Friday, September 29, 2006

Noonday Asset Management Raises Stake in Maverick Tube (MVK) to 7.3%

In an amended 13D filing on Maverick Tube Corp. (NYSE: MVK), Noonday Asset Management disclosed a 7.3% stake (2.7 million shares) in the company. This is up from the 5.5% stake (2.02 million shares) the firm disclosed in the original 13D filing (08/24).

From the Purpose Of The Transaction section of the original 13D filing: "...consistent with its investment purpose, each Reporting Person at any time and from time to time may acquire additional Shares or dispose of any or all of its Shares..." and "Also, consistent with their investment intent, the Reporting Persons may engage in communications with one or more shareholders of the Company, one or more officers of the Company and/or one or more members of the board of directors of the Company regarding the Company, including but not limited to its operations."

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Harbert Management Raises Stake in Gateway (GTW) to 10.7% and Enters Confidentiality Agreement

In an amended 13D filing with the SEC on Gateway (NYSE: GTW), Harbert Management disclosed a 10.7% stake (39.75 million shares) in the company. This is up from the 10.2% stake (37.8 million shares) the firm disclosed in a past filing (08/21). The investment firm disclosed that on September 25 they entered a confidentiality agreement with the company that will make available certain non-public information.

Back in August, in the original 13D filing, the group submitted a letter to Gateway to offer the board and management assistance in their efforts to enhance shareholder value. In the letter the group said, "The motivation for our investment in Gateway can be distilled to one simple thesis; there is nothing wrong with Gateway that can't be fixed with what's right with Gateway."

Also in August, Gateway received an unsolicited expression of interest from Lap Shun Hui to acquire Gateway's retail operations for $450 million. The company later said the deal was not in the best interest of shareholders.

Shares of Gateway closed at $1.89 on Friday.

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Pirate Capital Raises Stake in PW Eagle (PWEI) In Midst of Fund Shake-Up

In an amended 13D filing on PW Eagle, Inc. (Nasdaq: PWEI), Pirate Capital disclosed a 22.4% stake (2.8 million shares) in the company, this is up from the 20.5% stake (2.54 million shares) the firm disclosed in a past filing.

The filing comes after word spread through the market yesterday that half of Pirate's staff left or were dismissed. The news of the shake-up at the fund comes just weeks after Pirate came under SEC scrutiny for failing to promptly disclose changes in material holdings, including OSI Restaurant (NYSE: OSI) and FreightCar America (Nasdaq: RAIL) - position the hedge fund closed out.

The filing on PW Eagle is interesting because it shows that Pirate bought about 53,855 shares yesterday, in the midst of all the reported chaos at the fund.

Yesterday, rumors of liquidations hurt many of the stocks in Pirate's portfolio. Some of the analysts that left the fund are on the boards of companies in Pirate's portfolio. Brink's (NYSE: BCO) was down 3.86%, CEC Entertainment Inc. (NYSE: CEC) was down 2.74%, CEC Entertainment Inc. (NYSE: CEC) was down 2.5%, The Pep Boys (NYSE: PBY) was down 5%, among others.

PW Eagle was down 4.17% yesterday, but today's disclosure indicates PWEI is a position Pirate, in its current state, may maintain.

In a letter to customers, Pirate Capital founder Thomas Hudson said he will refocus the fund and close it to new investors as of October 1st. Hudson said he is targeting 20% in annual returns.

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Will Lampert Bail on AutoZone (AZO)?

In an amended 13D filing after the close yesterday on AutoZone, Inc. (NYSE: AZO), Eddie Lampert's hedge fund ESL Partners, which is a 30.99% holder (22 million shares) of the stock, noted the news that Mr. Lampert would step down from the Board of Directors of the company, in order to devote more time to other duties at ESL and Sears Holdings (Nasdaq: SHLD).

Yesterday, shares of AutoZone were under pressure as rumors surfaced Lampert's fund would start to liquidate the position. The rumors were abound even though Mr. Lampert stated in the press release, "I plan to remain involved with the company, and ESL currently plans to remain a significant shareholder in AutoZone for the foreseeable future."

I guess one could view the word "significant" as meaning a 5% or 10% holder, not a 31% holder.

Wording in the SEC filing certainly leaves the door open for a sale. The disclosure notes that "Filing Persons (ESL) may acquire additional Shares; may sell all or any part of their Shares pursuant to Rule 144, in privately negotiated transactions or in sales registered or exempt from registration under the Securities Act of 1933; may distribute Shares to various of their partners or may engage in any combination of the foregoing."

This wording is not new and is a pretty standard disclosure, so in and of itself is not an indication that Lampert is bailing. But speculation on Lampert's next move have been rife lately, with talk centering on the hedge fund guru accumulating stakes in Home Depot (NYSE: HD) or Gap (NYSE: GPS).

Using funds from a sale of all or part AutoZone would surely give Mr. Lampert some play money to throw around.

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Thursday, September 28, 2006

Metropolitan Capital Said Cyberonics (CYBX) Statements Were Misleading

In an amended 13D filing on Cyberonics Inc. (Nasdaq: CYBX), major stockholder Metropolitan Capital Advisors and The Committee for Concerned Cyberonics, Inc. Shareholders disclosed a letter sent to the company on September 28, 2006 to "set the record straight" on what they say was a number of misleading statements made in a press release issued by the Company last evening.

The firm said, contrary to statements by the company, they do not desire a "costly and disruptive proxy contest", but wish to replace a minority of its insular board with their nominees, who they say will provide shareholders with the independent voice in the boardroom that this Company so desperately needs.

The group also said on September 22, 2006, Bedford delivered a letter to the Company requesting its stockholder list in connection with the the groups planned solicitation of proxies. The group also said on September 27, 2006, they, together with Mssrs. Nestler and Rosenthal, filed with the SEC their preliminary proxy materials in connection with the solicitation of proxies with respect to the election of Mssrs. Schwarz, Nestler and Rosenthal to the Board of Directors of the Company at its 2006 annual meeting. They said Cyberonics has not yet announced the date of its 2006 annual meeting.

A Copy of the Letter:

"September 28, 2006
The Board of Directors
Cyberonics, Inc.
100 Cyberonics Boulevard
Houston, Texas 77058

Gentlemen:


In the interest of setting the record straight, we want to respond to a number of the misleading statements made in the press release issued by the Company last evening. We are addressing our letter to the Board as a whole because we are unable to determine from the press release the source of the quote contained in the release.

The press release said that the Company met with representatives of Metropolitan Capital on June 9, “in an effort to reach a cooperative solution.” In fact Cyberonics’ representatives, Ms. Westbrook and Ms. Frank but not Mr. Cummins, met with us and many other investors, separately, in a series of meetings organized by Piper Jaffray, in an effort to support your flagging share price. The only portion of our meeting that might be construed as “an effort to reach a cooperative solution” with us took place when the Company’s PR consultant asked us what we wanted. We responded that we wanted the Company to replace a minority of the existing Cyberonics board members with our nominees and to commit to implement long overdue corporate governance reform. It is highly misleading to imply that a special meeting took place to discuss our concerns and suggestions.

The remainder of the June 9 meeting involved the Company’s CFO, Pam Westbrook, walking us through the Company’s investor presentation (We notice that the Company’s investor presentations have been removed from the investor relations portion of the Company’s website. Does this mean that investors should no longer rely on the information in those presentations or is it simply the Company’s strategy to make it more difficult for investors to see the many examples of the Company over-promising and under-delivering?).

The Company press release says that shortly after the June 9 meeting “the Cyberonics Board invited Metropolitan Capital to submit the credentials for their director nominees to the Board’s outside search firm…. Rather than proceeding in a cooperative fashion to the benefit of the company and its shareholders, however, Metropolitan Capital has decided to pursue a potentially costly and disruptive proxy contest.” The depiction of the facts in this instance is also highly misleading because we had already provided all the information with respect to our nominees required by the Company’s advance notice provisions in the by-laws. After the June 9 meeting, we did not hear from the Company again until receiving a letter from the Company’s general counsel on July 25 (nearly two months after we provided notice to the Company of our nominations, along with the required information about our three nominees) that asked for further information about our director nominees. We responded with the requested additional information the very next day. In contrast, over the course of the last month our calls to Mr. Cummins and Ms. Westbrook have not been returned.

To be sure, we do not desire a “costly and disruptive proxy contest.” What we want is for the Company to replace a minority of its insular board with our nominees, who will provide shareholders with the independent voice in the boardroom that this Company so desperately needs, and for the Company to commit to implement necessary corporate governance reform.

As the Company professes a commitment to the highest standards of shareholder democracy, and as today is the one year anniversary of the last annual meeting of the Company’s shareholders, we reiterate the request we made earlier this month—inform the shareholders of the date of the 2006 annual meeting.

A true commitment to shareholder democracy must begin by providing shareholders with their most fundamental right—the right to choose directors that will represent their interests.

Respectfully yours,

Karen L. Finerman President

Jeffrey E. Schwarz Chief Executive Officer"

iPass (IPAS) Holder Shamrock Wants to Inspect Books

In an amended 13D filing earlier today on iPass Inc. (Nasdaq: IPAS), 14% holder Shamrock Activist Value Fund said on September 27, 2006 they submitted a demand to inspect the books and records and other documents of iPass with respect to the February 15, 2006 merger with GoRemote Internet Communications.
The hedge fund said the purpose of the demand is to investigate possible mismanagement, misrepresentation by management of cost savings associated with the merger with GoRemote, misrepresentation by management of an integration plan with respect to the merger with GoRemote, waste of corporate assets, lack of due care and appropriate due diligence by the Company’s Directors and senior management when evaluating the proposed merger with GoRemote.

Shamrock said, "We believe the Company’s financial results following the GoRemote merger, indicate either serious Company management and director failures, or misleading disclosures, or both, and thus warrants our review."

A Copy of the Letter:

"Bruce K. Posey, Corporate Secretary
iPass Inc.
3800 Bridge Parkway
Redwood Shores, California 94065


Re: Inspection of Books and Records

Dear Mr. Posey:

Shamrock Activist Value Fund, L.P. (the “Stockholder”), is the beneficial owner of shares of common stock of iPass Inc., a Delaware corporation (the “Company”), which are held of record by Lehman Brothers, Inc., for the account of Stockholder (see Attachment 1 hereto, which is a true and correct copy of what it purports to be). Pursuant to 8 Del. C. § 220, Stockholder hereby demands to inspect and copy (in person or by attorney or other agent), during the usual hours for business, the following books and records and other documents of the Company (the “Books and Records”):

1. All reports, memoranda and other materials prepared by the Company or for the benefit of the Company by outside investment banking, consulting or accounting firms in connection with the Company’s merger with GoRemote Internet Communications covering the period from January 1, 2004 through February 14, 2006.

2. All minutes, notes or other records of meetings of the Company’s Board of Directors or any meeting of any other Company subcommittee or ad hoc committee comprising any directors of the Company relating to the Company’s merger with GoRemote Internet Communications.

3. All materials prepared for any meeting (or for any participant in any such meeting) described in paragraph (2) hereof of the Board of Directors, a subcommittee or adhoc committee.

4. All materials prepared by the Company detailing management’s proposed integration plan for the Company’s merger with GoRemote Internet Communications covering the period from October 1, 2004 through September 15, 2006.

The purpose of this demand to inspect the Company’s Books and Records is to investigate possible mismanagement, misrepresentation by management of cost savings associated with the merger with GoRemote, misrepresentation by management of an integration plan with respect to the merger with GoRemote, waste of corporate assets, and lack of due care and appropriate due diligence by the Company’s Directors and senior management when evaluating the proposed merger with GoRemote.

This request is predicated on, among other things, the following:

(i) The Company’s Chief Executive Officer, Ken Denman, made a presentation to the Credit Suisse First Boston Small/Mid Cap Software Conference on December 15, 2005 that described on Page 4 “immediate cost savings” and stated on Page 8 that “operating and cost saving synergies are substantial” from the proposed merger.

(ii) During the six month period following the acquisition, Mr. Denman indicated that total iPass operating expenses in the quarter ended June 2006 were approximately equal to the combined operating expenses of iPass and GoRemote in the quarter ended December 2005 prior to the merger (August 8, 2006 Company conference call). The immediate and substantial cost savings indicated by Mr. Denman in his December 2005 presentation noted in (i) above had not materialized by June 30, 2006.

(iii) Management indications that the merger would be accretive in the first full quarter of combined operations. This did not occur.

(iv) After completion of the merger, the following suggest that management had a limited integration plan: (i) until our letter to the Company in May 2006, there was no plan to effect the restructuring announced on May 25, 2006, (ii) as of August 2006, the GoRemote web-site directed “dissatisfied iPass customers how to convert to GoRemote services”, and, (iii) shortly after the closing of the transaction, John Thuma, the head of the supposed integration, left the company.

We believe the foregoing indicate either serious iPass mismanagement and director failures or misleading disclosures, or both, and thus warrants our review of the above requested books and records.

Stockholder will bear the reasonable costs incurred by the Company in connection with the production of the information demanded. Please advise David K. Robbins of Bingham McCutchen LLP, 355 South Grand Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90071, (213) 680-6400, within five business days after receipt of this letter, when and where the requested materials will be available for inspection. The undersigned hereby authorizes David K. Robbins of the law firm of Bingham McCutchen LLP and his respective partners, associates, employees and any other persons to be designated by him, acting together, singly or in combination, to conduct the inspection and copying herein demanded.

Very truly yours,

Shamrock Activist Value Fund, L.P.

Michael J. McConnell

Vice President"

Activist Target Friendly (FRN) Gets Boosts After CEO Leaves

Friendly Ice Cream Corp. (AMEX: FRN), a stock that has been the target of activist investor Sardar Biglari of The Lion Fund, is getting a pop today after the company announced that President and Chief Executive Officer John L. Cutter resigned to pursue other interests.

It is not clear if Cutter was forced out, but investors are liking the news.

Biglari recently said he is seeking two seats on the Board of Directors. At last count, Biglari's fund owned 12% of Friendly's shares outstanding.

Shares of Friendly are up 5% in afternoon action Thursday.

CNBC Says Pirate Capital's Analysts Left Firm

According to reports from CNBC's David Faber, all or most of activist hedge fund Pirate Capital's analysts have left the firm after a dispute about handling regulatory matters and pay.

Pirate Capital, one of the most well-known activist hedge funds, recently came under SEC scrutiny for failing to promptly disclose changes in material holdings, including OSI Restaurant (NYSE: OSI) and FreightCar America (Nasdaq: RAIL) - position the hedge fund closed out.

Some of Pirate's holdings, based on recent disclosures, include: Brink's (NYSE: BCO), CEC Entertainment Inc. (NYSE: CEC), CKE Restaurants Inc. (NYSE: CKR), Cornell Companies, Inc. (NYSE: CRN), GenCorp Inc. (NYSE: GY), Intrawest Corporation (NYSE: IDR), James River Coal Company (NASDAQ: JRCC), Mirant Corporation (NYSE: MIR), P.H. Glatfelter Company (NYSE: GLT), PW Eagle, Inc. (NASDAQ: PWEI), The Pep Boys (NYSE: PBY), Walter Industries, Inc. (NYSE: WLT).

Carl Icahn Seeks To Remove Some Imclone Systems (IMCL) Directors

In an amended 13D filing on Imclone Systems Inc. (Nasdaq: IMCL), 13.85% holder Carl Icahn said he intends to solicit consents from stockholders of the company to remove certain directors from the Board of the Issuer and to fill one of the vacancies with a nominee to be proposed by Mr. Icahn and his affiliates, and, in connection therewith, today filed a preliminary consent solicitation statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission, which statement may be amended prior to its use and is not yet in definitive form.

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Sun Capital Securities Offers to Acquire Talk America (TALK) for $9/Share

In a 13D filing on Talk America Holdings Inc. (Nasdaq: TALK), 13.9% holder Sun Capital Securities said it delivered a letter proposing to acquire in an all-cash merger transaction all outstanding shares of Common Stock at $9.00 per share.

Sun Capital said it has sufficient capital to complete the transaction without external financing.

Last Friday, Talk America agreed to be acquired by privately-held Cavalier Telephone & TV for $8.10 per share in cash.

A Copy of the Letter:

Attention: Mr. Edward B. Meyercord, III
Chief Executive Officer, President and Director

Gentlemen:

Reference is made to the Merger Agreement dated September 22, 2006, among Talk America Holdings, Inc. (the “Company”), Cavalier Telephone Corporation (“Cavalier”) and Cavalier Acquisition Corp. (“CAC”), whereby, upon the terms and subject to all of the conditions precedent expressed therein, CAC would be merged with and into the Company (the “Merger”), and all holders of the Company’s Common Stock, $.01 par value (the “Common Stock”) would receive $8.10 per share in cash (the “Merger Agreement”). All capitalized terms used and not expressly defined herein are used herein with the meanings assigned in the Merger Agreement.

We have read carefully and are familiar with all terms and conditions of the Merger Agreement (including, in particular, those set forth in Sections 3.20-3.22, 4.8, 5.2-5.5, 6.1-6.3 and 7.1-7.3 thereof). We also are familiar with the terms of the Rights Agreement dated August 19, 2006, as amended, between the Company and Stocktrans, Inc., as Rights Agent.

We herewith submit to you our proposal to acquire the Company on terms and conditions more favorable, from a financial point of view, to holders of the Common Stock, than the transactions contemplated by the Merger Agreement. Specifically, we hereby propose to acquire for cash all outstanding shares of Common Stock at approximately $9.00 per share in a single-step merger transaction (although we remain flexible with respect to transaction structure and the related timing of execution to the extent you determine an alternative structure is in the best interests of the Company’s stockholders).

Our proposal represents an approximately 11% premium to the Common Stock Consideration. We presently have sufficient capital to complete the transaction without external financing.

As more fully outlined below, subject to our completion of a maximum 30-day period of confirmatory due diligence, including our review of all schedules to the Company’s representations and warranties set forth in the Merger Agreement, we would be prepared to negotiate and execute definitive transaction documentation substantially similar to the Merger Agreement. Please know that this proposal is presented on an entirely consensual basis, and we would work only directly through the Company’s Board of Directors, senior management and your professional advisors. As detailed in this proposal, Sun Capital and its affiliates are prepared to execute immediately with the Company a confidentiality agreement of the type referred to in the proviso to Section 5.5(a) of the Merger Agreement.

By way of introduction, Sun Capital (www.SunCapPart.com), and the affiliated Sun Capital Securities Group, LLC (“Sun Capital”), based in Boca Raton, Florida (with offices in New York, Los Angeles, London and Shenzhen), is one of the most prominent and active private investment firms in the U.S. focused principally on sponsored management buyouts, acquisitions and investments in market-leading companies. We are quite well-positioned to submit this proposal. Sun Capital presently owns approximately 13.92% of the outstanding Common Stock based on transactions reflected in Sun Capital’s Statement of Beneficial Ownership on Schedule 13D and our Section 16(a) reports filed today with the Securities and Exchange Commission and furnished directly to you.

Sun Capital has more than $3.5 billion of equity capital under management and acquires majority interests in companies through its private equity fund, Sun Capital Partners IV, L.P. with $1.5 billion of committed equity capital, and makes investments in equity, debt and other securities of companies through Sun Capital Securities Fund, with more than $1.3 billion of committed equity capital. Sun Capital’s affiliates are authorized to invest more than $800 million of capital in any one transaction. With a team of more than 100 professionals with significant operational and transactional experience, to date, Sun Capital’s affiliates have invested in more than 130 companies, with aggregate sales in excess of $30 billion, since our inception in 1995.

Sun Capital has been the most acquisitive private equity firm in the U.S. over the past four years, consummating 80 acquisition and investment transactions from 2002-2005, including 30 acquisitions in 2005 and 24 acquisitions thus far in 2006 (including the just completed privatization of Marsh Supermarkets), and was recently listed in a leading M&A trade publication as the fifth most acquisitive company of any kind in the U.S.

Based on (i) our proven track record of acquiring businesses; (ii) our expedience in closing transactions (generally within 30 days from inception), including going-private transactions; (iii) our significant capital resources which enable us to provide consummation certainty; (iv) our lack of any financing contingency; and (v) our decisive and fair approach to business, we believe that Sun Capital is the ideal firm to execute the acquisition of the Company on terms superior to the pending Merger.

In addition, given our current portfolio holdings in the telecommunications sector, along with the extensive time and resources already allocated to reviewing the Company, its end markets and competitive landscape, Sun Capital is, subject only to our completion of Company-specific confirmatory due diligence, well-prepared to complete our proposed acquisition of the Company. Furthermore, this transaction has received all internal Sun Capital approvals and consents.


Specifically, we are pleased to submit to the Company the following proposal:


Overview of Proposed Transaction

All-Cash Consideration. Sun Capital proposes to purchase for cash all of the outstanding shares of Company Common Stock for $9.00 per share (based on the Company’s public filings which reflect approximately 31.1 million shares of Common Stock outstanding on a fully diluted basis using the treasury method). As stated above, we propose that the transaction be structured as a single-step merger (although we remain flexible with respect to transaction structure to the extent an alternative structure is feasible and in the best interests of the Company’s stockholders). Our proposal represents an approximately 11% premium to the pending Common Stock Consideration.

No Financing Contingency. Equity financing for this transaction will be provided by one or more of Sun Capital’s affiliated funds (“Funds”). As stated above, with more than $3.5 billion in capital presently under management and the ability to invest over $800 million in any single transaction, Sun Capital currently does not need to nor does it intend to partner (or “club”) with any other equity financing sources or co-investors with respect to this transaction. Financing for the proposed transaction (including all fees and expenses) would be fully committed by Sun Capital and affiliated funds at the date definitive transaction documentation is executed by the Company.

Due Diligence. Upon execution of a confidentiality agreement, Sun Capital’s confirmatory due diligence would need to be completed to Sun Capital’s satisfaction. Such due diligence would include meetings with management and outside auditors, and a review of the Company’s books, records and legal documents by Sun Capital and its professional advisory team. Such confirmatory due diligence would be completed in a maximum period of 30 days and definitive documentation would be completed in tandem with that time frame.

Management. It is Sun Capital’s current preference and intention to retain incumbent senior and middle management who desire to remain with the Company and join our team. It is our intention to offer appropriate cash and/or equity incentive compensation, and to provide appropriate retention programs and welfare benefits.

Execution Speed. Sun Capital and its professional advisors are prepared to commence due diligence immediately following execution with the Company of a confidentiality agreement. Immediately thereafter, Sun Capital would begin good faith discussions and negotiations with the Company and the Board and definitive transaction documentation would be prepared and finalized contemporaneously.

No Regulatory Delays. As a U.S.-based private equity firm with no foreign control persons, we do not anticipate any delays in obtaining requisite regulatory approvals for the proposed transaction, including HSR, FCC and state commission licenses. Sun Capital will work collaboratively with the Company to obtain such approvals, including making all necessary filings immediately following the signing of a definitive transaction agreement. Subject to other customary closing conditions, we would anticipate closing a transaction as promptly as possible.

Selected Transactions

Sun Capital has substantial experience acquiring and operating publicly-traded companies. As such, we have an in-depth knowledge of the unique public-to-private transaction process. Please see Appendix A hereto for a select list of publicly-traded companies in which we have acquired a majority position or have privatized.

Sun Capital is uniquely positioned to execute transactions within a 30-day time frame due to our dedicated staff of approximately 100 people with significant transaction experience and a decisive approach to business. Sun Capital has a demonstrated track record of closing transactions in an expeditious manner. Appendix B hereto contains a sample of transactions Sun Capital completed from 2002 through 2006, each of which closed in approximately 30 days.

We welcome the opportunity to meet with your Board and your professional advisory team as promptly as practicable. We believe that we can amply demonstrate to you the seriousness of our commitment to execute the transaction outlined in this proposal and our ability to deliver to your stockholders maximum superior value — $9.00, subject only to our reasonable confirmatory due diligence investigation of the Company.

I look forward to speaking with you promptly. In the meantime, if you have any questions please do not hesitate to contact me directly at 561-962-3408.


Sincerely,


Sun Capital Securities Group, LLC

Michael H. Kalb

Managing Director

Kerkorian's Tracinda Interested in Acquiring 12M More GM Shares

In an amended 13D filing on General Motors Corporation (NYSE: GM), Kerkorian's Tracinda said it sent a letter to G. Richard Wagoner, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Directors of General Motors, in which Tracinda indicated that, consistent with Amendment No. 6 to the Schedule 13D, it is interested in acquiring approximately six million shares of General Motors common stock and may consider acquiring up to an additional six million shares.

Tracinda continues to believe that a strong opportunity exists in a potential alliance between General Motors, Renault and Nissan and that there should be strong General Motors Board involvement in the analysis of such a potential alliance, including the utilization of independent advisors.

Tracinda currently owns 56 million shares of GM, or 9.9%.

A Copy of the Letter:

Dear Mr. Wagoner:

In keeping with Tracinda’s desire to have an open relationship with General Motors, we want to let you know that, consistent with statements included in our Schedule 13D filings, Tracinda is interested in acquiring approximately six million shares of GM’s common stock in the open market and may consider acquiring up to an additional six million shares.

As you are aware, because GM owns interest in various insurance, banking, trust and industrial loan companies, Tracinda could be required to satisfy various state and federal rules and regulations prior to any such acquisition, since it would result in Tracinda owning 10% or more of GM’s outstanding common stock.

We are seeking the cooperation and support of the Company and its management in connection with these filings and any related proceedings, as we believe additional investment by Tracinda in GM would be viewed positively by investors, and your support will maximize the likelihood of obtaining regulatory approval.

We welcome the opportunity to discuss this matter further with you if you so desire.

Very truly yours,
TRACINDA CORPORATION

Wednesday, September 27, 2006

Arnhold and S. Bleichroeder Urges Emmis (EMMS) Board to Reconsider Sale to CEO at 40% Premium

In a press release today on Emmis Communications Corp. (Nasdaq: EMMS), 1.7% holder (650K shares) Arnhold and S. Bleichroeder noted that in a recent 13D filing Emmis Chairman and CEO Jeffrey Smulyan disclosed that after withdrawing his $15.25 buy-out offer for Emmis on August 4, 2006, he engaged in exploratory discussions with the Special Committee regarding the "potential reinstitution of a proposal at a price of $16.80 per share in cash." The filing indicated these discussions ended on or around August 31, 2006.

The investment firm notes that a price of $16.80 represents a premium of 40% to the average closing price of Emmis shares on the five trading days prior to the date of this 13Dfiling.

Arnhold and S. Bleichroeder said the Board's apparent decision not to pursue a transaction at a premium of this magnitude was simply not in the best interests of shareholders. The firm urged the Board to take whatever actions necessary to revive discussions with Mr. Smulyan and proceed expeditiously toward a definitive agreement with him and a shareholder vote on the matter.

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Pirate Capital Raises Stake in P.H. Glatfelter (GLT) to 5.7%

In a 13D filing on P.H. Glatfelter Company (NYSE: GLT) this morning, Pirate Capital disclosed a 5.7% stake (2.55 million shares) in the company. This is up from the 1.6 million share stake the firm disclosed in a quarterly filing with regulators.

Pirate said they intend to review their investment on a continuing basis and may engage in discussions with management, the Board of Directors, other shareholders of the company and other relevant parties concerning the business, operations, board composition, management, strategy and future plans.

Glatfelter is a global manufacturer of specialty papers and engineered products.

Pirate Capital, one of the most well-known activist hedge funds, recently came under SEC scrutiny for failing to promptly disclose changes in material holdings, including OSI Restaurant (NYSE: OSI) and FreightCar America (Nasdaq: RAIL) - positions the hedge fund closed out.

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Talk America (TALK) Holder Flagg Street Capital Said $8.10/Share Deal Does Not Reflect Full Value

In an amended 13D filing on Talk America Holdings Inc. (Nasdaq: TALK), 9.11% holder Flagg Street Capital said they are seriously concerned that the proposed transaction with Cavalier does not reflect the best possible price reasonably available, and we are confident that other large shareholders share our concerns. We therefore look forward to a sale of the Company at a price that does reflect its full and fair value, whether to Cavalier or another buyer.

Last Friday, Talk America agreed to be acquired by privately-held Cavalier Telephone & TV for $8.10 per share in cash.

A Copy of the Letter

"September 27, 2006

Board of Directors
Talk America Holdings Inc.
12020 Sunrise Valley Drive
Suite 250
Reston, VA 20191
Attention: Edward Meyercord

Gentlemen:
We are writing to you in connection with the announcement last Friday that you entered into an agreement for Talk America to be acquired by Cavalier for $8.10 per share in cash. In this respect, we wish to note at the outset that we agree with the conclusion implicit in that announcement that a sale of Talk America at this time is the best alternative for maximizing value for shareholders. However, we are seriously concerned that the proposed transaction with Cavalier does not reflect the best possible price reasonably available, and we are confident that other large shareholders share our concerns. We therefore look forward to a sale of the Company at a price that does reflect its full and fair value, whether to Cavalier or another buyer.

We also note that we filed a Schedule 13D on August 22nd and thereafter discussed with management whether Talk America should add a stockholder representative to its Board of Directors in order to ensure that maximizing shareholder value was the sole motivation in agreeing to any sale and that shareholder interests were otherwise observed; yet you nevertheless proceeded to announce a deal before you provided any formal response to our stated concerns. We therefore wish to ensure that this transaction is in your stockholders’ interests and represents the highest price reasonably attainable for the Company.

Our concerns in relation to the Cavalier transaction include whether:

• the price proposed to be paid actually reflects the fair value of the Company. We estimate that the proposed merger values Talk America at approximately 3x pro forma EBITDA (including synergies). By comparison, recent acquisitions in the CLEC space have been completed at 9-12x pro forma EBITDA;

• you ran a comprehensive sale process in which you contacted the full range of buyers that are likely to be interested in acquiring the Company and would be able to pay the best price, including granting them reasonably adequate time and access to information to formulate an offer;

• the Company was actively shopped before entering into the merger agreement; or, if not, that there were value-maximizing reasons not to do so, as well as why the merger agreement does not contain a so-called “go-shop” provision during which “go-shop” period only a substantially reduced break-up fee would be payable if a higher bid were to emerge;

• (1) you will be filing a Rule 13E-3 Transaction Statement in relation to the proposed merger and making all of the additional disclosures that are required in relation such a “go-private” transaction, including detailed disclosure of the projections on which Cavalier based its price, or (2) you have an adequate explanation as to why no such filing is required;

• the Board was incentivized to seek the highest possible price despite the lack of shareholder representation as noted above. In addition, we remain concerned that potential conflicts may exist in the form of: (1) the change of control and other payments and benefits that will accrue to the Company’s senior management by virtue of the transaction, and (2) the deal struck by Talk America’s CEO to become CEO of Cavalier at closing of the transaction, including the financial and equity incentives to be granted to him by Cavalier (and to any other members of the Company’s senior management or the Board); and

• a significant portion of the fees payable to Blackstone in exchange for its services are structured as “success” and/or “opinion” fees contingent on completion of the deal and delivery of its fairness opinion, particularly given our concerns about the deficiency of the proposed price.
We realize that Talk America has not yet filed a copy of its proxy statement which will include more details about the transaction. As such, we will reserve judgment on a number of issues (including the questions outlined above) until we get this additional information.

Should you wish to discuss any of these issues or the transaction generally, please feel free to give me a call.

Best regards,


Jonathan Starr
Managing Member"

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Icahn Seeks to Buy $113.4-$500M More Federated Department (FD) Shares

In a press release, Federated Department Stores, Inc. (NYSE: FD) said that it has been notified by investor Carl Icahn that he plans a filing under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act for clearance to acquire $113.4 million to $500 million of additional shares in Federated.

"We're glad Mr. Icahn sees value in our company and is increasing his investment," said Terry J. Lundgren, Federated's chairman, president and chief executive officer. "While our stock hit an all-time high four times in the past three weeks, we continue to see significant opportunity ahead as we maximize the Macy's and Bloomingdale's brands nationwide."

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Reports Ackman's Pershing Square Plans to Buy More Than $2B in McDonald's (MCD) Stock

According to reports from Bloomberg, McDonald's Corp. (NYSE: MCD) investor Bill Ackman's, through his Pershing Square Capital fund, plans to buy more than $2 billion of the stock and may wage a proxy fight to pressure the company to take various actions to raise the stock price.

Earlier in the month, McDonald's said it was notified that three investment funds managed by Pershing Square Capital Management L.P. or its affiliates planned to file on or about August 15, 2006 necessary notifications under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act to acquire in excess of $793.8 million of McDonald's common stock.

Last year, Bill Ackman pushed the company to spin off 65 percent of its company-owned restaurants in a stock offering. Ackman later backed off after the company said it would take a number of steps to improve value including a $1 billion buyback and licensing 1,500 restaurants. Ackman was also instrumental in getting Wendy's International (NYSE: WEN) to make aggressive changes, including spinning off its Tim Horton's (NYSE: THI) chain.

This morning, McDonald's boosted its dividend nearly 50% to an annual rate of $1 per share and said they expect to return at least $10 billion to shareholders through dividends and share repurchases in 2006 through 2008.

Shares of McDonald's are 1.3% higher to $39.56 in early action Wednesday, a new 52-week high.

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SuttonBrook Capital Makes Good In AnorMED (ANOR) Investment

In a 13D filing on AnorMED Inc. (Nasdaq: ANOR), SuttonBrook Capital disclosed a 6.36% stake (2.7 million shares) in the Company. This is up from the 450K stake the firm disclosed in a quarterly filing with regulators.

SuttonBrook said it paid a total of about $25 million for its shares, about $9.40 per share.

Yesterday, Millennium Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Nasdaq: MLNM) agreed to acquire AnorMED for $12 per share, which represented approximately a 21 percent premium over the closing price of AnorMED's shares on September 25, 2006.

Other small biotech companies SuttonBrook is making big bets in include: Neurocrine Biosciences Inc. (Nasdaq: NBIX), Ligand Pharmaceuticals Inc. (Nasdaq: LGND), Medicure Inc. (AMEX: MCU) and Threshold Pharmaceuticals Inc. (Nasdaq: THLD)

From the 'Purpose of Transaction' section of the filing:

"As part of the ongoing evaluation of this investment and investment alternatives, the Filing Persons and their affiliates may consider any or all of the following: (a) the acquisition by any person of additional securities of the Company, or the disposition of securities of the Company; (b) an extraordinary corporate transaction, such as a merger, reorganization or liquidation, involving the Company or any of its subsidiaries; (c) a sale or transfer of a material amount of assets of the Company or any of its subsidiaries; (d) any change in the present board of directors or management of the Company, including any plans or proposals to change the number or term of directors or to fill any existing vacancies on the board of directors; (e) any material change in the present capitalization or dividend policy of the Company; (f) any other material change in the Company's business or corporate structure; (g) changes in the Company's charter or bylaws or other actions which may impede theacquisition of control of the Company by any person; (h) causing a class of securities of the Company to be delisted from a national securities exchange or to cease to be authorized to be quoted in an inter-dealer quotation system of a registered national securities association; (i) causing a class of equity securities of the Company to become eligible for termination of registration pursuant to Section 12(g)(4) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; or (j) any action similar to any of thoseenumerated above.

In addition, from time to time, the Filing Persons and their affiliates may hold discussions with the Company, other stockholders of the Company, or potential acquirers of the Company regarding the matters described in subparagraphs (a) through (j) above."

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Parlux (PARL) Holder Glenn Nussdorf Says Perry Ellis License Sale Not in Best Interest

UPDATE: 3:21PM ET - Nussdorf amended the letter

In an amended 13D filing on Parlux Fragrances Inc. (Nasdaq: PARL), Glenn H. Nussdorf disclosed a 10.5% stake (1.9 million shares). On September 26, 2006, Mr. Nussdorf sent a letter to the Board of Directors of Parlux indicating his position that the proposed sale of the company's Perry Ellis license to Victory International (USA) LLC is not in the best interests of the comapny and is such a significant sale of assets that shareholder approval may be required.

Recently, Glenn Nussdorf was granted approval to purchases of more than fifteen percent (15%) of PARL's outstanding shares.

Glenn Nussdorf with his brother Stephen Nussdorf own 37% of E Com Ventures, Inc. (Nasdaq: ECMV) and together with their sister Arlene Nussdorf, control Model Reorg, Inc.

A Copy of the Letter:

Members of the Board of Directors
Parlux Fragrances, Inc.
3725 S.W. 30th Avenue
Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33312

Gentlemen:

Dear Board Members:

As you know, Lillian Ruth Nussdorf and I are major shareholders of Parlux Fragrances, Inc. (“Parlux” or the “Company”) holding, at present, approximately 10.5% of the outstanding shares of the Company. As indicated in our Schedule 13D filing, we may seek to influence or serve on the Board of Directors of the Company or designate nominees for election to the Board. In view of the fact that we are actively considering these actions in the foreseeable future, we strongly urge the Board to act in a fully informed and deliberate manner and not take any action that is inconsistent with the interests of the Company's stockholders.

In its Form 8-K filing and August 16th press release, the Company announced that it has “entered into a letter of intent to sell its Perry Ellis fragrance rights to Victory International (USA) LLC (“Victory”) for a total of up to $140 million: $120 million for the fragrance rights and up to $20 million for inventory”. In my view, this proposed transaction is contrary to the best interests of the Company and its stockholders for several reasons:

1. I have investigated the available information regarding Victory’s financial wherewithal to consummate a transaction of this nature and to perform its obligations thereunder. As described in the Company’s press release, this transaction would require Victory to pay $20 million at the outset and then make subsequent payments totaling $24 million per year (in $2 million monthly installments) for the next five years. Based on the financial information that Victory has made available to the industry through credit reporting agencies, its sales, profits and net worth do not appear to support such a payment obligation, even with the additional income generated from the sale of Perry Ellis fragrances. Moreover, there is no indication in the Company’s disclosures as to whether Victory has obtained the financing necessary to fund its obligations to the Company.

It is likely that this transaction would transfer a significant and valuable asset of the Company without adequate assurances that its value would be realized, potentially resulting in a tie-up of the Perry Ellis brand while the Company attempts to retrieve the brand from Victory in the event of a failure by Victory to perform its financial obligations to the Company. In this connection, since Victory does not appear to have the means to fund this obligation, it is likely that it will have to manufacture inordinately large quantities of the Perry Ellis line and sell these quantities into mass and discount markets, and possibly to other wholesalers domestically and internationally, in order to fund this obligation. Such overproduction and non-department and specialty store sales will erode the value of the brand and strain relationships with the licensor, thereby resulting in a much less valuable asset coming back to Parlux in the event that Victory fails to meet its payment obligations to Parlux.

2. It is highly unlikely that the licensor of the Perry Ellis trademark would give their consent to a transaction such as this, especially since the proposed sale is to a non-affiliate and it constitutes, in effect, the sale of the entire Perry Ellis fragrance brand. Moreover, even if consent were to be contemplated, it is likely the licensor would demand a significant price for it, which would reduce the economic value of this transaction to the Company.

3. The proposed transaction constitutes a sale of the Company’s principal asset, since sales of the Perry Ellis line over the past several fiscal years have ranged from 81% to 41% of the Company’s total sales. In view of the significant contribution to sales and profitability of the Perry Ellis asset, I believe that its sale might well require approval of the Company's stockholders under Delaware General Corporation Law Section 271, which requires that stockholders vote on and approve a sale of all or substantially all of a company's property and assets. In any event, in view of our stated intentions, as well as the views of other large stockholders with whom we have spoken, it is contrary to the best interests of the Company, and also contravenes principles of responsible management and good corporate governance, to proceed hastily with a transaction which could adversely impact stockholder value and expose the Company to a myriad of issues and problems.We have retained as special counsel the firm of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP to advise us in connection with our investment in the Company and our available options relating thereto. I again urge the Board to proceed prudently, deliberately and in accordance with law in considering the proposed transaction. If the Board or management take any action that is detrimental to the Company or inconsistent with the best of interests of stockholders, we intend to take all actions necessary to hold each director or executive officer accountable and personally liable.

In view of the urgency of this matter, we are available to meet with members of the Board immediately and would like to do so as soon as possible, wherever and whenever is most convenient for the members of the Board.

I look forward to hearing from you promptly.

Very truly yours,

Glenn H. Nussdorf

Tuesday, September 26, 2006

Nabi (NABI) Holder Third Point LLC Seeks Consent Solicitation To Remove Chairman McLain and Possibly Others

In an amended 13D filing on Nabi Biopharmaceuticals (Nasdaq: NABI), 9.5% holder Daniel Loeb's Third Point LLC said it intend to conduct shortly a consent solicitation in order to remove Chairman/CEO Mr. McLain and possibly one or more other directors from the Board of Directors. Loeb said the company refused to comment on whether it is moving toward a strategic alternatives process or whether some other decision was taken by the Board. The hedge fund has been encouraging the Company and its Board of Directors to explore strategic alternatives in order to maximize value for all shareholders.

From the 'Purpose of Transaction' section of the filing:

"Over a period of approximately seven months, the Reporting Persons have encouraged the Company and its Board of Directors to explore strategic alternatives in order to maximize value for all shareholders. The Reporting Persons have repeatedly expressed to the Company and the Board their belief and concern that the Company's "cash burn" rate is too high and its strategic plan is too risky for the Company to continue with "business as usual." Of particular concern to the Reporting Persons are that the Company does not appear to have been receptive to interest from prospective buyers of the Company or its component assets, and the possibilities that the Company may have to sell valuable assets at inadequate prices or enter into dilutive equity-linked financings in order to follow through on its business plan.

On September 14, 2006, in advance of a Board meeting scheduled for the following day, the Reporting Persons once again called upon the Board of Directors to expand its investment bankers' mandate to allow them to explore all ways to maximize the value of the Company's assets. Since that Board meeting, the Company has refused to comment on whether it is moving toward a strategic alternatives process or whether some other decision was taken by the Board.

As a result, the Reporting Persons intend to conduct shortly a consent solicitation in order to remove Mr. McLain and possibly one or more other directors from the Board of Directors. In conjunction with this solicitation, the Reporting Persons also intend to solicit consents in favor of a proposal requesting that one or more individuals named by the Reporting Persons be added to the Board to fill any vacancies created by the removal of directors.

Under the Delaware General Corporation Law (the "DGCL") and the Company's Certificate of Incorporation (the "Certificate"), the shareholders of the Company are entitled to act by written consent to remove directors of the Company. The written consent procedure to remove directors operates outside of annual or special meetings of shareholders and may be undertaken at any time. Although a provision of the Company's Bylaws (the "Bylaws") purports to limit the removal of Company directors to instances of "cause" and to require a 75%vote of the shareholders to effect such a removal, the Reporting Persons believe that this Bylaw provision is invalid and ineffective because it conflicts with the DGCL. Under the DGCL, except in cases not relevant to the Company and except where the right is limited in the Certificate (not the Bylaws), the Company's shareholders have a right to remove any or all Company directors, without cause, by the vote of the holders of a majority of the shares of Common Stock outstanding. The Certificate does not restrict this statutory right of the shareholders to remove directors of the Company by majority vote and without cause.

The Reporting Persons believe, however, that under the DGCL and the Bylaws, the remaining members of the Board of Directors, and not the shareholders, have the right to fill any vacancies created by the removal of directors. Accordingly, the Reporting Persons also intend to solicit consents, at the same time as consents are solicited for the removal of Mr. McLain and possibly one or more other directors, in favor of a resolution of the shareholders of the Company calling on the Board to fill the vacancies with individuals who will be named by the Reporting Persons at the time of the consent solicitation.

In connection with the consent solicitation, Third Point LLC and certain of its affiliates intend to file a consent statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC") to solicit stockholders of the Company with respect to the removal of Mr. McLain and possibly one or more other directors from the Board of Directors. THIRD POINT LLC STRONGLY ADVISES ALL STOCKHOLDERS OF THE COMPANY TO READ THE CONSENT STATEMENT WHEN IT BECOMES AVAILABLE BECAUSE IT WILL CONTAIN IMPORTANT INFORMATION, INCLUDING INFORMATION RELATING TO THE PARTICIPANTS IN ANY SUCH CONSENT SOLICITATION. SUCH CONSENT STATEMENT, WHEN FILED, AND ANY OTHER RELEVANT DOCUMENTS WILL BE AVAILABLE AT NOCHARGE ON THE SEC'S WEBSITE AT HTTP://WWW.SEC.GOV.

Highbridge Capital Raises Stake in Takeover Target Banta (BN) to 5%

In a 13D filing after the close yesterday on Banta Corp. (NYSE: BN), Highbridge Capital disclosed a 5% stake (1.2 million shares) in the company. This is up from the 30K share stake the hedge fund disclosed in a quarterly filing with regulators. Highbridge Capital said it may or may not engage in discussions with management of the Company and/or any potential acquirer of the Company concerning the business, operations and future plans of the Company.

Cenveo (NYSE: CVO) has been been trying to acquire Banta since August, and recently raised its offer to $47 per share. Banta said it will review the new offer, after turning away past offers.

Banta recently approved payment of a special cash dividend of $16.00 per share. The dividend is payable November 21, 2006, to shareholders of record on November 10, 2006.

From the 'Purpose of the Transaction' section of the filing:

"Depending on various factors including, without limitation, the terms of Cenveo, Inc.'s proposal to acquire the Company and any other offers or developments that may occur relating thereto, the Company's financial position and business strategy, the price levels of the shares of Common Stock, conditions in the securities markets and general economic and industry conditions, the Reporting Persons may in the future take such actions with respect to their investment in the Company as they deem appropriate including, without limitation, voting their shares of Common Stock to support or oppose the acquisition of the Company, tendering into an offer to purchase the Company's Common Stock, purchasing additional shares of Common Stock or any of the Company's debt or equity securities, selling or otherwise disposing of some or all of their shares of Common Stock or any of the Company's debt or equity securities, short selling or otherwise hedging some or all of their shares of Common Stock or any of the Company's debt or equity securities, in each case, in the open market or in privately negotiated transactions or otherwise, or changing their intention with respect to any and all matters referred to in this Item 4."

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Pardus Capital Raises Stake in Visteon (VC) to 14.1%, Recommends Person to Board

In an amended 13D filing with the SEC on Visteon Corporation (NYSE: VC), Pardus Capital disclosed a 14.1% stake (18 million shares) in the auto-parts maker.

Pardus Capital said it continues to engage in discussions from time to time with management, the Board of Directors, other shareholders of Visteon and other relevant parties concerning, among other things, the business, operations, board composition, management, strategy and future plans of the company.

In the context of these discussions, Pardus Capital said it has raised with Visteon the possibility of an individual suggested by them joining the board, and have been informed that the company has taken this matter under advisement.

This morning, Visteon said it does not expect to meet the financial guidance targets announced on Aug. 1, 2006. The company currently expects second half product sales to be about 10 percent lower than first half product sales of $5.7 billion. The company cited reductions to second-half customer production levels, changing vehicle mix, and other cost factors that will challenge the company's financial results for the remainder of 2006. The stock is 5% lower in pre-open action.

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Friday, September 22, 2006

Jana Partners Raises Stake in Titan International (TWI) to 22.8%

In an amended 13D filing on Titan International (NYSE: TWI), Jana Partners disclosed a 22.8% (4.5 million share) stake in the company. This is up from the 4.3 million share stake the firm disclosed in a quarterly regulatory filing.

Jana's saga with Titan started in October of 2005, when the company voiced opposition to the company's $18 per share merger deal with One Equity Partners LLC. Because of pressure from Jana, in April of 2006 Titan discontinued discussions regarding a potential acquisition of the company by One Equity Partners.

Titan International owns subsidiaries that supply wheels, tires and assemblies for off-highway equipment used in agricultural, earthmoving/construction and consumer applications. Shares of the stock closed at $17.25 on Friday.

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The Lion Fund Raises Stake in Friendly Ice Cream (FRN), Seeks Two Board Seats

In an amended 13D filing on Friendly Ice Cream Corp. (AMEX: FRN), The Lion Fund disclosed an 12% stake (950K shares) in the company, this is up from the 11.11% stake the firm disclosed in a recent filing (09/07).

The Lion Fund said it has consulted with the Chairman of the Board of Directors and management of the Company concerning the business, operations and future plans, and is seeking seats on the Board of Directors for Mr. Sardar Biglari and Dr. Philip L. Cooley.

Sardar Biglari is the portfolio manager of the Lion Fund and models his investment philosophy after Warren Buffett. Dr. Philip L. Cooley is the Prassel Distinguished Professor of Finance at Trinity University and sits of the Board of Directors of the Lion Fund. The fund's website is http://lionfundmanagement.com.

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Desert Rock Enterprises Discloses 7% Stake in Riviera Holdings (RIV)

In a 13D filing after the close Friday on Riviera Holdings Corp. (AMEX: RIV) Desert Rock Enterprises LLC and related parties disclosed a 7% stake (879K shares) in the Company.

The principal business of Desert Rock is that of a limited liability company, currently focusing on the acquisition and development of real estate.

The firm said it acquired the shares for investment purposes. The firm also said they may consider from time to time various strategic alternatives, which may include, among other things, (i) the acquisition of additional shares of Common Stock or other securities of the Issuer through open market purchases or otherwise, (ii) the sale of any number of shares of Common Stock or other securities of the Issuer through the open market or otherwise, (iii) extraordinary corporate transactions, (iv) a sale or transfer of a material amount of assets of the Issuer or any of its subsidiaries, or (v) any other of the matters described in clauses (a) through (j) of Item 4 of Schedule 13D.

Riviera Holdings recently terminated its consideration of the takeover proposal from International Gaming & Entertainment, LLC, saying the firm did not respond to its requests for information.

In August, International Gaming & Entertainment offered to acquire Riviera Holdings for $20 per share, topping a $17 offer from Riv Acquisition Holdings.

Shares of Riviera Holdings closed at $20.31 Friday.

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Harbinger Capital Enters Confidentiality Agreement with Applica (APN)

In a amended 13D filing Friday afternoon on Applica Incorporated (NYSE: APN), 40% holder Harbinger Capital said on September 21st they entered into a confidentiality agreement with the company.

Earlier in the month, Harbinger Capital sent a letter to Applica's Board proposing to acquire all outstanding shares of the Company not owned by Harbinger for $6 per share in cash. Harbinger believes its offer represents a superior proposal to Applica's current merger agreement with the Hamilton Beach/Proctor-Silex subsidiary of NACCO Industries, Inc. (NYSE: NC).

Shares of Applica closed at $5.55 per share on Friday.

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Another Large Lone Star (STAR) Holder Against Merger with Lone Star Funds

In a 13D filing on Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon Inc. (Nasdaq: STAR), Millenco, L.P. disclosed a 5% stake (1.07 million shares) in the company. In the filing, Millenco said it may decide to vote against the proposed merger with Lone Star Funds.

The investment firm said, "We believe that purchase price set forth in the Merger Agreement significantly undervalues the assets, including, but not limited to, the real estate assets, and the business, of the Issuer. In addition, we believe that the sales process conducted for the sale of the Issuer was flawed in numerous respects and helped contribute to the low purchase price."

On August 18th, Lone Star signed a definitive agreement to be acquired by affiliates of Lone Star Funds, a Dallas-based private equity firm, for $27.10 per share in cash.

Recently, other large Lone Star holders, Barington Capital and Deutsche Bank AG, said they are against the merger. Barington represents a group of investors that owns about 9.4% of the outstanding common stock of the Company and Deutsche Bank AG owns 9.8%.

Shares of Lone Star are currently trading at $27.40, slightly above the $27.10 offer price.

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Blum Capital Raises Stake in Kinetic Concepts (KCI) to 5.9%

In a 13D filing after the close yesterday on Kinetic Concepts, Inc. (NYSE: KCI), Blum Capital disclosed a 5.9% stake (4.26 million shares) in the company. This is up from the 2.7 million share stake the firm disclosed in a quarterly filing with regulators.

On August 31, 2006, Blum entered into a purchase plan with Merrill Lynch providing for the periodic acquisition of Common Stock up to an aggregate of 3,000,000 shares through January 3, 2007.

Blum reserved the right to engage in communications with one or more shareholders of the company, one or more officers and/or one or more members of the board of directors and/or one or more representatives of the company, regarding the company, including but not limited to its operations.

Nils Colin Lind, who is a Managing Partner of Blum, is a member of the Board of Directors of Kinetic Concepts.

In early August, Kinetic Concepts was delivered a blow after a jury found that a competitor's product didn't infringe Kinetic's wound-care system patents.

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CNBC's Faber Said Houston Exploration (THX) Weakness Due to Rumor Jana is Selling

CNBC commentator David Faber noted that yesterday's weakness in Houston Exploration Co. (NYSE: THX) (-9.85%) was due to rumors hedge fund Jana Partners has started selling its 14.8% stake in the company.

In June, the hedge fund sent a letter to Houston Exploration's Board proposing to purchase the Company for $62 per share. In response to the offer, Houston Exploration's board said the unsolicited offer from JANA Partners was not in the best interest of its shareholders.

On June 26, the Company announced that its Board of Directors has engaged Lehman Brothers Inc. to assist the Company in exploring a broad range of strategic alternatives.

In the most recent 13D filing, in late August, Jana noted that it raised its stake in Houston Exploration. So, if the rumors are true, this could indicate a complete reversal of Jana's view on the investment and the acquisition.

UPDATE: 9:52AM ET: Just 15 minutes after his original report, CNBC's David Faber is now saying that rumors that Jana Partners was selling its Houston Exploration Co. (NYSE: THX) stake are likely untrue. NOTE: Stock was down 6 points yesterday, currently up 2.5

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Thursday, September 21, 2006

Lenox Group (LNX) Holder Morgan Discloses 7% Stake, Dissatisfaction with Board

Shares of Lenox Group Inc. (NYSE: LNX) are higher today following an amended 13D filing from holder John Morgan and related parties. Morgan disclosed a 7% stake (989K shares) in the company and a letter the Company's Chairwoman and CEO Susan Engel. In the letter, Morgan said, "I now feel that the Board has decided to pursue a course of action that is not in the best interests of the shareholders and is a continuation of the strategies that have failed to create value over the past ten years."

Shares of Lenox Group are about 6% higher to $6.48 in mid-day action Thursday.

A Copy of the Letter:

September 20, 2006

Ms. Susan E. Engel

Chairwoman and Chief Executive Officer

The Lenox Group, Inc.

6436 City West Parkway

Eden Prairie, MN 55344

Dear Susan,

When your board offered me a directorship on September 18, 2006, we discussed the reasons that made it unacceptable. At that time, I reiterated that I could best serve the shareholders of Lenox Group by assuming a leadership role on the Board of Directors and playing an active role in formulating and guiding the strategic direction of the Company. Furthermore, I expressed my intention to not make changes in the management or Board of Directors. My views were based on information I had at that time.

The Board’s rejection of my offer to help the Company create a successful strategy has given me a different perspective. I now feel that the Board has decided to pursue a course of action that is not in the best interests of the shareholders and is a continuation of the strategies that have failed to create value over the past ten years.

The management team and Board of Directors continue to behave like the Company is a large, successful Company that has margin for making more mistakes. I do not agree. My offer to assist the Company in changing its strategy to benefit shareholders has been rejected although I proposed to work with the existing management and Board of Directors. You have made your position clear and I hope this letter will do the same for me and other likeminded shareholders.

Very truly yours,

John L. Morgan

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Danish Investor Jacobsen Enters Confidentiality Agreement with Pier 1 (PIR)

In an amended 13D filing Pier 1 Imports Inc. (NYSE: PIR) Jakup a Dul Jacobsen disclosed a 9.82% stake (8.6 million shares) in the company. On September 19, 2006, Lagerinn ehf and the company entered into a Confidentiality Agreement . Pursuant to the terms of the Confidentiality Agreement and in connection with Lagerinn's consideration of a possible negotiated transaction with the company, Pier 1 agreed to make available to Lagerinn certain Evaluation Material.

Lagerinn ehf, run by Danish investor Jakup a Dul Jacobsen, franchises home furnishings chain JYSK (yi-sk). JYSK has 1000 JYSK stores worldwide, including 25 in Canada.

In March of 2006, Pier 1 sold its England-based subsidiary The Pier Retail Group Limited to a wholly owned subsidiary of Lagerinn for approximately $15 million.

Jacobsen also owns stakes in other US retailers, including a 10% stake in Cost Plus (Nasdaq: CPWM) and a 13.6% stake in Linens N' Things (13.6%).

Wednesday, September 20, 2006

Amaranth Uses Natural Gas Blow Up to Put The Screws to Cinram

Sorry - another Amaranth story. This one is from an amended 13D filing on the Canadian income fund, Cinram International Income Fund (TSX: CRW.UN), which Amaranth holds a 15.3% stake in (8 million units).

It seems that even in its current state, Amaranth is not backing off its stance that Cinram should sell itself.

In a letter dated September 18th Amaranth said: "Earlier this morning the Amaranth investment fund group announced significant trading losses in its natural gas trading business. Shortly thereafter, the trust units of Cinram came under intense selling pressure. Given the absence of any fundamental news about Cinram, we believe this selling was due to market participants speculating about ACT's intentions with respect to its Cinram holdings.

It has been our view, which we understand is shared by the trustees and management of Cinram, that the public markets have failed to recognize the value of Cinram's business for quite some time. Given that the Cinram unit price has dropped 5% this morning without any fundamental news, we have come to the conclusion that this fact will persist for the foreseeable future.

We believe that the trustees can materially enhance unitholder value by concluding, as we have, that Cinram simply will not receive an appropriate valuation in the public markets. Therefore, we believe that the trustees of Cinram should immediately retain financial advisors to explore a sale of Cinram, including a going private transaction."

In a public response to the letter on Tuesday, Cinram Chairman, Henri Aboutboul, said "For the record, the Board has no intention of selling, or exploring the possibility of selling, the Fund or any of its operating subsidiaries or their respective businesses."

Goldman Sachs Hedge Partners Discloses Amaranth Related Losses

I know you've probably heard enough of Amaranth, but I thought this was interesting as it puts some numbers on the exposure of other firms:

In an SEC filing from Goldman Sachs Hedge Partners (NYSE: GS) the firm said, "Amaranth Advisors, an advisor to whom Goldman Sachs Hedge Fund Partners, LLC has indirectly allocated assets, has reported to the Company that it had suffered significant losses in energy-related investments, and that as a result anticipated year-to-date losses of Amaranth might be in excess of 35% of the value of the Company's indirect investment with Amaranth. Amaranth has not provided a current valuation of its net assets since such report and the Company has not verified such information. Further, the information with respect to Amaranth's losses is based on limited information and is dated. As of September 1, 2006, Amaranth accounted for approximately 1.73% of the Company's overall net assets through the Company's investment in Goldman Sachs Global Relative Value, LLC. The Company's return for September is expected to be adversely affected due to its indirect investment with Amaranth, although the overall return for the Company will also be impacted by fluctuations in the values of its other indirect investments with other advisors. Due to limited information at this time, however, the exact impact to the Company cannot be determined."

Icahn Asks Imclone Systems (IMCL) Chairman Kies to Step Down

In an amended 13D filing on Imclone Systems Inc. (Nasdaq: IMCL), Carl Icahn and related funds disclosed a 13.85% stake in the company (11.67 million shares). Icahn also disclosed a letter delivered to Chairman David Kies asking him to give up his position as Chairman of the Board.

Icahn said, "Now that I am becoming a director of ImClone, I am asking you again for the good of ImClone and its stockholders to give up your position as Chairman of the Board. Given what I consider the sorry record of the Company under your watch, it is time for you to step aside and allow someone else to be elected. You have even admitted to me that the board has done a bad job. ImClone has been without effective leadership for almost three years."

A copy of the letter:

September 20, 2006

David Kies, Chairman of the Board

ImClone Systems Incorporated

180 Varick Street

New York, NY 10014

Dear David:

When you offered me a directorship at ImClone in August, we discussed and Ithought you indicated that you would not continue to be the Chairman of theBoard of the Company. I also told you that it would be a mistake to give theInterim CEO a long term contract, given that he has little or no expertise inbiotech companies. I asked that you at least allow the new Board to make thisdecision. Nevertheless, without warning, ImClone entered into a multimilliondollar contract with the Interim CEO. You have also indicated that you will notbe willing to give up your chairmanship at today's meeting.

Now that I am becoming a director of ImClone, I am asking you again for the goodof ImClone and its stockholders to give up your position as Chairman of theBoard. Given what I consider the sorry record of the Company under your watch,it is time for you to step aside and allow someone else to be elected. You haveeven admitted to me that the board has done a bad job. ImClone has been withouteffective leadership for almost three years.

During your tenure, ImClone has suffered as a result of its inability to attainthe leadership position it should enjoy as an important biotechnology company.Most importantly, a great disservice has been done not only to stockholders,but, potentially, to cancer patients as well, by ImClone's apparent passivity inpushing to start appropriate trials in first-line colon cancer and otherindications.

During your tenure, I believe that commercialization has suffered, trials havenot been sufficiently pursued, the head and neck data was needlessly delayed,patent suits have been lost and the Company has not provided its stockholdersthe performance that they deserve. Rumors abound about employee dissatisfactionand probable defections.

During your tenure, ImClone hired a President and CEO who was totally the wrongperson for the position and it took you many many months to recognize this andreplace him. His replacement lasted only a few months. Now, ImClone has anotherinterim CEO and his permanent replacement is nowhere on the scene. To makematters worse, you even rewarded him with a favorable contract increasing hiscompensation and making it more expensive to replace him. This has all occurredduring the most critical period in the history of the Company in which itsability to exploit its lead in cancer treatment was being tested. Your regimehas failed the test.

During your tenure, ImClone's meaningful lead relative to potential competitorshas shrunk considerably and ImClone has suffered reversals such as the loss ofthe patent suit in the past week. I cannot believe that there were not a numberof opportunities to achieve a favorable settlement of the patent suit under yourleadership. Now the suit has been lost.

You should recognize that your leadership of ImClone should come to an immediateend. The time has come for you to peacefully pass the baton to a successor whowill be able to bring strong leadership back to ImClone. If you fail to do so,you will have thrown down the gauntlet and we will have to react accordingly.

Very truly yours,

Carl Icahn

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Tuesday, September 19, 2006

What Stocks Did Amaranth Own?

Now that the world knows about the blow-up at hedge fund Amaranth due to its foolish trade in natural gas, and word is spreading the fund may fold, do you know if they own any stocks in your portfolio?

Looking at the latest 13F filing some larger positions included: Boston Sci (NYSE: BSX), St Jude Medical (NYSE: STJ), Inverness Medical Innovations Inc. (AMEX: IMA), Charles River Laboratories (NYSE: CRL), Dade Behring Holdings Inc. (Nasdaq: DADE), FreightCar America Inc. (RAIL), Goldcorp Inc. (NYSE: GG), Hayes Lemmerz International Inc. (Nasdaq: HAYZ), ONEOK Inc. (NYSE: OKE), Patterson-UTI Energy Inc. (Nasdaq: PTEN), Silver Wheaton Corp. (AMEX: SLW), Sprint Nextel Corp. (NYSE: S), Star Maritime Acquisition Corp. (AMEX: SEA), Thoratec Corp. (Nasdaq: THOR), Ventana Medical Systems Inc. (Nasdaq: VMSI), Vitesse Semiconductor Corp. (Nasdaq: VTSS) and Yamana Gold Inc. (AMEX: AUY)

Here is a link to the most recent filing showing their positions.

Funny, but looking at their equity/debt holdings it looks like the firm was nicely hedged in many positions. Too bad they didn't do the same with the natural gas trade.

Noonday Raises Stake in Ligand Pharmaceuticals (LGND) to 8.8%

In an amended 13D filing after the close Monday on Ligand Pharmaceuticals Inc. (Nasdaq: LGND), Noonday Asset Management and related funds disclosed an 8.8% stake (7.3 million shares) in the Company. This is up from the 5.6% stake the firm disclosed in the original 13D filing in August. The firm disclosed a number of purchases from 08/11-09/13 at prices from $8.40 to $10.54.

In the hedge fund's original 13D filing, they said, consistent with their investment intent, they may engage in communications with one or more shareholders of the Company, one or more officers of the Company and/or one or more members of the board of directors of the Company regarding the Company, including but not limited to its operations.

Ligand discovers, develops and markets new drugs that address critical unmet medical needs of patients in the areas of cancer, pain, skin diseases, men's and women's hormone-related diseases, osteoporosis, metabolic disorders, and cardiovascular and inflammatory diseases.

Noonday manages discretionary capital for institutional investors and high net worth individuals, through its relationship with Farallon Capital Management, L.L.C. Farallon is one of the world's largest hedge funds.

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Watershed Asset Raises Stake in Carmike Cinemas (CKEC), Managing Member Nominated to Board

In an amended 13D filing on Carmike Cinemas Inc. (Nasdaq: CKEC) after the close Monday, Watershed Asset Management disclosed a 6.7% stake (853K shares) in the company. This is up from the 6.4% stake the firm disclosed in a quarterly filing with regulators.

The investment firm noted that the Company nominated a Managing Member of the firm, Kevin D. Katari, for election to the Board of Directors. If elected, Mr. Katari intends to serve on the Company's Board.

In the filing the firm also noted, as part of their ongoing review, they have sought and may continue to seek the advice of legal and financial advisors to assist them in such review and in evaluating alternatives that are or may become available with respect to the Company or their holdings in the Company. Also, consistent with their investment intent and in an effort to maximize shareholder value, the firm have had and may continue to have discussions with the Company's management and/or stockholders regarding alternatives for enhancing stockholder value. The firm may engage in communications with one or more shareholders of the Company, one or more officers of the Company, one or more members of the board of directors of the Company, potential investors in the Company and/or other persons regarding the Company, including but not limited to its operations.

Carmike Cinemas, Inc. is a premiere motion picture exhibitor in the United States with 297 theatres and 2,455 screens in 37 states, as of June 30, 2006. Carmike's focus for its theatre locations is small to mid-sized communities with populations of fewer than 100,000.

Watershed Asset Management is a San Francisco-based hedge fund, started in July 2002 by Meridee A Moore. According to its website, the firm's investment objective is to seek consistent, absolute returns by investing in situations that are undergoing change. Moore was previously a Managing Member of Farallon Capital Management LLC.

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Monday, September 18, 2006

Silver Lake Sells 2M Gartner (IT) Shares to ValueAct Capital

In an amended 13D filing on Gartner Inc. (NYSE: IT), Silver Lake Partners said on September 15th it entered into an agreement with ValueAct Capital Master Fund III, L.P. pursuant to which ValueAct agreed to purchase 2,000,000 shares of Common Stock from the Silver Lake Entities.

Prior to the sale to ValueAct, Silver Lake beneficially owned 25,615,128 shares of Gartner Common Stock. As a result of the sale to ValueAct, the Silver Lake Entities now own 23,615,128 shares of Common Stock, representing approximately 20.7% of the issued and outstanding shares of Common Stock.

Silver Lake has been selling pieces of its massive investment in Gartner for some time.

The purchase will boosts ValueAct Capital's stake in Gartner, which was last reported at 16.3% (18.6 million shares).

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Loeb Partners Discloses 6.7% Stake in Takeover Target Micro Linear (MLIN)

In a 13D filing on Micro Linear Corporation (Nasdaq: MLIN) Loeb Partners disclosed a 6.67% stake (867,300 share) in the company. Loeb's Arbitrage Fund held 697,740 of the shares.

In the filing, Loeb said it may engage in discussions with management or the Board of Directors concerning the business and future plans of the Company. Loeb also said it may in the future seek Board representations, make proposals to the Company concerning the capitalization of the Company, purchase additional Common Stock and other securities of the Issuer, sell some or all of its Common Stock, engage in short selling of or any hedging or similar transaction.

In August, Sirenza Microdevices, Inc. (Nasdaq: SMDI) signed a definitive agreement to acquire Micro Linear Corporation (Nasdaq: MLIN). Under the terms of the agreement, 0.365 of a Sirenza share will be issued for each Micro Linear share ($2.88 based on todays' SMDI price of $7.90). The acquisition is expected to close in the fourth quarter of 2006. Shares of Micro Linear are currently at $2.89.

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