Fine Capital Raises Stake in Radio One (ROIAK), ValueVision Media (VVTV) and Carmike Cinemas (CKEC)

In a 13D filing, Fine Capital disclosed it raised its stake in Radio One Inc. (Nasdaq: ROIAK) to 5.9% (5.1 million shares). This is up from the 1.2 million shares stake the firm disclosed in a quarterly filing with regulators.

In an amended 13D filing, Fine Capital also disclosed it raised its stake in ValueVision Media, Inc. (Nasdaq: VVTV) to 6.4% (2.43 million shares). This is up from the 5.11% stake (1.9 million shares) the firm disclosed in a past filing.

In an amended 13D filing. Fine Capital also disclosed it raised its stake in Carmike Cinemas Inc. (Nasdaq: CKEC) to 8.3% (1.05 million shares). This is up from the 976K shares stake the firm disclosed in a quarterly filing with regulators.

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Nierenberg Investment Raises Stake in RadiSys (RSYS) to 11.1%, Still Thinks Stock Dramatically Undervalued

In an amended 13D filing on RadiSys Corp. (Nasdaq: RSYS), Nierenberg Investment disclosed an 11.1% stake (2.37 million shares) in the company. This is up from the 2.06 million share stake the firm disclosed in a quarterly filing with regulators.

The firm disclosed the last time they bought a large block of RSYS was one year ago, on October 28, 2005, when RSYS' fourth quarter guidance caused the share price to swoon. The firm bought 300,000 more shares on October 27, 2006.

Quoting from their amended 13D, filed November 9, 2005, which they said remains true, the firm said:

"RSYS is a dramatically undervalued growth company which possesses a fortress balance sheet, an impressive board of directors, a strong management team, and a business model which generates a stunning amount of positive cash flow.

The stock market has trouble valuing this company. Because RSYS is a micro-cap, not many analysts trouble to understand it. Moreover, RSYS' business, on the surface, is not easy for some people to understand. What "advanced embedded computing" means is not intuitively obvious. There are few, if any, pure play public companies with which to compare RSYS. RSYS' revenues are highly concentrated, with its top five customers generating 72% of sales in the most recent quarter. This means that quarterly revenues are inherently lumpy.

Wall Street's obsession with linear short term results causes it to undervalue dramatically the fundamental shareholder value which is being created at RSYS. Those who look out three to five years, like venture capitalists do, see value in a very different way than those who only look out three months."

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Ilia Lekach Lowers Stake in eCom Ventures (ECMV) to 4%

In an amended 13D filing on eCom Ventures, Inc. (Nasdaq: ECMV), Ilia Lekach disclosed a 4% stake (120K shares) in the company. This is down from the 9% stake he disclosed in a past filing (07/02).

According to traders who know the stock, Lekach's selling has undeservedly punished the stock over the past six months, but the stock has moved higher recently as word circulated Likach was nearly done selling.

While Lekach has been selling his stake in the company, eCom Ventures' controlling shareholder Glenn Nussdorf has been buying up shares of Lekach's company Parlux Fragrances (Nasdaq: PARL).

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Nabi (NABI) Holder Third Point LLC Files Preliminary Consent Statement to Remove Board Members, Discloses Unsuccesful Settlement

Nabi Biopharmaceuticals (Nasdaq: NABI) 9.5% holder Third Point LLC filed a preliminary consent statement to remove Chairman Thomas H. McLain and other directors from the Board of Directors (Harvey, Hudson, Davis, Castaldi)

Third Point said it will nominate Mr. Aryeh, Todd Davis, Stephen Kasnet, Timothy Lynch and Stuart Oran to be appointed by the remaining members of the Board to fill any vacancies created by the removal of directors.

In a related 13D filing, Third Point also disclosed an exchange between a Third Point representitive and the company which resulted in an unsuccesful settlement agreement.

From the 'Purpose of Transaction' section of the 13D filing:

"On October 26, 2006, Mr. Aryeh contacted Mr. McLain to clarify fundamental issues regarding NABI-HB raised on the Company's earnings conference call held the prior day. Mr. Aryeh also advised Mr. McLain that he had agreed to be a nominee of the Third Point Reporting Persons, and that he regretted that the Company's dispute with many of its largest stockholders had come to such an impasse. Later that day, Mr. McLain reached out to Mr. Aryeh and proposed that Mr. Aryeh act as an intermediary to attempt to reach a settlement with the Third Point Reporting Persons. With the consent of the Third Point Reporting Persons, Mr. Aryeh again proposed a settlement offer substantially on the terms previously proposed on September 29, 2006. Discussions continued on October 27, 2006 and ended without an agreement because the parties could not agree on the composition of the strategic action committee (the "SAC"). The Company insisted that the SAC be a committee of five members, consisting of three current Board members and two of the Third Point Reporting Persons' nominees, and the Reporting Persons agreed that the SAC could be a committee of five members if there were a mutual agreement on the fifth member. The Reporting Persons proposed that the SAC be established with four members - two designated by the Board and two of the Management Company's nominees - and that the four members, by majority vote, would choose a fifth member from among the current Board members and, failing agreement in good faith, that the four members would seek to agree in good faith on an independent person not currently on the Board to be added to the Board and the SAC. The discussions ended because the Company required that the fifth member of the SAC be another current member of the Board. Subsequently, on October 30, 2006, the Reporting Persons and the Company renewed discussions, but no settlement has been reached and significant differences between their respective positions remain."

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RLR Capital Partners Raises Stake in Infocrossing (IFOX) to 6.2%

In an amended 13D filing on Infocrossing, Inc. (Nasdaq: IFOX), RLR Capital Partners disclosed a 6.2% stake (1.34 million share) in the company. This is up from the 5.1% stake (1.08 million shares) the firm disclosed in its original 13D filing in June. In the original filing the firm disclosed a letter sent to the company regarding prior meetings with the company and forthcoming value creating strategic and capital structure opportunities. Also in the original filing, the firm said they believe shares of IFOX are "substantially undervalued."

The stock is up from the mid-$10 level when the firm disclosed the letter, currently trading at $12.45. According to calculations, the firm paid an average price of $11.06 each for its shares.

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Harbinger Capital and Salton (SFP) Enter Confidentiality Agreement Which Could Lead to Merger

In an amended 13D filing after the close on Salton Inc. (NYSE: SFP), 15.54% holder Harbinger Capital disclosed that on October 26 they entered into a confidentiality agreement with the company. The agreement follows an recent disclosure that on October 19, the fund sent a letter to the company proposing a merger between Salton and Applica (NYSE: APN), a small household appliances company they recently acquired.

On Monday, Salton announced they would explore strategic alternatives, which they said could include a sale or merger of the company.

Salton is a distributor of small appliances, home decor, and personal care products, best known for its George Foreman grill.

Shares of Salton surged 15.2% last Friday and another 24.7% on Monday following the Harbinger proposal and the company's willingness to consider a sale. The stock is flat today.

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Former UBS Star Trader Takes 6.5% Stake in Cheniere Energy (LNG)

In a 13D filing on Cheniere Energy Inc. (AMEX: LNG), SRM Global Master Fund disclosed a 6.5% stake (3.55 million shares) in the Company.

In a pretty standard disclosure, SRM said it intends to review their investment in CNG on a continuing basis and may engage in discussions with management concerning the business and future plans.

SRM Global was recently launched by Jon Wood, a former star trader at UBS AG, who according to an article from Bloomberg, helped the bank earn $2.4 billion over a six-year span. The report said Wood never lost money for clients during his 16 years at UBS, according to a marketing document sent to prospective investors. Wood's fund was one of the most anticipated of the year and quickly raised over $3 billion.

Shares of Cheniere Energy, a developer of liquid natural gas-receiving terminals, are trading at $26.50 --- near a 52-week low of $24.72 and well off the 52-week high of $44.40.

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MMI Investments Discloses 6% Stake in Paxar (PXR)

In a 13D filing on Paxar Corporation (NYSE: PXR), MMI Investments disclosed a 6% stake (2.46 million shares) in the Company.

MMI said it intends to review and evaluate the investment on an ongoing basis and may determine to increase, decrease, or dispose of its holdings of Common Stock. As a part of such review and evaluation, they may communicate with the Company's management, directors and other shareholders.

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Nierenberg Investment Raises Stake in Electro Scientific Industries (ESIO) to 9.4%

In an amended 13D filing on Electro Scientific Industries Inc. (Nasdaq: ESIO), Nierenberg Investment Management disclosed an 9.4% stake (2.74 million shares) in the company. This is up from the 8.3% stake the investment firm disclosed in a past 13D filing.

The firm said they continue to believe that there is a substantial gap between ESIO's current market value and its intrinsic value.

The firm disclosed a recent conversation with the Chairman and a separate conversation with the CEO, CFO, and the company's Director of Corporate Development and Investor Relations.

The firm said they believe that the combination of more proactive communications with the investment community and increased director ownership of ESIO stock could ultimately drive ESIO's share price closer to the company's intrinsic value.

From Item 4 of the Filing: Purpose of Transaction:

The reporting persons acquired the shares because we continue to believe that there is a substantial gap between ESIO's current market value and its intrinsicvalue. We believe this valuation gap persists even though the company has finemanagement, a fine board, a sound business strategy, leading market shares inits major business units, an attractive long term growth rate, and a fortress balance sheet.

In a friendly and constructive spirit, we have recently shared several ideas with the company in the hope that these ideas might, over time, help close the gap between ESIO's market and intrinsic value. This dialogue occurred in two conversations, summarized below, subsequent to ESIO's annual shareholder meetingof October 5, one with the Chairman of the Board of Directors and the other with the CEO, CFO, and the company's Director of Corporate Development and Investor Relations.

In our conversation with the Chairman, we noted that, according to ESIO's most recent proxy statement, none of the company's outside directors owned out rightany shares of the company's stock. We also expressed our belief that the financial community appears to attribute little value to ESIO's approximately$7.50 per share in cash when valuing the company. Finally, we noted how challenging it is for the company to earn a mid teen's return on equity (whichwe consider achievable) when half the company's equity sits on its balance sheet in cash and marketable securities which earn only a 5% pre-tax return.

We suggested to the Chairman that the ESIO board consider mandating that each outside director ultimately, over a period of time, hold a significant personal investment in the company's shares, which could be purchased in the open market or earned through board service in lieu of cash fees. We believe large director shareholding could more closely align the interests of the company's directors and shareholders and perhaps heighten urgency about driving ESIO to attain amid-teens return on equity. We believe that doing this could help close the gap between ESIO's market and intrinsic value.

Our separate conversation with the CEO, CFO and Director of Corporate Development and Investor Relations pertained to several other investors' apparent disappointment with ESIO's recently reported quarterly results. Duringt he company's earnings conference call, several investors expressed surprise and displeasure with the company's revenue guidance, both relative to their expectations and to the company's prospective shipments. This negative reaction was unfortunate because it appears to us that ESIO's several years of investing heavily in Research & Development is beginning to pay off in new products, increased customer penetration, market share gains, improved revenue growth, and widening margins.

The purpose of our conversation, however, was to suggest to management that the shareholders' disappointment with the company's revenue guidance was neither unreasonable nor unforeseeable. After all, investors have two fundamental preferences: they prefer linear growth over lumpy growth and they hate surprises.

Legitimate investor expectations about linear revenue growth create a challengefor ESIO for three reasons: (1) many ESIO products carry seven figure pricetags, which means that small variations in the number of units shipped in aquarter can drive significant near term revenue fluctuations; (2) ESIO sells to a highly concentrated set of customers, which means that small near term variations in ordering by a single customer can drive significant near term revenue fluctuations; and (3) ESIO is introducing many big ticket new products which customers will test thoroughly before accepting and paying for the products.

Therefore we advised ESIO management that they should bend over backwards to remind investors that these innocent factors can cause meaningless near term fluctuations in sequential revenue growth while the company can neverthelessremain on a healthy 15% + long term growth trajectory. In addition, we suggested that ESIO management consider guiding and characterizing financial results lessby individual quarter and more in terms of multi-quarter moving averages which could help smooth over insignificant near term fluctuations. Our belief is that such proactive investor communication could avoid the disappointment which occurred in the most recent earnings call.

In conclusion, we believe that the combination of more proactive communications with the investment community and increased director ownership of ESIO stock could ultimately drive ESIO's share price closer to the company's intrinsic value.

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Gateway (GTW) Holder Firebrand Demands Decisive Action

In an amended 13D filing with the SEC on Gateway (NYSE: GTW) after the close, 10.7% holder Harbert Management/Firebrand disclosed a letter sent to the company on October 25 regarding actions it desires that the board of directors take. Specifically, the firm urged Gateway to de-classify its board, eliminate its shareholder rights plan and appoint three Firebrand designees to the board.

The group said, "As the scale of our share purchases suggests, we believe the opportunity to increase shareholder value is dramatic. However, we also believe it is perishable and demands decisive action on the part of the Board. We are troubled that the Board appears to lack the sense of urgency to address the Company's challenges and capitalize on its opportunities. A company with a great brand and channel strength, but 5.5% gross margins, requires a Board whose oversight and experience can aid in the development and articulation of a strategy to improve margins. We believe that continued inertia at the Board level is unacceptable. If, working together, we cannot leverage these assets, then they should be put in the hands of an organization that can (i.e., the Company should be sold)."

A Copy of the Letter:

Dear Rick and Ed:

I hope this letter finds the two of you well. The discussions we have had overthe last two months have confirmed our original thesis: there is nothing wrongwith Gateway that can't be fixed with what's right with Gateway. We believe there is a great deal of common ground and that we share a workable vision of how shareholder value can be restored.

As the scale of our share purchases suggests, we believe the opportunity to increase shareholder value is dramatic. However, we also believe it is perishable and demands decisive action on the part of the Board. We are troubled that the Board appears to lack the sense of urgency to address the Company's challenges and capitalize on its opportunities. A company with agreat brand and channel strength, but 5.5% gross margins, requires a Board whose oversight and experience can aid in the development and articulation of a strategy to improve margins. We believe that continued inertia at the Board level is unacceptable. If, working together, we cannot leverage these assets,then they should be put in the hands of an organization that can (i.e., theCompany should be sold). To that end, we are requesting that the Board do thefollowing:

- Appoint three Firebrand designees to the Gateway Board of Directors;

- Redeem the Company's shareholder rights plan ("Poison Pill"); and

- Call a special meeting of shareholders for the purpose of adopting an amendment to the Company's certificate of incorporation to declassify the Board.

The Board's skills set should reflect its needs. We believe the addition of three Firebrand designees will bring much needed domain expertise inbrand and design to the boardroom that can immediately aid management's efforts to create customer differentiation and improve margins. In addition, staggered boards and poison pills are relics of a by-gone era; weapons of mass entrenchment that do nothing but hamstring shareholder value.

The steps we have outlined above reflect our continued enthusiasm and resolve to work with the Board and management for the benefit of all Gateway shareholders. We request a response by October 31, 2006 to confirm your intention to comply with our requests. If we do not hear from you, we will take your silence as a sign of unwillingness to work together and will pursue these matters on our own, through the calling of a special meeting or otherwise.

As always, I'm reachable at XXX-XXX-XXXX or XXXX@firebrandpartners.com

Regards,

Scott Galloway

Firebrand Partners

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Pardus Capital Buys Another 2M Shares of Visteon (VC), Bringing Stake to 15.6%

In a 13D filing this morning on Visteon Corp. (NYSE: VC), Pardus Capital disclosed a 15.6% stake (20 million shares) in the company. The fund bought 2 million shares between 10/24 and 10/25 at prices from $7.50 to $7.85.

In a past filing, Pardus Capital said it continues to engage in discussions from time to time with the company and has raised the possibility of an individual suggested by them joining the board.

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Integral Systems (ISYS) Lower After Sales Process Proves Fruitless, Large Holder Wants Buyback

Shares of Integral Systems, Inc., (Nasdaq: ISYS) are under pressure today after providing an update on its review of strategic alternatives.
The company said its efforts, which have been focused principally on a possible sale, have not resulted in any proposal. Therefore, the company said it has decided to explore other strategic alternatives to maximize stockholder value while still exploring a sale.
In a 13D filing after the close on Integral Systems, 12.1% shareholder Mellon HBV Alternative Strategies LLC disclosed a letter to the company dated October 22nd asking the company to consider a "broad range of alternatives". The firm suggested a Dutch auction to buyback a significant amount of its common stock.
Shares of Integral Systems are 11.6% lower to $27.94 in mid-day action Wednesday.
A Copy of the Letter:

To the Board of Directors:

As an alternative to the efforts of Integral Systems, Inc. to pursue anoutright sale, Mellon HBV Alternative Strategies LLC ("MHBV") asks that youconsider a broad range of alternatives to enhance shareholder value. As theCompany has a substantial amount of cash and unutilized debt capacity, webelieve a Dutch auction whereby the Company would buy back a significant amountof its common shares at or above current market prices would serve the goal ofenhancing shareholder value. Based on our understanding of current marketconditions, we are confident that the Company would find lenders willing tofinance such a buyback.

We believe a significant buyback would reflect the Company's belief in theinvestment value of its shares, while also providing a liquidity opportunity forthose of the Company's shareholders that may be interested in selling someportion of their position.

As you know, MHBV on behalf of affiliated investment funds and separatelymanaged accounts over which it exercises discretionary authority may be deemedthe beneficial owner of in excess of 1.3 million shares of Company common stock.As the Company's largest shareholder, we confirm that we would support effortsto explore alternative means of enhancing shareholder value, including thepossible pursuit of a Dutch auction style self tender or other significant stockbuyback program.

William F, Harley, III
Chief Executive Officer
Mellon HBV Alternative Strategies LLC

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Gazit-Globe Discloses 9% Stake in Mills Corp (MLS), Wants to Invest Up to $1.2B

In a 13D filing on The Mills Corporation (NYSE: MLS), Gazit-Globe Ltd. disclosed a 9% stake (5.1 million shares) in the Company.

Gazit-Globe's said its goal is to recapitalize what it views as a struggling Mills Corporation, and that it is prepared to "invest up to $1.2 billion into Mills.

Chaim Katzman, Gazit-Globe's chairman, said, "At this point it is clear to us that an outright sale of the company is not in the best interests of shareholders. We're urging the Mills' board of directors in the strongest terms possible to consider our recapitalization proposal" He also said, "We believe Mills can and should be rebuilt, and not sold."

In the Gazit-Globe's Septermer 29th proposal to Mills the company said, "Based upon our extensive review of the currently available public information, and, as discussed below, our in-depth property analysis, we are prepared to recapitalize the Company by investing new capital in the form of common stock. The cash amount would be up to $1.2 billion at a price per share of $24.50. This new common stock would be classified as Series B and would entitle Gazit to a majority of the seats on the Company’s board. The new common stock would also be convertible into the currently outstanding series of common stock. This new investment would be in addition to our current holdings of the Company's common stock. "

Gazit is a real estate investment company that trades on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange. The company operate their business in North America and Europe mainly through a 41% ownership of Equity One, Inc. (NYSE: EQY) and large ownership stake in First Capital Realty, Inc. and Citycon OYJ.

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CSK Auto (CAO) Holder Karsch Capital Wants Proposal For Hiring Investment Bank at Annual Meeting

In an amended 13D filing this morning on CSK Auto Corp. (NYSE: CAO), 9.3% holder Karsch Capital Management disclosed that they sent a second letter to the Board requesting that the company include in its proxy materials for the next annual meeting a proposal that the company immediately hire an investment banking firm to pursue a sale.

Karsch said, "We hope that the Board has already decided to take the steps to solicit offers for the sale of the Company upon the availability of its restated financial statements, but if not, we urge the Board to include our proposal in the Company's proxy materials for the next meeting of stockholders."

A Copy of the Letter:

To The Board of Directors of CSK Auto Corporation ("CSK Auto" or the "Company"):

Karsch Capital Management, LP(1), as a holder of 9.3% of the outstanding commonstock of CSK Auto's common stock, has attached a formal proposal that webelieve, subject to the bolded text below, should be considered by stockholdersat the Company's next stockholders meeting and included in the proxy materialsto be disseminated by the Company. Essentially, we propose that the Company putitself up for sale immediately after the Company completes the restatement ofits financial statements and becomes current with SEC reporting obligations.For confirmation of ownership, we enclose a copy of our Schedule 13D filed withthe Securities and Exchange Commission on October 10, 2006, as amended.

We want to emphasize that this letter is not being written to antagonize theBoard. Our October 9, 2006 letter states our views and they have not changed. Webelieve that the views of the Company's most important constituency - itsstockholders - be obtained concerning the Company's future and alternatives tomaximizing stockholder value. Moreover, given the provisions of CSK Auto'sbylaws regarding advanced notice of stockholder proposals, we wanted to give theCompany early notification of our proposal.

Since we have not spoken to any members of management or the Board of Directorsafter sending our letter of October 9, 2006, we do not know the Board's currentviews. HOWEVER, IF THE BOARD HAS ALREADY DECIDED, OR DECIDES, TO PUT THE COMPANYUP FOR SALE, THERE WOULD BE NO NEED TO HAVE THIS PROPOSAL INCLUDED IN THE NEXTPROXY.

We hope that the Board has already decided to take the steps to solicit offersfor the sale of the Company upon the availability of its restated financialstatements, but if not, we urge the Board to include our proposal in theCompany's proxy materials for the next meeting of stockholders.

We have not held our shares of CSK Auto common stock for at least one year asrequired by Rule 14a-8 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to qualify to have our proposal included in the Company's proxy materials. Our intent isto continue ownership of the shares through the date of the Company's nextannual or special meeting of stockholders. However, since the Company has notheld an annual meeting for nearly 16 months, we reserve the right to change ourintent or position if the Company fails to restate its financial statements andhold its annual meeting within reasonable time.

We are also aware of the provisions of the Company's bylaws that requirestockholder proposals to be submitted to the Company "no later than the close ofbusiness on the 120th day prior to the upcoming annual meeting." This advancednotice provision may not be an issue depending on the date you plan to schedulethe Company's next annual meeting of stockholders. However, because the Companyhas not held an annual meeting of stockholders since June 16, 2005, we believethat pursuant to Rule 14a-8(e)(2), stockholders have reasonable time to submitproposals and that submitting this proposal at this time provides the Companywith reasonable notice. In any event, we request that the Board overlook anyprocedural issues and elicit the views of the Company's stockholders withrespect to the future of the Company by including our proposal in the Company's proxy materials for its next annual meeting of stockholders. Given the magnitudeof our financial stake in the Company and the reasonableness of our request, weexpect that the Board would make this decision.

If the Board feels that it cannot overlook the requirements of Rule 14a-8 andchooses not to include our proposal, we urge the Board to include any similarproposal(s) if submitted by stockholder(s) who meet the requirements of Rule14a-8.

Sincerely,

Michael Karsch

Activist Hedge Fund Jana Partners LLC Discloses Passive Stake in American Italian Pasta (PLB)

In a 13G filing after the close on American Italian Pasta Co. (NYSE: PLB), Jana Partners LLC disclosed an 6% stake (1.11 million shares) in the company. This is up from the 381K share stake the firm disclosed in a quarterly filing with the SEC.

Founded in 1988 and based in Kansas City, Missouri, American Italian Pasta Company is the largest producer and marketer of dry pasta in North America.

Jana Partners LLC., a $4 billion hedge fund run by Barry Rosenstein, is best known for activism in Kerr-McGee (NYSE: KMG), Time Warner Inc. (NYSE: TWX) and Houston Exploration Co. (NYSE: THX), among others.

Shares of American Italian Pasta are up 3.7% to $7.32 in mid-day action Tuesday.

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Goldman Sachs Group Continues to Trim IntercontinentalExchange (ICE) Stake

In an amended 13D filing on IntercontinentalExchange, Inc. (NYSE: ICE), The Goldman Sachs Group disclosed a 4.7% stake (2.7 million shares) in the company. This is down from the lowered 5.6% stake (3.18 million shares) the firm disclosed just yesterday.

On October 19, 2006, GS Group sold 250,000 shares of Common Stock in accordance with Rule 144(k). On October 20, 2006, GS Group sold an additional 250,000 shares of Common Stock in accordance with Rule 144(k).

Earlier today, Morgan Stanley Capital disclosed a lowered stake in IntercontinentalExchange. Both were initial partners in IntercontinentalExchange, a global marketplaces for trading both futures and OTC energy contracts. Both were also book-running managers of the company's IPO in 2005.

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Morgan Stanley Capital Lowers Stake in IntercontinentalExchange (ICE) to 4.23%

In an amended 13D filing on IntercontinentalExchange, Inc. (NYSE: ICE), Morgan Stanley Capital Group disclosed a 4.23% stake (2.4 million shares) in the company. This is down from the 7.4% stake (4.2 million shares) the firm disclosed in a past filing.

Morgan Stanley Capital made the following sales pursuant to Rule 144(k): Oct 16th 661,100 shares at $78.83 (avg price), Oct 17th 938,900 shares at $80.90 (avg price), Oct 18th 45,600 shares at $82.04 (avg price), Oct 19th 54,400 shares at $81.50 (avg price), Oct 20th 31,400 shares at $82 (avg price).

Yesterday, Goldman Sachs disclosed a lowered stake in IntercontinentalExchange. Both were initial partners in IntercontinentalExchange, a global marketplaces for trading both futures and OTC energy contracts. Both were also book-running managers of the company's IPO in 2005.

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Steris (STE) Holder Shapiro Capital Wants Sale

Reports from Bloomberg, Steris Corp. (NYSE: STE) 7.6% holder Shapiro Capital sent a letter to the company saying they should consider strategic alternatives including a possible sale. No 13D was filed disclosing the letter.
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Pershing Square Raises Stake in Barnes & Noble (BKS) to 8% According to Barron's

Although no 13D has been filed yet, Pershing Square, an activist hedge fund run by Bill Ackman, told Barron's that it has recently increased its stake in Barnes & Noble (NYSE: BKS) from 2.3% to 8%. Ackman said he thinks the stock could jump as much as 50% in the next 18 months and perhaps double over the next three years.

Shares of BKS are up 4.5% following the weekend article which hinted that the company may be the target of a takeover.

The article concluded that the company is being eyed by private equity investors since the share price has been held under pressure by concerns over growth prospects and regulatory issues (stock option practices). However, the company has impressive cash generation which may be the main reason the company is attracting potential suitors.

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Henry Partners Discloses 9.94% Stake in Quipp (QUIP), Wants Company Sold

In a 13D filing on Quipp, Inc. (NASDAQ: QUIP), Henry Partners and Matthew Partners disclosed a 9.94% stake (145K shares) in the company. The group also disclosed a letter to the company saying:"

1. We believe the best strategic alternative is for Quipp to agree to be sold now to the highest bidder in an arms-length transaction"

2. "We are strongly opposed to, and would not support, Quipp making any additional acquisitions"

3. "We are also strongly opposed to Quipp parting with any more of its cash reserves, unless such cash is distributed, or otherwise returned, solely to Quipp's shareholders."

4. "We are strongly opposed to, and would not support, any effort by Quipp to pursue a "going dark" process"

5. "If, for whatever reason, Quipp is not sold to a third party in the near term, we believe that Quipp should continue for the time being as a publicly-traded entity ..."

6. "... expect a further reshaping of the membership of the Board of Directors"

7. "strongly believe the shareholder rights plan should be repealed"

A Copy of the Letter:

The Board of Directors
c/o Quipp, Inc.
4800 N.W. 157th Street
Miami, FL 33014-6434

Dear Ms. Kepner and Gentlemen:

I am writing to you on behalf of Henry Partners, L.P. and Matthew Partners,L.P. (collectively, "we"), who together are the beneficial owners of 145,000 shares of the common stock ("shares") of Quipp, Inc. We will be reporting this holding, which represents 9.9% of Quipp's outstanding shares, in a Schedule 13Dfiling we will be making with the Securities and Exchange Commission. This letter will be attached as an exhibit to that filing.

We are writing to express our views as significant shareholders of Quipp:

1. We believe the best strategic alternative is for Quipp to agree to be sold now to the highest bidder in an arms-length transaction. We believe that Quipp's shareholders should then have the opportunity to decide at a special meeting whether or not the agreed upon consideration is acceptable to them. For the record, we have no intention of being a bidder for Quipp.

2. We are strongly opposed to, and would not support, Quipp making any additional acquisitions. Our opposition to such a step is based on the consideration paid in the Newstec acquisition, and the subsequent poor results of that unit as disclosed in Quipp's quarterly filings.

3. We are also strongly opposed to Quipp parting with any more of its cash reserves, unless such cash is distributed, or otherwise returned, solely to Quipp's shareholders.

4. We are strongly opposed to, and would not support, any effort by Quipp to pursue a "going dark" process. We believe that any cost savings purportedly offered by such a step are far outweighed by the potential further loss of both public market value and transparency that "going dark" actions typically result in.

5. If, for whatever reason, Quipp is not sold to a third party in the near term, we believe that Quipp should continue for the time being as a publicly-traded entity, with management focused solely on managing the now-existing business for maximum profitability, rather than seeking further acquisitions.

6. In conjunction with Quipp continuing as a publicly-traded entity, we would expect a further reshaping of the membership of the Board of Directors such that more representatives of Quipp's major shareholders are offered the opportunity to serve on Quipp's Board in place of its current members, some of whom may wish to retire from the Board. As one of Quipp's largest shareholders, we would expect to participate in that process.

7. As a further part of Quipp continuing its public company status, we strongly believe the shareholder rights plan should be repealed and not reinstated without the prior approval of Quipp's shareholders, and that all Quipp directors be required to purchase in the open market, with their own funds, a realistic, yet meaningful quantity of Quipp shares so as to align more closely their thinking with that of the actual owners of the business.

From our review of the public record, we believe that decisions made by Quipp's board over the last eighteen months are directly responsible for the substantial deterioration in the price of Quipp's shares in 2006. While our status as relatively recent shareholders of Quipp has spared us from most of the pain suffered by Quipp's other shareholders as a result of that decline in Quipp's share price, we want to make it clear that we will not tolerate any further diminution of Quipp's assets or the price of its shares.

We believe that the views we have expressed in this letter would be supported by many, if not a majority, of Quipp's shareholders. If the board attempts to take steps contrary to our views as expressed in this letter, or seeks to manipulate the corporate machinery to the disadvantage of Quipp's shareholders, we will be unable to support the board's nominees at any meeting of Quipp's shareholders. If necessary, we will consider nominating our own slate of directors and soliciting proxies for their election to the board.

We are pleased to see the appointment of John Lori to the Board. We agree with substantially all of the points Mr. Lori has made in his publicly-disclosed correspondence to the Board over the last many months regarding what he believes Quipp needs to do, and also what it needs to stop doing. We hope his appointment to the Board represents an acceptance of the general correctness of his views,rather than an effort by you to attempt to silence an active shareholder whom you have publicly criticized in the past. We urge you to view this moment as an opportunity to find a new path for realizing value in the near-term for all Quipp shareholders.

As I believe you know, I contacted Michael Kady earlier this week to informhim of our share ownership and to express our willingness to have a private discussion in advance of the public disclosure of our position. We were disappointed that you did not accept our invitation to have such a discussion. In one of our conversations, however, Mr. Kady and I agreed that "dialogue is good", and I encourage you to feel free to contact me if you would like to discuss anything in this letter.

Very truly yours,

HENRY INVESTMENT TRUST, L.P.

By: Canine Partners, LLC
Its General Partner

By: David W. Wright
President

Goldman Sachs Group Cuts Its Stake in IntercontinentalExchange (ICE) to 5.6%

In an amended 13D filing after the close Friday on IntercontinentalExchange, Inc. (NYSE: ICE), The Goldman Sachs Group disclosed a 5.6% stake (3.18 million shares) in the company. This is down from the 7.5% stake (4.26 million shares) the firm disclosed in a past filing.

On October 17, 2006, GS Group sold 600,000 shares of Common Stock in accordance with Rule 144(k). On October 18, 2006, GS Group sold an additional 452,800 shares of Common Stock in accordance with Rule 144(k).

Goldman Sachs was an initial partner in IntercontinentalExchange, a global marketplaces for trading both futures and OTC energy contracts.

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ValueAct Capital Reverses Course on Snap-on, Lowering Stake to 4.6%

In an amended 13D filing on Snap-on Incorporated (NYSE: SNA), ValueAct Capital disclosed a 4.6% stake (2.66 million shares). This is down from the 6.6% stake (3.84 million shares) the investment firm disclosed in a July filing, in which the firm was disclosing a raised stake in Snap-on.

Shares of Snap-On are higher today following better-than-expected Q3 results and the announcement of a $480 million deal to to acquire ProQuest Business Solutions from ProQuest Company (NYSE: PQE).

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Large Optimal Group (OPMR) Holder Clinton Group Wants Special Dividend or Buyback and Sale

In an amended 13D filing on Optimal Group, Inc. (NASDAQ: OPMR), 6.3% holder Clinton Group disclosed a letter sent to the board of directors urging them to take steps to return the Company's significant cash position to shareholders in the form of a special dividend or Dutch tender offer and immediately embark on a sale of the Company.

The letter also stated that if strategic buyers do not demonstrate interest in the Company's subsidiary, FireOne Group plc, Clinton Group would consider investigating a buyout of the unit.

A Copy of the Letter:

Neil S. Wechsler
Co-Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer

Dear Mr. Wechsler:

We acknowledge that the unexpected passage of the Unlawful Internet GamblingEnforcement Act of 2006 was a significant setback to the strategic business planof Optimal Group Inc. ("Optimal" or the "Company") and specifically FireOneGroup plc ("FireOne"). Obviously, the growth prospects of the business as wellas the overall dynamics of the industry have changed significantly. As such, weurge the board of directors to take steps to return the Company's significantcash position to the shareholders in the form of a special dividend or Dutchtender offer and immediately embark on a sale of the Company. The Company shouldexpand the scope of Genuity Capital Markets' engagement or engage anotherfinancial advisor to execute a sale process. We believe this course of actionwould maximize value to existing shareholders given the current industrydynamics and lack of historical trading volume. Our view is that after thedistribution of the cash, Optimal is not of sufficient size to continue as apublic entity.

In conjunction with a sale process of the Company and to the extent strategicbuyers do not demonstrate interest in FireOne, we would consider investigating abuyout of FireOne by Clinton and its affiliates, and we are prepared toimmediately commence the requisite due diligence to that end. We believe thatFireOne is trading at a level that discounts the inherent valuation of thetechnology and its growth prospects outside the U.S. market. While thefinancials were not entirely articulated in the most recent quarterly filing, itappears FireOne has approximately $25 million of non-U.S. revenues, a fact thatthe market seems to overlook.

We trust that the board under your leadership will work expeditiously toconsider and review our proposal. We believe Optimal would be an attractiveadd-on candidate to several larger transaction processors and similar portfoliocompanies controlled by private equity firms.

Our first approach is always to attempt to work constructively with managementto share ideas regarding how to deliver value for shareholders, and we havestated that we would possibly participate in certain types of transactions.However, if the board fails to expeditiously pursue our stated course of action,we would consider, among other things, seeking board representation at nextyear's annual meeting through the election of directors who, subject to theirfiduciary duties, are dedicated to maximizing shareholder value through a saleprocess. If you would like to discuss the above, you or your advisors are freeto contact me at XXX-XXX-XXXX.

Sincerely,
Conrad Bringsjord
Portfolio Manager Event Driven and Activist Investments
Clinton Group Inc.

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Middle East Cement Magnet Nassef Sawiris Discloses 2.3% Stake in Texas Industries (TXI), May Propose Transaction

In a 13D filing on Texas Industries, Inc. (NYSE: TXI), Nassef Sawiris/NNS Holding disclosed a 2.3% stake (547,700 Shares). In addition to the shares, NNS Holding holds call options over an additional 1,641,620 shares maturing at various dates in January, February and March 2007, which, together with the Shares, if exercised, will constitute up to approximately 9.1% of the Issuer’s common stock.

In the filing the group noted that the common stock at current market prices is undervalued and represents an attractive investment opportunity. The group also noted that Mr. Sawiris has had communications with the Issuer and it is anticipated that Mr. Sawiris may, from time to time, have discussions with management, the board of directors and other shareholders of the Issuer.

The group also said it intend to actively monitor efforts by management to increase stockholder value. The group may also decide in the future to propose a transaction whereby all or a portion of the Issuer be sold, and in connection therewith the group may seek to participate in such transaction or seek to acquire control of the Issuer in a negotiated transaction or otherwise. If it should acquire control of the Issuer, it may transfer all or part of it to affiliated or unaffiliated persons. The group also may seek in the future to have one or more representatives elected to the board of directors or to propose other matters for consideration and approval by the Issuer’s stockholders or board of directors.

Mr. Nassef Sawiris is Director and the Chief Executive Officer of Orascom Construction Industries (OCI) a leading cement producer and construction contractor active in emerging markets. OCI is based in Cairo, Egypt and employs more than 40,000 people in 20 countries. The OCI Cement Group is the largest cement producer in the Middle East and a leading regional cement exporter.

Texas Industries, Inc., together with its subsidiaries, engages in the production and supply of heavy building materials in the United States. It operates in three segments: Cement, Aggregates, and Consumer Products.

NOTE: Yesterday,Texas Industries approved and authorized the Company to enter into a new rights plan which is intended to protect stockholders of the Company from coercive or otherwise unfair takeover tactics by encouraging potential suitors to first negotiate with the Board of Directors.

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Pirate Capital Loses Place on Cutter & Buck (CBUK) Board

In a recent filing with the SEC, Cutter & Buck (Nasdaq: CBUK) noted that former Pirate Capital analyst David A. Lorber informed them of his decision to withdraw as a nominee for Director at the upcoming Annual Meeting of Shareholders to be held on October 19, 2006.

The Board does not intend to present a replacement nominee.

Lorber was one of the casualties of Pirate's recent shake-up.

Thomas O'Riordan, an industry expert recommended by Pirate, is still a nominee.

Mr. O'Riordan is a consultant to the footwear, apparel and sporting goods industries and was recently a senior executive anddirector with Fila. Mr O'Riordan is also a member of the Board of Directors of Innovo Group (Nasdaq: INNO), a publicly traded apparel company.

According to a recent filing, Pirate owns a 13.5% stake (1.4M shares) in Cutter & Buck.

NOTE: This was brought to our attention from a post at Wall $treet Folly, which cited a Seattle Times article.

Parlux Fragrances (PARL) Holder Nussdorf Exploring Possibility of Acquisition of Company

In an amended 13D filing on Parlux Fragrances Inc. (Nasdaq: PARL) 10.5% holder Glenn H. Nussdorf said he has begun to explore the possibility of making an acquisition proposal to acquire the Company in a business combination transaction. As part of such exploration, Mr. Nussdorf and/or his representatives have had preliminary discussions with the Company's management and have had preliminary discussions with potential financing sources to obtain the funds necessary for such a transaction. Mr. Nussdorf has made no decision at this time as to whether to pursue an acquisition proposal and no assurances can be given as to whether or not Mr. Nussdorf will submit such a proposal to the Company. In addition, if Mr. Nussdorf submits such a proposal, there can be no assurances as to whether it would be acceptable to the Company or whether any such proposal would result in a definitive agreement being executed.
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WCI Communities (WCI) Holder Basswood Partners Reiterates Its Request for a Seat on the Board

In a 13D filing on WCI Communities (NYSE: WCI), 5% holder Basswood Partners disclosed a letter sent to the company which, among other things, reiterated a request previously made by Basswood for representation on the Board of Directors of the Company and requested a meeting with the Board of Directors to discuss its position as to the protection and maximization of the value of their investment in the Company.

In the letter the firm said, "As of October 13th 2006, WCI's stock trades 16.5% below its March 2002 IPO price, while its peer group (as defined by the Company in its 2005 proxy statement) is up 88.9% over the same period." They also said, "WCI's stock is trading at a significant discount to its intrinsic value, especially given its large inventory of entitled land in coastal Florida purchased prior to 2000."

A Copy of the Letter:

October 17, 2006

Mr. Don E. Ackerman

Chairman of the Board

WCI Communities, Inc.

24301 Walden Center Drive

Bonita Springs, FL 34134

Dear Mr. Ackerman:

Basswood Capital Management ("Basswood") has been a shareholder of WCICommunities, Inc. ("WCI" or the "Company") for many years and currently owns 5.0% of the Company. We are long-term value investors, but over the last year wehave grown increasingly concerned with the performance and strategy of theCompany.

Since becoming a public company almost five years ago, WCI has failed to capitalize on the dramatic growth and profitability expansion experienced by the public homebuilding industry. As of October 13th 2006, WCI's stock trades 16.5%below its March 2002 IPO price, while its peer group (as defined by the Company in its 2005 proxy statement) is up 88.9% over the same period. This extreme underperformance is due to management's operating results and strategy which include:

* operating margins and returns on equity well below its peer group average

* operating with excessive leverage heading into a weakening housing market: at June 30th 2006, WCI's net debt to capitalization ratio was 62.0% compared to an average level of 44.5% for its peer group; LTM EBITDA coverage is 3.7x versus an average coverage ratio of 9.5x for its peer group

* continuing to invest in land, land options and stock buybacks even while operating with high levels of debt and a significant owned land position relative to its peer group

* increasing WCI's share repurchase authorization less than two months after Moody's placed the Company's credit rating under review (this rating was subsequently cut on October 6, 2006)

* agreeing to pay Citibank approximately $25 million for an option contract to repurchase five million shares of the Company's stock, instead of using this cash to reduce high debt levels

Therefore, we urge WCI's board of directors ("WCI board") to take decisive action to prevent any further loss of shareholder value and to maximize thevalue of the Company. WCI's stock is trading at a significant discount to itsintrinsic value, especially given its large inventory of entitled land in coastal Florida purchased prior to 2000. WCI and its shareholders would realizethis value by selling for a premium to a larger, better capitalized and more profitable homebuilding company.

In a recent meeting with you, we requested that a representative of Basswood be placed on WCI's board. This request was ignored. In order to protect and maximize the value of our investment, we reiterate this request. We would also like to meet with the Company's independent directors to explain our position. Your response to these requests will determine whether or not we seek to replace board members at WCI's next annual meeting.

Please be aware that we will be filing a schedule 13D with the Securities and Exchange Commission which will include a copy of this letter. We look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

Bennett Lindenbaum

Principal

Basswood Capital Management, L.L.C.

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Venezuelan Investor Tomasello Raises Stake in WorldGate (WGAT) to 7.5%

In an amended 13D filing on WorldGate Communications (Nasdaq: WGAT) today, Venezuelan investor Antonio Tomasello disclosed a 7.5% stake (3.01 million share) in the company. This is up from the 7.02% stake Tomasello disclosed in a 10/04 filing and the 5% stake he disclosed in the original 13D filing on 08/07.
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ZF Partners Raises Stake in Saba Software (SABA) to 6.7%

In an amended 13D filing on Saba Software, Inc. (NASDAQ: SABA), ZF Partners disclosed they raised their stake in the company to 6.7% (1.92 million shares). The investment firm said between June 30, 2006 and October 10, 2006, they acquired an additional 420,500 shares of Common Stock in open market purchases in a price range of $5.0854 to $5.20 per share, at an average purchase price of $5.1944 per share.

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Nabi Biopharm (NABI) Holder Third Point Determined to Pursue a Consent Solicitation To Remove Chairman McLain and Others

In an amended 13D filing on Nabi Biopharmaceuticals (Nasdaq: NABI), 9.5% holder Third Point LLC disclosed a letter sent to the company. The firm said they are now determined to pursue a consent solicitation to remove not only McLain but, as well, a majority of the Company's directors from the Board. The firm said they will present a majority slate of proposed replacement directors. They said their nominees will have only one objective - "to capitalize on the enormous and escalating interest in, and investment dollars dedicated to, all of the areas in which Nabi currently participates - for the direct benefit of all Nabi shareholders."

The firm said the Company's management and Board are prepared to dissipate asset sale proceeds (PhosLo) on a risky business strategy rather than return them to shareholders. Third Point maintains its view that Nabi should not be a public company.

A Copy of the Letter:

October 16, 2006

Dear Nabi Directors:

As you are probably aware, on October 12th Nabi Biopharmaceuticals (the"Company") held a conference call following the announcement of the sale of PhosLo to Fresenius. In that call, Tom McLain articulated a plan which, when stripped down to its essence, would use the sale proceeds to fund $30 million per annum of cash burn in 2007 and 2008. Thus, the Company has proven our thesis that it contains valuable and coveted assets. The net present value of the PhosLo sale, which was exactly in line with our estimates, confirms our view that Nabi's assets are worth roughly twice as much as where the stock currently trades.

However, the conference call also confirmed our fears that this management and Board are prepared to dissipate asset sale proceeds on a risky business strategy rather than return them to shareholders. Further confirmation came in your letter to shareholders this morning, which stated that the proceeds from the sale of PhosLo, from partnering NicVAX and StaphVAX and Civacir, and the associated expected cost reductions will be used "to fund ... important development programs." Your strategy may now be clear, but we are baffled as to which "important development programs" you intend to fund going forward.

We have repeatedly warned this Board that we (and, we are confident, other shareholders) will not tolerate a "burning the furniture to heat the house"policy with respect to asset sales and spending, which is precisely the policy your October 12 conference call and this morning's letter appear to adopt. Indeed, there is no conceivable reason why Nabi should be in a cash burn position once the PhosLo disposition has been consummated and the major development projects sold or partnered. In fact, if the Company were to become an efficiently-run ongoing entity after such a restructuring, it should be earnings and cash-flow positive by mid-2007.

Mr. McLain unwittingly gave one of the most persuasive arguments on the conference call as to why Nabi should not continue as a public company. When asked about the cash flows from Nabi-HB, and why they would not be sufficient to fund ongoing business spending, he responded that this cash flow will be offset by the costs of being a public company. While we can't begin to fathom why it would cost nearly that much to run Nabi as a public company (given Nabi-HB's approximately $40 million in annual sales and the fact that the related cash flows should be a very high percentage of its sales), Mr. McLain's answer makes our point seem obvious - Nabi should NOT be a public company. We believe that Nabi-HB is worth upwards of $200 million, and the Company can get no credit for that substantial value in the marketplace if this value is in effect negated by unfathomable overhead and "development" expenses.

As you know, last month we proposed a settlement whereby we would place representatives on the Board to help ensure the success of the value-maximization process for all shareholders and ensure that shareholders directly receive the proceeds from any asset sales - as well as to aid in immediately beginning to mitigate Nabi's unnecessary cash burn. Unfortunately, your response made it clear that you have no interest in engaging in earnest discussions to involve the Company's highly-qualified owners in the oversight of these issues.

Accordingly, you have left us no choice: we have now determined to pursue a consent solicitation to remove not only McLain but, as well, a majority of the Company's directors from the Board. Concurrently, we will present to our fellow Nabi shareholders a majority slate of proposed replacement directors whom we believe are far superior to the directors we will seek to remove. Importantly, the nominees we will ask Nabi's shareholders to endorse will have only one objective - to capitalize on the enormous and escalating interest in, and investment dollars dedicated to, all of the areas in which Nabi currently participates - for the direct benefit of all Nabi shareholders.

Sincerely,

Daniel S. Loeb

Large InFocus (INFS) Holder Caxton Calls for Changes

In a 13D filing after the close Friday on InFocus Corporation (Nasdaq: INFS), Caxton Associates disclosed an 8.9% stake (3.55 million shares) in the company. This is up from the 1.2 million shares stake the firm disclosed in a quarterly regulator filing.

In the filing, Caxton said they believe that the intrinsic value of the Company, and the amount a strategic or financial buyer would pay to acquire the Company, is significantly greater than the current market value of the Common Stock.

The firm said unless significant changes are made promptly, changes in the Board are in the best interests of all shareholders. They also said the Board should immediately work with management to develop a new business plan and said the new plan should be assessed against other available alternatives, including the possibilities of a sale or restructuring of the Company.

On October 10th, InFocus lowered their third quarter guidance and hired Banc of America to evaluate strategic alternatives.

From the 'Purpose of Transaction' section of the filing:

The Reporting Persons believe that the intrinsic value of the Company, and the amount a strategic or financial buyer would pay to acquire the Company, is significantly greater than the current market value of the Common Stock. The Reporting Persons believe that this gap in value has resulted from the implementation by the Company's Board of Directors (the "Board") of a flawed business plan that has been detrimental to shareholder value. The Reporting Persons accordingly believe that the following steps should be taken promptly in order to preserve and maximize shareholder value:

1) The Reporting Persons believe that the Company's poor performance is the result of mistakes made by management and the Board's failure to grasp the strategic realities of the environment in which the Company operates. At this time, we believe that the Company's operating management is capable of effectively executing the Board's strategic vision should it be given adequate guidance and oversight. We do not, however, believe that the Board, as currently constituted, is providing the necessary strategic thinking. Therefore, we believe that, unless significant changes are made promptly, changes in the Board are in the best interests of all shareholders.

2) The Board should include individuals with strong ties to large shareholders, as well as industry, legal and/or financial markets expertise, which have a firm grasp of the realities of the markets in which the Company operates. Unless significant changes are made, the Board should be restructured to consist of Mr. Ranson, at least two individuals drawn from among the Company's largest shareholders, and other independent directors with relevant industry backgrounds.

3) As part of the Company's announced exploration of strategic alternatives, the Board should develop an operating strategy that not only protects and enhances the hard asset value of the Company, but also will allow the Company to be cash flow positive under any foreseeable circumstances. The Board should immediately work with management to develop a business plan that, among other things, permits revenue growth only at a reasonable cost, fixes or exits money-losing operations, and leverages the Company's valuable brand name franchise and considerable intellectual property assets. This new business plan should be assessed against other available alternatives, including the possibilities of a sale or restructuring of the Company.

Representatives of the Reporting Persons have had conversations with members of the Company's operating management and with members of the Board, as well as with certain significant shareholders of the Company. The Reporting Persons reserve the right to communicate further with the Company's operating management and with members of the Board, as well as with other shareholders and third parties, about these and other matters.

The Reporting Persons continue to examine all of their options with respect to the possibility of taking actions that they believe will enhance shareholder value, including the option of actively seeking to replace members of the Board. Any such actions could relate to or result in one or more of the matters referred to above. The Reporting Persons also reserve the right to purchase or otherwise acquire additional Common Stock, or to sell or otherwise dispose of Common Stock owned by them, in each case in open market or privately negotiated transactions or otherwise.

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Luther King Capital Raises Stake in Beasley Broadcast (BBGI) to 5.8%

In a 13D filing on Beasley Broadcast Group, Inc. (NASDAQ: BBGI), Luther King Capital disclosed a 5.8% stake (461K shares) in the company. This is up from the 55K share stake the firm disclosed in a quarterly filing with regulators.

Luther King Capital said it may engage in communications with one or more shareholders, officers or directors of the Issuer, including discussions regarding the Issuer's operations and strategic direction and ideas that, if effected, could result in, among other things, any of the matters identified in Item 4(a)-(j) of Schedule 13D.

The firm said it paid approximately $3,225,730 to acquire the 461,397 share stake.

Loeb Partners Discloses 5% Stake in Nash-Finch (NAFC)

In a 13D filing on Nash-Finch Company (NASDAQ: NAFC) Loeb Partners disclosed a 5.07% stake (677K shares).

The investment firm said it may engage in discussions with management or the Board of Directors of concerning the business and future plans.

Nash Finch Company's core business, food distribution, serves independent retailers and military commissaries in 31 states, the District of Columbia, Europe, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Iceland, the Azores and Honduras.

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Morgan Stanley Raises Stake in New York Times Co. (NYT) to 7.62%

In an amended 13D filing on New York Times Co. (NYSE: NYT), Morgan Stanley disclosed a 7.62% stake (10.95 million shares) in the Company. This is up from the prior 9,541,084 share stake (6.62%) the firm disclosed in a past filing.

In the original 13D filing (04/18/06) Morgan Stanley noted they withheld their vote for management's slate of directors to be elected by the Class A Common Stock at the annual meeting held on April 18, 2006. The firm said the dual-class voting structure creates special privileges as well as responsibilities and said the Board and management failed to fulfill their responsibilities effectively. Morgan Stanley also commented on the consistent underperformance of the stock while management's compensation rose. Morgan Stanley wants the company to amend the capital structure in order to combine the Class A Common Stock and Class B Common Stock into a single class.

While clearly dissatisfied, Morgan Stanley originaly noted that they accumulated the position because they felt the stock was undervalued and represented an attractive investment opportunity.

Since Morgan Stanley's original filing, shares of New York Times have drifted even lower.

From the Purpose of Transaction Section of the Original Filing:

From time to time, the Reporting Persons acquired shares inthe ordinary course of business for investment purposes and have held a continueto hold such shares in such capacity.

The Reporting Persons withheld their vote for Management'sslate of directors to be elected by the Class A Common Stock at the Issuer'sannual meeting held on April 18, 2006. The Issuer's current dual class commonstock structure effectively entitles the Issuer's Class B common stock, $0.10par value (the "Class B Common Stock"), to all of the shareholders' votingrights and to elect two-thirds of members of the Issuer's board of directors(the "Board").

The Reporting Persons believe that the dual-class votingstructure at the New York Times Company, which is an exception to the generalrule of one-share, one-vote, creates special privileges as well asresponsibilities. The Reporting Persons contend that the Board and management atthe New York Times Company have failed to fulfill these responsibilitieseffectively. While it may have at one time been designed to protect theeditorial independence and the integrity of the news franchise, the dual-classvoting structure now fosters a lack of accountability to all of the company'sshareholders.

Over the past several years, The New York Times Company hasconsistently underperformed its peers. Its market value has declined by 52%since its peak in June 2002. The share price has fallen by 29%, 38% and 33% inthe one, three and five year periods to the end of March 31, 2006. Despitesignificant underperformance, management's total compensation is substantial andhas increased considerably over this period. As a long-term, committedshareholder since 1996, the Reporting Persons have privately conveyed theirconcerns to the Issuer's Board and senior management on a number of occasionsand have suggested substantive strategies to operate the business better andmore efficiently allocate capital. However, to date, the Board and managementhave failed to take the actions necessary to improve operational and financialperformance.

The Reporting Persons are filing this statement on Schedule13D because they are dissatisfied with the lack of accountability of the Boardand management to the Issuer's public shareholders and the resultant lack of theprogress that the Issuer has made to enhance shareholder value. The ReportingPersons want the Board and controlling Class B shareholders to amend theIssuer's capital structure in order to combine the Class A Common Stock andClass B Common Stock into a single class of common stock with the same rights,preferences and other privileges. The Reporting Persons believe thatde-classifying the share structure of the New York Times Company will foster aculture of accountability that will ultimately benefit all shareholders,including Class B shareholders, by improving the financial and operationalperformance of the business and closing the gap between the market price of thestock and its intrinsic value.

The Reporting Persons purchased the Class A Common Stock basedon the Reporting Persons' belief that the Class A Common Stock at current marketprices are undervalued and represent an attractive investment opportunity.Depending upon overall market conditions, other investment opportunitiesavailable to the Reporting Persons, and the availability of Class A Common Stockat prices that would make the purchase of additional Class A Common Stock desirable, the Reporting Persons may endeavor to increasetheir position in the Issuer through, among other things, the purchase of ClassA Common Stock on the open market or in private transactions or otherwise, onsuch terms and at such times as the Reporting Persons may deem advisable.

The Reporting Persons intend to review their investment in theIssuer on a continuing basis and may engage in discussions with management andthe Board concerning the business, operations and future plans of the Issuer.Depending on various factors including, without limitation, the Issuer'sfinancial position and investment strategy, the price levels of the Class ACommon Stock, conditions in the securities markets and general economic andindustry conditions, the Reporting Persons may in the future take such actionswith respect to its investment in the Issuer as it deems appropriate including,without limitation, seeking Board representation, engaging financial, legal andother advisors, making proposals to the Issuer concerning changes to thecapitalization, ownership structure or operations of the Issuer, changes to theoverall strategic direction of the Issuer, merger and/or sale opportunities,communicating with other shareholders regarding the company, purchasingadditional Class A Common Stock, selling some or all of its Class A CommonStock, engaging in short selling of or any hedging or similar transaction withrespect to the Class A Common Stock or changing its intention with respect toany and all matters referred to in Item 4.

Except as set forth herein, no contract, arrangement,relationship or understanding (either oral or written) exists with the ReportingPersons as to the acquisition, disposition, voting or holding of shares. Exceptas set forth herein, the Reporting Person has no present plan or proposal thatwould result in or relate to any of the transactions required to be described inItem 4 of Schedule 13D.

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Pirate Capital Maintains James River Coal (JRCC) Position Following Goldfarb Resignation

In an amended 13D filing on James River Coal Company (Nasdaq: JRCC), 14.1% (2.3 million shares) holder Pirate Capital notes that Matthew Goldfarb, a member of the Board of Directors of the Issuer, has voluntarily resigned his employment with Pirate Capital.

Interestingly, Pirate Capital didn't cut its position in JRCC.

Goldfarb's separation from Pirate occurred after the hedge fund shake-up in late-September.

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Pirate Capital Maintains CKE Restaurants (CKR) Position Following Goldfarb Resignation

In an amended 13D filing on CKE Restaurants, Inc. (NYSE: CKR), 10.3% (7 million shares) holder Pirate Capital notes that Matthew Goldfarb, a member of the Board of Directors of the Issuer, has voluntarily resigned his employment with Pirate Capital.

Interestingly, Pirate Capital didn't cut its position in CKR.

Goldfarb's separation from Pirate occurred after the hedge fund shake-up in late-September.

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Large Barnwell Industries (BRN) Holder Mercury Real Estate Advisors Urges Energy Division Sale and Buyback

In a 13D filing of Barnwell Industries, Inc.'s (AMEX: BRN), Mercury Real Estate Advisors LLC disclosed a 16.3% stake (1.33 million shares) in the company This is below the 1.55 million share stake the firm disclosed in a quarterly filing with regulators. The investment firm sent a letter to the company urging that "strategic alternatives, including the sale of its energy division, must be evaluated to fully maximize the value of the Company for all shareholders." The firm also said, "a substantial share buyback program should be put into effect immediately."

Commenting on valuation the firm said, "With the combined value of its real estate and energy divisions implying a $29 per share price at a minimum, Barnwell is a dramatically undervalued company."

Shares of Barnwell Industries are currently trading at $21.70, up 1.6% on the session.

A Copy of the Letter:

Barnwell Industries, Inc.
Board of Directors
1100 Alakea Street
Honolulu, Hawaii 96813

Dear Board:

As you are aware, Mercury Real Estate Advisors LLC and its affiliates (“Mercury”) are the largest shareholders of Barnwell Industries, Inc. (“Barnwell” or the “Company”). As a significant shareholder of the Company for approximately the past two years, we have witnessed the Company’s preliminary success in unlocking the significant value in its desirable real estate holdings on the western coast of the main island of Hawaii and the improvement in profitability of its oil and natural gas business in Canada. Although there remains substantial unrealized value in these assets, we believe the Company’s current corporate structure, egregious executive compensation and disparate business divisions are fundamentally flawed. We further believe that strategic alternatives, including the sale of its energy division, must be evaluated to fully maximize the value of the Company for all shareholders. Finally, a substantial share buyback program should be put into effect immediately.

As you know, Barnwell’s majority-owned subsidiary, Kaupulehu Developments, has strategically negotiated the sale of its leasehold interests in 870 acres of prime coastal real estate (Increment I and II) to an affiliate of Westbrook Partners (“Westbrook”), which allows Kaupulehu, and ultimately Barnwell, to profit substantially from the development of the land into a luxurious residential community with limited execution risk. As of April 2006, five of the planned 80 lots in Increment I had been sold for what we estimate to be an average price above $8 million per lot. Based on our underwriting of the real estate, as well as discussions with local real estate brokers, we believe that many of the remaining lots in Increment I may sell for $10 million or more, while the lots in Increment II will also sell for millions of dollars each. Given Barnwell’s percentage interest in the revenues associated with these property sales, the Company stands to realize a significant return over the next several years as Westbrook continues to sell these highly desirable residential lots and creates a high-end residential community that rivals its Kukio Resort to the south. Based on our analysis, we believe the value of Barnwell’s real estate interests alone translates into a per share value in excess of $11. Further, this estimate attributes no value to the potentially substantial profits to be earned from the entitlement to and or sale of the 1,000 acres of land to the east of Lot 4-C in which Barnwell has an interest.

Concurrently, Barnwell has seen dramatic growth in the operating profit of its oil and natural gas business in Canada as a result of a substantial increase in market prices and, to a lesser extent, increased production of oil and natural gas liquids. As the largest shareholder of the Company, we have applauded these significant improvements in profitability and believe that strong and increasing global demand for petroleum products will allow Barnwell’s energy business to experience further enhancements in profitability. Looking at recent energy transactions in Alberta, we currently believe that the value of Barnwell’s proven BoEs (barrels of oil equivalent) translates on a standalone basis into a per share value of approximately $18.

With the combined value of its real estate and energy divisions implying a $29 per share price at a minimum, Barnwell is a dramatically undervalued company. However, its unnecessarily complex corporate structure, which includes independent businesses with no synergies, obfuscates its intrinsic value. Further, an executive management team at Barnwell characterized by nepotism in the Chief Executive Officer and President positions continues to reap million dollar-plus salaries, in part driving general and administrative expenses to an astronomical 21% of total revenues for the nine months ended June 30, 2006.

As the largest shareholder of the Company, we demand that the Board hire an investment bank to evaluate strategic alternatives, including a sale of the energy division and a share buyback program using proceeds received from lot sales in Increment I and II. As noted above, we believe there is no synergistic advantage to the current corporate structure and believe that the full value of Barnwell will only be recognized if the energy division, which would be an attractive acquisition candidate for any of the energy companies with a presence in Canada, is sold immediately. Further, this sale would significantly reduce general administrative expenses as the real estate division, which already has sold its most valuable asset and is passively collecting funds from Westbrook in an annuity-like fashion, could focus singularly on cultivating value in the 1,000 acres it owns north of Lot 4A (which is currently zoned as conservation land) through a sale to a strategic buyer. Given the minimal capital requirements associated with this project, a substantial share buyback could be easily instituted with the percentage payments received from the lot sales.

Further, given that the shares are trading at a substantial discount to their intrinsic value, the Board should immediately implement a share buyback using both the $10,807,000 of cash and cash equivalents on the balance sheet as well as proceeds received from lot sales in Increment I and Increment II. This share buyback could also be significantly increased in scale after a sale of the oil and gas operations.

We believe that the Board should be committed to maximizing value for all shareholders, not paying excessive compensation to a complacent management team lacking in transparency. To this end, we are requesting a meeting with the Independent Members of the Board to discuss our proposed strategy as well as the hiring of an investment bank to evaluate strategic alternatives.

Sincerely yours,

MERCURY REAL ESTATE ADVISORS LLC

David R. Jarvis Chief Executive Officer

Malcolm F. MacLean IV President

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ValueAct Capital Raises Stake in Hanover Compressor (HC) to 10.8%

In an amended 13D filing on Hanover Compressor Company (NYSE: HC) after the close, ValueAct Capital disclosed a 10.8% stake (11.1 million shares) in the company. This is up from the 9.4 million share stake the firm disclosed in a quarterly filing with regulators.

The investment firm has not made any changes to the 'Purpose of Transaction' section of the filing, a pretty standard disclosure from ValueAct, which basically says they may change their stake at any time, talk with management/directors or others about the company, and propose changes.

Hanover Compressor is a global market leader in full service natural gas compression and a leading provider of service, fabrication and equipment for oil and natural gas production, processing and transportation applications.

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Large Jacuzzi Brands (JJZ) Holder Southeastern Asset "Vehemently Oppose" Buyout Deal

In an amended 13D filing on Jacuzzi Brands Inc. (NYSE: JJZ), 23.6% holder Southeastern Asset Management responsed to today's Apollo Management buyout news. Southeastern said, "Our initial reaction to today's announcement is that we vehemently oppose this transaction, because the $12.50 price is completely insufficient."

The firm also said, "The Board began a process of exploring options at an inopportune time, when the results of the Bath division were far below what it's capable of producing. Now that Al Marini is in place as CEO, the company is finally in position to fix Bath and eliminate significant unnecessary corporate expenses. The Zurn division has a tremendous long-term outlook and is worth more than this transaction implies.

We would much rather proceed as an independent company under Al Marini, rather than hand over future profits to a very smart group at a bad time. There is a huge opportunity to fix Bath, cut corporate expenses, and to continue to grow Zurn. We fear that the Board, who owns very little stock and has lived through many different mistakes and unpleasant episodes, took a bid despite a low price because they wanted to wash their hands of the whole thing. The asbestos liability is one that we believe to be a non-issue, and the buyers are apparently not too worried about it either.

Once we receive the proxy materials we will review the offer and process in fuller detail. While our actions are limited somewhat by the terms of the Standstill Agreement between Southeastern and Jacuzzi (see Exhibit 10.48 to Jacuzzi Brands 10K filed on December 24, 2002 and Jacuzzi Brands 8K filed on August 12, 2005), we currently intend to vote against this transaction with the maximum percentage permitted under that Agreement."

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Atticus Capital Discloses 9.97% Stake in Phelps Dodge (PD), Met with Investors About Possible Acquisition of Company

In an amended 13D filing on Phelps Dodge Corp. (NYSE: PD), Atticus Capital capital disclosed a 9.97% stake (20.3 million shares) in the company. This is up from the 16.3 million share stake the firm disclosed in a quarterly filing with regulators.

The group said, "As previously disclosed, the Reporting Persons have consulted outside advisors to help them formulate their options with regard to their investment in the Company. The Reporting Persons and an investment bank have recently met with several potential investors, including private equity firms and strategic buyers, to discuss each firm's possible interest in pursuing an acquisition of the Company."

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