein the Company's saleable assets are sold to fund its riskier development projects. This is the situation that Nabi will soon find itself in should you not take action immediately to stop the cash burn and take advantage of the substantial current interest in Nabi's valuable assets.

In sum, it is irrefutable that a majority of your shareholders vehemently oppose the long-term, highly-risky strategic plan that you continue to force upon us against our collective will (while, once again, you undertake very little risk yourselves due to your negligible outright holdings in the stock). You have had six months now to do your research and come to the only accurate conclusion -i.e., if you truly take your fiduciary, legal and moral obligations seriously you will agree to act upon the will of the majority of Nabi shareholders (many of whom have apparently now communicated with you directly) and empower BofA to explore all possibilities to maximize the significant asset values embedded within Nabi. As Mr. McLain has explained to us himself, it is very difficult fora small biotechnology company to succeed in the marketplace today. We agree, and when that company is not strongly capitalized and extremely well managed - Nabi being neither of these - it is nearly impossible. It is time that you finally acknowledge this and, should this prove to be the optimal outcome, place our valuable assets, at a substantial premium, in the hands of stronger operators.

Mr. McLain's "balanced scorecard" (alluded to on the Company website) apparently does not exist (if it does the Company has refused to release it), but if it does exist it must be overwhelmingly unbalanced in that it is unarguably weighted so strongly to the negative. Nabi's large shareholders, on the other hand, are highly respected investors with strong long-term track records and the willingness to work with you to maximize the value of Nabi for everyone's benefit. The Board's final scorecards have yet to be submitted. Again, we understand that Nabi is holding a Board meeting tomorrow to discuss the future direction of the Company - including whether BofA's mandate will be expanded to allow them to explore all ways to maximize the value of Nabi's assets. We insist once again that you do the right thing, listen to the will of the owners of the Company whom you serve, and empower your investment bankers to explore all avenues torealize the substantial value of, and interest in, Nabi.

While you consider the right course of action for this Company, in our minds theconclusion is clear and irrefutable. Should this board continue to pursue acourse of inaction, let us remind you that "proxy season" is but a few months away.

Very truly yours,

Daniel S. Loeb

Wednesday, August 16, 2006

Nabi Biopharma (NABI) Holder Third Point LLC Wants BofA Empowered to Sell the Company

In an amended 13D filing on Nabi Biopharmaceuticals (Nasdaq: NABI), 9.5% holder Third Point LLC disclosed a letter sent to the Board of Directors of NABI asking them to empower investment bank Bank of America to sell the Company.
A Copy of the Letter:

c/o Mr. Thomas E. Rathjen

Vice President,

Investor Relations

Nabi Biopharmaceuticals

5800 Park of Commerce Boulevard, N.W.

Boca Raton, Florida 33487

Dear Directors: "We will provide ... our shareholders with superior growth and value."
I ask each director to consider whether during your tenure on the Nabi Board you have fulfilled the above commitment set forth in the Nabi Mission Statement. If you have never read the statement, or have not done so for some time, I suggest that you study it again before continuing this letter. It can be found on the company website: (http://www.nabi.com/about/mission.php)
"Results Oriented: We are driven to accomplish our goals and objectives and strive for excellence and quality. Our Nabi Balanced Scorecard monitors both Company and individual performance and assures that activities are aligned with the corporate vision, mission and strategy" (source: Company Mission Statement)
I must ask each director once again, by what "Scorecard" have you measured the performance of Company CEO Thomas H. McLain: the Company's abysmal financial performance, laundry list of missed milestones or bargain-basement stock price? By what "Scorecard" should we judge this Board of Directors? We all know the answer to these questions, as the "Balanced Scorecard" kept by the stock market has been rendered: The stock plunged to under $4.00 last year and has recovered only marginally since.* Over the years, with recent examples outlined below, Mr. McLain has made one blunder after another, making him, in our opinion, one of the most disliked and least respected executives in the biotechnology industry. Please be advised that our opinion of Mr. McLain does not extend to the hard-working employees at Nabi who have worked diligently to create substantial unrealized scientific value at the Company.

As you may know, Bank of America approached Third Point LLC recently with an offer to present our views to three "independent" Nabi board members. While other large shareholders may have agreed to meet with these directors, we declined to do so. Our decision, however, should not be read by you as reflecting any diminution in our determination that NABI should immediately undertake a public process to maximize value for all shareholders -- a view that we remain confident is held by, and is in the best interests of, the vast majority of the Company's shareholders. Indeed, we have continued to add to our ownership position in Nabi, and believe that we are currently the largest shareholder of the Company.

Our prior correspondence with you, dating back to April of this year, has spelled out in detail the reasons why such a process should be commenced as soon as practicable. We made these points to Mr. McLain early this year, several months prior to approaching the Board directly. Unfortunately, Mr. McLain's curt response to us on May 1st made it clear that he has no intention of taking seriously the will of the Company's owners. His actions since then, both public and private, have reinforced our view that he wishes to rule Nabi as his own personal "kingdom" and plans to inflict upon shareholders a long- term strategic plan that has no merit, is enormously risky, and that a vast majority of the Company's owners vehemently oppose. Given the small outright ownership of Nabi shares by both the executives and directors of this Company, as noted above, and the much larger out-of-the-money option positions held by both constituencies, it is little wonder that you have so far decided to undertake a high-risk, "swing for the fence" strategy, as you have little to lose in the highly-likely event that it fails. Needless to say, we (as the owner of 9.5% of Nabi's outstanding shares) and our fellow non-management shareholders are the ones who will bear the brunt of the losses from this misguided and unwanted plan.

Therefore, and because we were informed that the meeting would not be interactive, we declined to reiterate our well-known views to the independent directors. The prospect of making our case to a group of directors dutifully taking notes in a belated attempt to protect their legal backsides, but who have shown no inclination to act upon or even explore our well-reasoned recommendations, was not one that we relished. Rather, we believe these meetings were proposed as simply another stall tactic on the part of management and the Board, who, despite their fiduciary obligations, so far obstinately cling to the status quo -- no matter how ill-conceived such a strategy may be from the standpoint of creating shareholder value, no matter how strongly shareholders oppose it, and no matter how much damage this strategy has caused and will continue to cause, both to the portfolios of shareholders and to the reputations and legal positions of the directors themselves.

Since our last letter to you on June 15th, just two months ago, Nabi and its shareholders have witnessed a continued deterioration in their fortunes and prospects:

1) The Company once again fell short of Wall Street revenue and earnings (i.e., loss) expectations in the second quarter results reported on July 26th. This continues a remarkable, virtually unbroken string of disappointments and unfulfilled promises on all fronts (financial results, financial strategies, trial designs, trial results, product approvals, facility approvals, etc.) that the Company has served up to its shareholders and to Wall Street analysts year after year.

2) Several well-respected analysts at major Wall Street brokerage firms have for the first time begun to question Nabi's financial position given the continuing egregious cash burn at the Company as well as Mr. McLain's now-demonstrated unwillingness to reduce overhead (SG&A) to appropriate levels despite his public promises that he would, and his inability to effectively manage product inventory in the sales channel. One would think that the issue of the Company's financial situation would be an issue which the directors would consider from a personal liability standpoint given the warnings from both "street" analysts and major shareholders on this issue.

3) The Company burned another $11.5 million of its cash in Q2, which Mr. McLain in an Orwellian twist characterized as a "48% improvement" over the horrific cash burn in Q1. This rate of value destruction is almost incomprehensible, yet both Mr. McLain and the Board seem unbothered by it. Let us once again make it clear that the owners of this Company will not accept a plan wherein the Company's unexplainable, unnecessary and out-of- control cash burn is funded via selling or otherwise encumbering our valuable and highly-coveted assets at distressed levels. This is the situation that Nabi will find itself in should you not take the only logical step of exploring opportunities to maximize value for shareholders immediately.

4) Mr. McLain told us in late June that if we agreed to hold off on taking further action against the Company, which we have warned both McLain and Bank of America is forthcoming, he would be willing to update us on the Company's progress and its position regarding our outstanding demands (within the constraints of Regulation FD, we assumed) in the second week of July. Given Mr. McLain's promise, we reluctantly agreed to suspend our public critique of the Company and trusted that we could finally commence a constructive dialogue with management regarding a plan of action to stop the significant negative operating cashflow and to embark upon a plan to realize the substantial value embedded in the Company. However, instead of fulfilling his promise to present a plan based upon the Bank of America study, he said that in fact he was in no position to update us when we called at the appointed time. When I queried at what point he would be able to pursue this essential dialogue, he said that it would not happen. At that point, it became readily apparent that Mr. McLain's earlier promise to engage in a constructive discussion was a further ruse to buy him time to begin implementing his long-term plan against our wishes.

5) Despite his repeated assurances to the contrary, it is becoming increasingly clear that not only does Mr. McLain not "welcome the input" of shareholders, as is his disingenuous mantra, but instead he has begun to completely withdraw from interactions with any shareholders who might have views different than his own. Apparently, Mr. McLain instructed the conference call operators running the second quarter Nabi conference call in late July not to allow questions from anyone but Wall Street analysts (i.e., no questions were taken from any shareholders). We say this because several shareholders did in fact try to ask questions on the call but were denied the ability to do so ("luckily," the second quarter results were sufficiently disappointing, that the analysts from brokerage firms asked some of the hard questions that shareholders were attempting to ask). You should be aware that this is not an aberration, but the beginning of a regrettable pattern, as only one "friendly" shareholder was permitted to ask a question on the first quarter conference call. So we do not in any way believe McLain's assertions that he "constantly considers" what is in the best interest of the Company's shareholders -- nor should you. Indeed, he has begun to distance himself from any interactions with shareholders whatsoever, which is reinforced by his elusiveness, as noted by several Wall Street firms, at this year's unusually short (like the recent conference calls) annual meeting. If he were a man of his oft-spoken, but disingenuous, word, and truly listened to the wishes of the Company's shareholders, Nabi would have already embarked upon a successful process to maximize value for all shareholders.

6) We are aware that several parties, comprised of both substantial corporate and financial buyers, have expressed to Mr. McLain their interest in purchasing several, and in one case a majority, of Nabi's assets in the past few months. In all cases it appears that the prospective buyers have been placed "in limbo" and have not heard from anyone at the Company for a lengthy period. Indeed, we were aware, as was Mr. McLain, of a large international company that was interested in purchasing Civacir -- before Mr. McLain went ahead and encumbered the asset (albeit, not significantly), apparently without exploring the larger opportunity. Needless to say, such treatment of interested parties is unprofessional, does not reflect well upon management's attention to its fiduciary duties, and is dangerous to all of you legally; but sadly it is not inconsistent with the pervasive shareholder-unfriendly corporate behavior we have observed.

7) We have attempted to contact each Nabi director, and have succeeded on only one occasion (apparently Mr. Davis inadvertently picked up his phone). We have not received return calls from any of you. If you were truly interested in learning what the owners of the Company really want, we would think that each of you would be interested in engaging us in an unfiltered two-way dialogue. Instead, it appears that Mr. McLain prefers a more Maoist approach whereby only information he deems beneficial to his empire is disseminated to board members. Many of you may not have been aware of this, so understand that a "head in the sand" approach to corporate directorship will not absolve you of your fiduciary, legal or moral duties.

8) We believe that some of the correspondences to you from Third Point, as well as potentially from other shareholders, have not been delivered to you in a timely manner, if at all. Such a failure to disseminate communications to the Board is a breach of Nabi's own policies as set forth in its proxy statement, as well as a deviation from normal and accepted corporate governance principles. Again, we believe that Mr. McLain has devised a self- serving system whereby all information goes through him before he filters it and sends the portions that he chooses along to you.

9) We are concerned that Bank of America -- which we believe to be an outstanding investment banking firm with a first-rate life sciences practice -- has so far been hamstrung by a nebulous mandate, essentially to provide "consulting services" to Nabi. We are confident that now that BofA has had sufficient time to investigate Nabi's staggering litany of historical failures and value destruction, to correspondingly comprehend the enormous risk and low probability of success of Nabi's current multi-year "strategy," and to understand the will of Nabi's shareholders, it has come to the only logical conclusion -- that undertaking a strategic process to maximize shareholder values at this time is the only reasonable step for the Company to take. However, it appears that BofA's retention as a "consultant" is yet another ploy by Mr. McLain to temporarily appease shareholders, and that so far they have not been empowered to evaluate any of the transactions that have been proposed by interested parties and that could result in material gains to Nabi shareholders. Accordingly, we insist that Bank of America immediately be empowered to evaluate strategic alternatives for the Company as a whole or in part.

10) We have become more convinced, based upon our further investigation of the legal parameters of spring-loading of options as well as our investigation of the knowledge circulating within Nabi at the time, that, as we have noted previously, there was at best a horrendous lack of judgment by the Board and management in implementing a generous and uncalled for retention package ahead of the positive StaphVax news earlier this year.

11) Nabi stock has continued to trade down over the past two months. And, despite what we understand to be Mr. McLain's delusional bragging that the small increase in the stock price off of its post-StaphVax-failure lows is related to anything other than several highly-respected money management firms taking positions in the stock and demanding that the Company do the right thing for shareholders, rest assured that if the market truly believed that Mr. McLain was going to be allowed to undertake his value-destructive long- term plan this stock would be making new lows every day.

12) Despite repeated promises by Mr. McLain to shareholders (dating back to a projected approval in the 4th quarter of 2005), Nabi yet again failed to secure EU approval for PhosLo in the second quarter (and still has not done so).

13) While Nabi did secure a positive FDA Advisory Committee opinion to expand the label for Nabi-HB, it nearly bungled what should have been a "no- brainer" approval, as it is already the off-label standard-of-care for this indication. One committee member noted "it would have been easier to approve this product if we had never seen the data from Nabi." This near miscue on what should have been a straightforward, unanimous (which it wasn't) approval shows again Nabi's lack of competence in designing trials, collecting and presenting data, etc. -- and, among many reasons, why we assign such a low probability of success to the Company's current "strategic plan".

We remain hopeful that this Board of Directors takes its fiduciary duty seriously. As we've alluded to only in statistical form so far, we are aware that this Board has had an aggregate lack of success in creating value for shareholders at other public companies in which Board members have been involved. Now is your chance to do the right thing for Nabi's long-suffering shareholders by initiating a process to unlock the substantial value embedded at this Company before it's too late to recognize full value for our superior assets. With all due respect, Nabi has shown that it has neither the management team nor the expertise at the board level to pursue a "go it alone" or growth strategy. We ask that you finally recognize this, and act upon it.

EMPOWER BANK OF AMERICA TO IMMEDIATELY EXPLORE ALL STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES AND PURSUE A PUBLIC PROCESS TO MAXIMIZE SHAREHOLDER VALUE.

And remember your own Corporate Governance Principles:

"THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY OF THE BOARD IS TO PROVIDE OVERSIGHT, COUNSELING AND DIRECTION TO THE MANAGEMENT OF THE COMPANY IN THE INTEREST AND FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE COMPANY'S STOCKHOLDERS."

From "The Nabi Way" on the Company's corporate website:

"Change Ready: We strive to identify areas in the company where improvement can be made. Rethinking old ways is encouraged to keep the business in a state of continuous improvement."

If you, the Nabi directors, charged as fiduciaries with running this Company for the benefit of its shareholders, are truly "Change Ready," you will "rethink" your "old," and unsuccessful "Nabi ways" and finally take action that is in the best interests of, and complies with the wishes of, the owners of this Company.

To that point, we strongly believe that if you do not undertake a program to maximize value for all shareholders you will certainly be removed from your positions, along with management, at the next annual shareholders' meeting. So, it appears to be simply a question of timing, and how much value current management can further destroy, before the Company is put up for sale -- not whether Mr. McLain's far-too-risky long-term plan will be allowed to proceed indefinitely against shareholder wishes. The Company's shareholders have now spoken loud and clear. We are highly-confident that a value maximization process will yield values for Nabi shareholders on the order of three times the current price of the stock (i.e., our continued due diligence has given us ever increased confidence that Nabi has valuable and coveted assets that, sold in whole or in components, will yield value for shareholders well in excess of $10 per share). We are confident that once you have done your homework you will also reach the only logical conclusion -- that undertaking a process of maximizing value now is a far better risk-adjusted, probability-weighted outcome for shareholders than what the Company is currently proposing. Do your jobs and direct management to take appropriate action for the benefit of the shareholders whom you serve. We are grateful for your cooperation, and look forward to a speedy response to this letter.

Very truly yours,

Daniel S. Loeb
Chief Executive Officer

Monday, March 05, 2007

Executives In Dan Loeb's Portfolio Take Notice

Activist hedge fund manager Daniel Loeb and his Third Point LLC fund have been very aggressive recently --- targeting PDL BioPharma today, and also Acorda Therapeutics and Pogo Producing recently.

Below we take a look at the stocks in his portfolio.

The boards at any of the companies yet to be contacted by Mr. Loeb should be nervous.

Recent Loeb Activist Targets:

Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. (NASDAQ: ACOR) has 9.9% stake. Wants company sold
Flow International Corp. (Nasdaq: FLOW) has 13.6% stake. Wants and recently requested the company be sold.
Nabi Biopharmaceuticals (Nasdaq: NABI) reached agreement with the company to have its representitives on the board
PDL BioPharma Inc. (Nasdaq: PDLI) has a 7.5% stake. Urged company cut costs and not pursue additional acquisitions.
Pogo Producing Company (NYSE: PPP) has a 7.9% stake. Wants company sold in whole or pieces. Proposed six nominees to the board. (NOTE: Company announced exploration of strategic alternatives)

Loeb Large 5%+ Passive Stakes of Interest (Loeb Could Turn Activist)

FEI Co. (Nasdaq: FEIC) 6.2% stake
Martin Marietta Materials Inc. (NYSE: MLM) 6.6% stake disclosed in 13D but no demands
IHOP Corp. (NYSE: IHP) 7% stake
Ryerson Inc. (NYSE: RYI) 7.5% stake (activist target of Harbinger and Owl Creek)

More Loeb Stocks To Watch: (Loeb Could Raise Stakes and/or Turn Activist)

ASML Holding NV (ASML), Cephalon Inc. (CEPH), Ceridian Corporation (CEN), Cypress Semiconductor (CY), Dominion Resources Inc. (D) , Flamel Technologies SA (FLML), GATX Corp. (GMT), Glenayre Technologies, Inc. (GEMS), Helix Energy Solutions Group, Inc. (HLX), Invitrogen Corp. (IVGN), Mastercard Incorporated (MA), Motorola Inc. (MOT), Neurocrine Biosciences Inc. (NBIX), NeuroMetrix Inc. (NURO), NPS Pharmaceuticals Inc. (NPSP), Pharmion Corp. (PHRM), Sepracor, Inc. (SEPR), Verigy, Ltd. (VRGY), Vulcan Materials Co. (VMC), Xenoport, Inc. (XNPT).

Other Positions:

AEP Industries Inc. (AEPI), Centennial Bank Holdings, Inc. (CBHI), Eddie Bauer Holdings, Inc. (EBHI), CBS Corp (CBS), Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. (CMG), Core-Mark Holding Company, Inc. (CORE), CSX Corp (CSX), Dade Behring Holdings Inc. (DADE), Daimlerchrysler AG (DCX), Embarq Corp. (EQ) , EXCO Resources Inc. (XCO), Harrah's Entertainment Inc. (HET), ICO GLOBAL COMM CL A (ICOG), Infineon Technologies AG (IFX), Integrated Electrical Services Inc. (IESC), Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV (PHG), Leap Wireless International Inc. (LEAP), Liberty Media Interactive (LINTA), Ligand Pharmaceuticals Inc. (LGND), Loral Space & Communications, Inc. (LORL), Massey Energy Co. (MEE), McDonald's Corp. (MCD), MedImmune Inc. (MEDI), Microsoft (MSFT), Molex Inc. (MOLX), NEXEN INC (NXY), NTL Inc. (NTLI) now Virgin Media, Inc. (VMED) , NYSE Group, Inc. (NYX), OSI Restaurant Partners, Inc. (OSI), Phelps Dodge Corp. (PD), PHOENIX COS INC (OTC: PNXZL), Plains Exploration & Production Co. (PXP), PNC Financial Services Group Inc. (PNC), Qimonda AG (QI), Quest Resource Corp. (QRCP), Ruddick Corp. (RDK), Salton Inc. (SFP), Sears Holdings Corporation (SHLD) shares, Union Pacific Corp. (UNP)

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Friday, February 16, 2007

Loeb Gets His Way - Twice

Dan Loeb of Third Point LLC scored a double win today.

1. Nabi Biopharmaceuticals (Nasdaq: NABI) announced that Thomas H. McLain has resigned as chairman, chief executive officer and president, effective immediately. Loeb had been pushing for McLain's ouster.

2. Pogo Producing Company (NYSE: PPP) confirmed that its Board of Directors previously initiated the exploration of a range of strategic alternatives to enhance shareholder value and is continuing to do so, including the possible sale or merger of Pogo, the sale of its Canadian, Gulf Coast, Gulf of Mexico or other significant assets, and changes to the company's business plan. Pogo retained Goldman, Sachs & Co. and TD Securities Inc. as financial advisors for the process. Loeb has been pushing the company to sell.

Link to past reports on Loeb's moves related to PPP

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Tuesday, September 05, 2006

Loeb's Third Point LLC Sends Letter to Nabi Biopharmaceuticals (NABI) Demanding a Look at Books

In an amended 13D filing on Nabi Biopharmaceuticals (Nasdaq: NABI) 9.5% holder Third Point LLC run by Daniel Loeb disclosed a letter sent to the Company demanding the right to inspect certain books and records of the Company. Loeb said the demand is being made to: 1) investigate whether members of the board of directors of the Company have engaged in gross mismanagement in managing the affairs of the Company, 2) to investigate whether such members breached, and are continuing to breach, their fiduciary duties to the Company and the stockholders, 3) to determine whether to conduct a proxy contest to replace the members of the board of directors and 4) to determine whether to commence litigation against members of the board for the breaches of fiduciary duty, among other wrongs.

A Copy of the Letter:

Pursuant to Section 220 of the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware, Third Point LLC, the beneficial owner of 5,750,000 shares of the Common Stock of Nabi Biopharmaceuticals (the "Company"), Daniel S. Loeb, the beneficial owner of the same shares, and Third Point Offshore Fund, Ltd., the beneficial holder of 3,691,500 of those shares (collectively, the"Stockholders"), demand the right to inspect, during usual business hours, the books and records of the Company listed below and to make copies or extracts from them. True and correct copies of a (1) Schedule 13D Amendment filed by Stockholders with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, and (2)brokerage statement reflecting beneficial ownership of shares of the Company are attached hereto.

The following are the true and primary purposes for which the Stockholders are making the demand for inspection: (1) to investigate and, we believe, confirm that the members of the board of directors of the Company have engaged in gross mismanagement in managing the affairs of the Company, (2) to investigate and, we believe, confirm that such members breached, and are continuing to breach, their fiduciary duties to the Company and its stockholders, (3) to determine whether to conduct a proxy contest to replace the members of the board of directors and (4) to determine whether to commence litigation against such members for breaches of fiduciary duty, among other wrongs. These purposes are reasonably related to the Stockholders' interests as stockholders of the Company.

The Stockholders believe that the board of directors of the Company has grossly mismanaged the affairs of the Company and has engaged, and is engaging, in breaches of fiduciary duty contrary to the interests of stockholders. For example, the Stockholders believe that the granting of stock options to certain members of management in February 2006 was deliberately and wrongfully timed to maximize the economic benefit to the option grantees and was contrary to the interests of stockholders. In addition, Stockholders believe that the directors have ignored, and are continuing to ignore, the will of the majority of the Company's stockholders, and are embarked on a scheme to entrench themselves in office for as long as possible and to maximize the personal financial benefits to themselves during their remaining tenure at the expense of the Company and its stockholders. The Company's board of directors has paid mere lip service to the interests and wishes of its stockholders, and has refused to engage in substantive dialogue concerning the gross mismanagement over which they have presided. The Stockholders further refer the board to their letters dated April27, 2006 and June 15, 2006, which spell out the gross mismanagement and breaches of fiduciary duty engaged in by the Company's management and board of directors. Those letters are incorporated by reference herein.

The books and records demanded are the following:

1. Any documents reviewed by the compensation committee of the board of directors (the "Committee") of the Company in connection with its adoption of the "retention package" described in the Company's February 28, 2006 Form 8-K, the minutes of any meeting of the Committee or the board at which any such package was discussed during 2006, and any other books and records concerning the decision to adopt the "retention package."

2. Any documents reviewed by the board of directors of the Company or the Committee in connection with the decision in 2006 to accelerate the vesting of options of certain officers of the Company, the minutes of any meeting of the board or any committee at which the possibility of such acceleration was discussed and any other books and records concerning the decision to accelerate the vesting.

3. Any report of the results of the confirmatory Phase III clinical trial for StaphVax described in the Company's November 1, 2005 news release, the investigatory plan for StaphVax described in the Company's March 21, 2006 news release, any report of the assessment, described in the same release, by the Company of the StaphVax confirmatory Phase III clinical study results, and any books and records concerning the review of the Company's assessment by the outside advisory panel described in the news release.

4. Any books and records prepared or reviewed by the board of directors of the Company or any committee of the board concerning the results of the confirmatory Phase III clinical trial for StaphVax, the Company's assessment of the results and the review of such assessment or the results by the outside advisory panel, and any minutes of any board or committee meetings at which some or all of these subjects were discussed.

5. The agreement by which the Company's manufacturing agreement with Cambrex Bio Science Baltimore, Inc. was terminated, as described in the Company's February 28, 2006 Form 8-K, including any books and records concerning the same that were reviewed by the board of directors of the Company or any committee of the board and any minutes of any board or committee meetings at which the termination was discussed.

6. Any actual or draft standstill agreements between the Company and any person that would prevent an acquisition of the Company or any of its shares by such person for any period of time and any books and records concerning any actual or proposed agreement to the same effect.

7. Any books and records, created, dated or received on or after October 1,2005, concerning the possibility of entering into an extraordinary transaction, whether by sale of substantially all the Company's assets, consolidation, merger, acquisition, recapitalization or otherwise, including any valuation of the Company or its assets whether or not prepared by a financial advisor to the Company and any board or committee presentations or minutes concerning such possibility.

8. Any engagement letters entered between the Company and any financial advisor on or after October 1, 2005, including the engagement letters with Lehman Brothers and Bank of America.

9. Any books and records concerning any discussion by the board of directors of the Company or any committee concerning the actual or possible retention of any financial advisor to the Company on or after October 1, 2005.

10. The strategic business plan described in the letter of Thomas H. McLain t hat is Exhibit 99 to the Company's May 1, 2006 Form 8-K, any books and records prepared or reviewed by the board of directors of the Company or any committee of the board concerning such plan, and any board or committee minutes reflecting the development of the plan or concerning the plan.

11. All Nabi Balanced Scorecards for Thomas H. McLain prepared on or after January 1, 2004.

12. All projected financial statements for the Company that were prepared on or after January 1, 2005 and have been provided to the board of directors of the Company or any committee of the board.

13. All books and records reflecting any agreements or transactions, dated or entered into after January 1, 2005, between (a) any member of the board of directors of the Company or any entity in which such director has a financial interest and (b) the Company or any other member of the board of directors or any officer of the Company.

The Stockholders designate and authorize their attorneys, Willkie Farr &Gallagher LLP and Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor, LLP, to conduct the inspection and copying of the books and records. Please advise C. Barr Flinn,Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor, LLP, The Brandywine Building, 1000 West Street,17th Floor, Wilmington, Delaware, 19801 (telephone (302) 571-6692), as promptly as possible when and where the items demanded above will be available to the Stockholders for inspection and copying. If no response is received within five business days, further action will be taken to enforce the Stockholders' inspection rights.

If this demand includes books and records that, in the Company's view, are unduly burdensome to provide, the counsel designated above are authorized to modify the request, but to avoid any misunderstanding, any such modification must be in writing. Stockholders will bear the reasonable costs the Company incurs in connection with production of the information sought by this demand.

Very truly yours,

THIRD POINT LLC

Daniel S. Loeb

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Monday, November 13, 2006

Nabi Biopharmaceuticals (NABI) and Third Point LLC Reach Agreement

This morning, Nabi Biopharmaceuticals (Nasdaq: NABI) and dissident shareholder Third Point LLC announced that they have reached a settlement relating to a potential consent solicitation.

Under the deal, Nabi Biopharmaceuticals has appointed two Third Point nominees, Jason Aryeh, founder and general partner of JALAA Equities, LP and Tim Lynch, president and CEO of NeuroStat Pharmaceuticals, Inc., to the company's board of directors. In addition, Nabi Biopharmaceuticals will establish a strategic action committee to continue the company's previously announced process of exploring strategic alternatives. The Third Point nominees' will sit on the five member committee.

As part of the settlement, Nabi Biopharmaceuticals has agreed to pay up to $250,000 of Third Point's expenses and Third Point has agreed that it will not commence a consent solicitation or a proxy contest prior to the company's 2007 annual meeting of shareholders.

Third Point CEO, Daniel S. Loeb, said, "We are pleased to be able to work constructively with Nabi Biopharmaceuticals with the shared goal of enhancing the value of the company."

Friday, May 11, 2007

Loeb's Third Point Raises Stake in Nabi Biopharmaceuticals (NABI) to 11.4%

In an amended 13D filing this afternoon on Nabi Biopharmaceuticals (Nasdaq: NABI), Dan Loeb's Third Point LLC disclosed they raised their stake to 11.4% from 9.5%, buying 1.14 million shares from 05/08-05/10.

Third Point has representatives on the board of directors of Nabi as part of a 2006 settlement.

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Wednesday, October 04, 2006

Third Point LLC Plans to Proceed with Consent Solicitation to Remove Chairman McLain

Daniel Loeb's Third Point LLC confirmed that it will proceed shortly with its previously-announced plan to conduct a consent solicitation to remove Thomas H. McLain, Chairman, Chief Executive Officer and President of Nabi Biopharmaceuticals (Nasdaq: NABI), from the Company's Board of Directors.

Third Point will also likely seek the removal of one or more additional Nabi directors.

Third Point said despite Nabi's recent announcement that it has authorized Bank of America to explore strategic alternatives, Nabi waited almost two weeks subsequent to its September 15, 2006 board meeting to make this announcement, and only did so the day after Third Point initially announced its intention to solicit consents.

Third Point LLC, which beneficially owns approximately 9.5% of the Nabi shares outstanding, is a $4 billion investment management firm based in New York.

Tuesday, September 26, 2006

Nabi (NABI) Holder Third Point LLC Seeks Consent Solicitation To Remove Chairman McLain and Possibly Others

In an amended 13D filing on Nabi Biopharmaceuticals (Nasdaq: NABI), 9.5% holder Daniel Loeb's Third Point LLC said it intend to conduct shortly a consent solicitation in order to remove Chairman/CEO Mr. McLain and possibly one or more other directors from the Board of Directors. Loeb said the company refused to comment on whether it is moving toward a strategic alternatives process or whether some other decision was taken by the Board. The hedge fund has been encouraging the Company and its Board of Directors to explore strategic alternatives in order to maximize value for all shareholders.

From the 'Purpose of Transaction' section of the filing:

"Over a period of approximately seven months, the Reporting Persons have encouraged the Company and its Board of Directors to explore strategic alternatives in order to maximize value for all shareholders. The Reporting Persons have repeatedly expressed to the Company and the Board their belief and concern that the Company's "cash burn" rate is too high and its strategic plan is too risky for the Company to continue with "business as usual." Of particular concern to the Reporting Persons are that the Company does not appear to have been receptive to interest from prospective buyers of the Company or its component assets, and the possibilities that the Company may have to sell valuable assets at inadequate prices or enter into dilutive equity-linked financings in order to follow through on its business plan.

On September 14, 2006, in advance of a Board meeting scheduled for the following day, the Reporting Persons once again called upon the Board of Directors to expand its investment bankers' mandate to allow them to explore all ways to maximize the value of the Company's assets. Since that Board meeting, the Company has refused to comment on whether it is moving toward a strategic alternatives process or whether some other decision was taken by the Board.

As a result, the Reporting Persons intend to conduct shortly a consent solicitation in order to remove Mr. McLain and possibly one or more other directors from the Board of Directors. In conjunction with this solicitation, the Reporting Persons also intend to solicit consents in favor of a proposal requesting that one or more individuals named by the Reporting Persons be added to the Board to fill any vacancies created by the removal of directors.

Under the Delaware General Corporation Law (the "DGCL") and the Company's Certificate of Incorporation (the "Certificate"), the shareholders of the Company are entitled to act by written consent to remove directors of the Company. The written consent procedure to remove directors operates outside of annual or special meetings of shareholders and may be undertaken at any time. Although a provision of the Company's Bylaws (the "Bylaws") purports to limit the removal of Company directors to instances of "cause" and to require a 75%vote of the shareholders to effect such a removal, the Reporting Persons believe that this Bylaw provision is invalid and ineffective because it conflicts with the DGCL. Under the DGCL, except in cases not relevant to the Company and except where the right is limited in the Certificate (not the Bylaws), the Company's shareholders have a right to remove any or all Company directors, without cause, by the vote of the holders of a majority of the shares of Common Stock outstanding. The Certificate does not restrict this statutory right of the shareholders to remove directors of the Company by majority vote and without cause.

The Reporting Persons believe, however, that under the DGCL and the Bylaws, the remaining members of the Board of Directors, and not the shareholders, have the right to fill any vacancies created by the removal of directors. Accordingly, the Reporting Persons also intend to solicit consents, at the same time as consents are solicited for the removal of Mr. McLain and possibly one or more other directors, in favor of a resolution of the shareholders of the Company calling on the Board to fill the vacancies with individuals who will be named by the Reporting Persons at the time of the consent solicitation.

In connection with the consent solicitation, Third Point LLC and certain of its affiliates intend to file a consent statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC") to solicit stockholders of the Company with respect to the removal of Mr. McLain and possibly one or more other directors from the Board of Directors. THIRD POINT LLC STRONGLY ADVISES ALL STOCKHOLDERS OF THE COMPANY TO READ THE CONSENT STATEMENT WHEN IT BECOMES AVAILABLE BECAUSE IT WILL CONTAIN IMPORTANT INFORMATION, INCLUDING INFORMATION RELATING TO THE PARTICIPANTS IN ANY SUCH CONSENT SOLICITATION. SUCH CONSENT STATEMENT, WHEN FILED, AND ANY OTHER RELEVANT DOCUMENTS WILL BE AVAILABLE AT NOCHARGE ON THE SEC'S WEBSITE AT HTTP://WWW.SEC.GOV.

Wednesday, August 15, 2007

Summary of Loeb's Third Point LLC 13F

Daniel Loeb's Third Point LLC issued their latest 13F for the quarter ended June 30, 2007:

New Stakes:
Abraxas Petroleum Corp. (AMEX: ABP) 1,207,572 shares, Aeroflex Inc. (Nasdaq: ARXX) 1,260,000 shares, Apartment Investment & Management Co. (NYSE: AIV) 755,000 shares, Applera Corp-Applied Biosystems Group (NYSE: ABI) 200,000 shares, Atmel Corp. (Nasdaq: ATML) 24,400,000 shares, BEA Systems Inc. (Nasdaq: BEAS) 9,650,000 shares, BioFuel Energy Corp. (Nasdaq: BIOF) 1,250,000 shares, CIT Group Inc. (NYSE: CIT) 750,000 shares, Citadel Broadcasting Corporation (NYSE: CDL) 4,396,163 shares, Clear Channel Communications Inc. (NYSE: CCU) 2,750,000 shares, Cypress Bioscience Inc. (Nasdaq: CYPB) 100,000 shares, Dillard's Inc. (NYSE: DDS) 1,000,000 shares, Dominion Resources Inc. (NYSE: D) 400,000 shares, Douglas Emmett Inc (NYSE: DEI) 2,750,000 shares, Greenlight Capital Re, Ltd. (Nasdaq: GLRE) 800,000 shares, Herbalife Ltd. (NYSE: HLF) 1,000,000 shares, Home Solutions of America Inc. (Nasdaq: HSOA) 100,000 share PUT, ICICI Bank Ltd. (NYSE: IBN) 1,110,000 shares, Invesco Plc (NYSE: IVZ) 850,000 shares, Linn Energy, LLC (Nasdaq: LINE) 1,733,331 shares, Medis Technologies Ltd. (Nasdaq: MDTL) 100,000 shares, NuStar GP Holdings LLC (NYSE: NSH) 2,000,000 units, OM Group Inc. (NYSE: OMG) 2,050,000 shares, Post Properties Inc. (NYSE: PPS) 165,000 shares, T. Rowe Price Group, Inc. (Nasdaq: TROW) 100,000 shares PUT, Symantec Corporation (Nasdaq: SYMC) 500,000 shares, UBS AG (NYSE: UBS) 150,000 shares, United Therapeutics Corp. (Nasdaq: UTHR) 250,000 shares, Vantage Energy Services, Inc. (AMEX: VTG) 1,875,000 shares, Veeco Instruments Inc. (Nasdaq: VECO) 1,425,000 shares, Victory Acquisition Corp. (AMEX: VRY) 2,200,000 shares, Willbros Group Inc. (NYSE: WG) 1,500,000 shares
Raised Stakes: Acadia Pharmaceuticals Inc. (Nasdaq: ACAD) from 350,000 shares to 475,000 shares, Alkermes, Inc. (Nasdaq: ALKS) from 750,000 shares to 2,835,000 shares, ATP Oil & Gas Corp. (Nasdaq: ATPG) from 2,000,000 shares to 2,500,000 shares, Eddie Bauer Holdings, Inc. (Nasdaq: EBHI) from 1,200,000 shares to 1,425,000 shares, Bausch & Lomb Inc. (NYSE: BOL) from 300,000 shares to 1,605,000 shares, Candela Corp. (Nasdaq: CLZR) from 1,275,000 shares to 2,120,000 shares, Charming Shoppes Inc. (Nasdaq: CHRS) from 2,2000,000 shares to 5,250,000 shares, CSX (NYSE: CSX) from 1,300,000 shares to 2,000,000 shares, CV Therapeutics, Inc. (Nasdaq: CVTX) from 1,350,000 shares to 5,900,000 shares, Cypress Semiconductor Corporation (NYSE: CY) from 750,000 shares to 5,300,000 shares, DAIMLERCHRYSLER (NYSE: DAI) from 322,000 shares to 447,000 shares, DepoMed Inc. (Nasdaq: DEPO) from 325,000 shares to 4,735,000 shares, Flamel Technologies SA (Nasdaq: FLML) from 225,000 shares to 920,000 shares, Freedom Acquisition Holdings Inc. (NYSE: FRH) from 1,500,000 shares to 2,700,000 shares, Granite Construction Inc. (NYSE: GVA) from 1,350,000 shares to 3,500,000 shares, Infineon Technologies AG (NYSE: IFX) from 1,800,000 shares to 2,600,000 shares, Nabi Biopharmaceuticals (Nasdaq: NABI) from 5,750,000 shares to 6,890,000 shares, Norfolk Southern Corp. (NYSE: NSC) from 1,250,000 shares to 1,350,000 shares, Northern Orion Resources Inc. (AMEX: NTO) from 7,600,000 shares to 8,600,000 shares, NYSE Euronext, Inc. (NYSE: NYX) from 1,650,000 shares to 4,849,700 shares, PDL BioPharma Inc. (Nasdaq: PDLI) from 8,450,000 shares to 11,400,000 shares, Questar Corp. (NYSE: STR) from 325,000 shares to 3,500,000 shares, Synovus Financial Corp. (NYSE: SNV) from 5,500,000 shares to 7,375,000 shares, Tronox Inc. (NYSE: TRX) from 450,000 shares to 2,500,000 shares, Union Pacific Corp. (NYSE: UNP) from 500,000 shares to 700,000 shares
Lowered Stakes:
Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. (Nasdaq: ACOR) from 2,290,000 shares to 1,000,000 shares, AEP Industries Inc. (Nasdaq: AEPI) from 1,000,000 to 0, Alexion Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Nasdaq: ALXN) from 400,000 shares to 0, BearingPoint (NYSE: BE) from 3,000,000 to 0, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. (NYSE: BMY) 200,000 to 0, Cephalon Inc. (Nasdaq: CEPH) from 375,000 shares to 200,000 shares, Clearwire Corporation (Nasdaq: CLWR) 150,000 shares to 0, Embarq Corp. (NYSE: EQ) from 325,000 shares to 225,000 shares, Euroseas, Ltd. (ESEA) from 262,212 shares to 0, FMC Corp. (NYSE: FMC) from 700,000 shares to 0, FEI Co. (Nasdaq: FEIC) from 2,130,000 shares to 1,950,000 shares, General Motors Corporation (NYSE: GM) from 1,000,000 to 0, ICO GLOBAL COMM CL A (Nasdaq: ICOG) from 4,500,000 shares to 2,245,000 shares, Invitrogen Corp. (Nasdaq: IVGN) from 800,000 shares to 750,000 shares, Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV (NYSE: PHG) from 685,000 shares to 400,000 shares, Leap Wireless International Inc. (Nasdaq: LEAP) from 750,000 shares to 575,000 shares, Martin Marietta Materials Inc. (NYSE: MLM) from 2,575,000 shares to 550,000 shares, Mastercard Incorporated (NYSE: MA) from 1,900,000 shares to 1,600,000 shares, MDS, Inc. (NYSE: MDZ) from 1,350,00 shares to 0, Molex Inc. (Nasdaq: MOLX) 475,000 shares to 181,700 shares, Motorola Inc. (NYSE: MOT) 3,000,000 shares to 0, Neurochem Inc. (Nasdaq: NRMX) from 250,000 to 0, Neurocrine Biosciences Inc. (Nasdaq: NBIX) from 1,215,000 shares to 0, Onyx Pharmaceuticals Inc. (Nasdaq: ONXX) from 1,080,000 shares to 500,000 shares, Plains Exploration & Production Company (NYSE: PXP) from 2,000,000 shares to 0, QIMONDA AG (NYSE: QI) from 400,000 shares to 0 ,QUALCOMM (Nasdaq: QCOM) from 500,000 shares to 0, Ryerson Inc. (NYSE: RYI) from 1,975,000 shares to 0, SAIC, Inc. (NYSE: SAI) from 300,000 shares to 0, Sears Holdings Corporation (Nasdaq: SHLD) from 500,000 shares to 0, SunPower Corporation (Nasdaq: SPWR) from 559,800 shares to 336,800 shares, Talisman Energy Inc. (NYSE: TLM) from 3,750,000 shares to 1,000,000 shares, Temple-Inland Inc. (NYSE: TIN) from 300,000 shares to 0, Tronox Inc. (NYSE: TRX) from 900,000 shares to 0, Verigy, Ltd. (Nasdaq: VRGY) 900,000 shares to 800,000 shares
Maintained Stakes:
Ariad Pharmaceuticals Inc. (Nasdaq: ARIA), Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corp. (NYSE: BNI), CBS CORP CL B (NYSE: CBS), Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. (NYSE: CMG), Coleman Cable, Inc. (Nasdaq: CCIX), Core-Mark Holding Company, Inc. (Nasdaq: CORE), Dade Behring Holdings Inc. (Nasdaq: DADE), EXCO Resources Inc. (NYSE: XCO), Flow International Corp. (Nasdaq: FLOW), Harrah's Entertainment Inc. (NYSE: ET), IHOP Corp. (NYSE: IHP), Kansas City Southern (NYSE: KSU), Ligand Pharmaceuticals Inc. (Nasdaq: LGND), Loral Space & Communications, Inc. (Nasdaq: LORL), Massey Energy Co. (NYSE: MEE), Pogo Producing Co. (NYSE: PPP)

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